954
Eip/His
29806-A

Processed at
The Preservation & conservation
Laboratory of
The Asiatic Society of Bombay
Date JULY-2009

Digitized with financial assistance from
NSDL
Technology, Trust & Reach
on 07 January, 2017

~~SS 9 1~~
954 Elp/His
29806A

SSg 1. II (473)

CONTENTS.

29806

		Page
1299.	His Failure and Death	40
1300.	Other Disturbances quelled	ib.
1303.	Capture of Chitor	42
1304.	1305. Unsuccessful Invasions of the Moguls	ib.
	Discontinuance of their Incursions	43
1306.	Expedition to the Deccan	ib.
	Story of the Princess Dewal Dévi	44
1309.	Failure of an Expedition to Telingana	46
1310.	Conquest of Carnatak	[illegible]
	Conquest of Maabar up to Cape Comorin	ib.
1311.	Massacre of Mogul Converts	48
1312.	Taking of Deogiri and Conquest of Maharashtra	ib.
	[illegible]	ib.
	[illegible]	49
	Recovery of [illegible] by the Rajputs	ib.
[illegible]	Death of Ala [illegible]	50
	His Character	ib.
	[illegible]	ib.
	[illegible]	53
	[illegible]	54
[illegible]	[illegible] and Ascendancy of a Hindu Party at [illegible]	ib.
1321.	Murder of [illegible] and Extirpation of his Family	55

CHAP. III. HOUSE OF TOGHLAK, SEIADS, AND HOUSE OF [illegible]

(1321 to 1325.)

HOUSE OF TOGHLAK — 1321 to 1412.

1321.	Glorious [illegible] Toghlak	56
1322.	Failure of an Expedition to Telingana	ib.
1323.	Conquest of Telingana, and Capture of Warangol, the Capital	57
1325.	Death of the King	ib.
	Mohammed Toghlak	58
	Character of Mohammed Toghlak	ib.
	Wild Schemes of Mohammed	60

A. D.		Page
1325.	Projected Conquest of Persia	60
	Attempt to conquer China	ib.
	Introduction of Paper Money	61
	Tyranny and Exactions of the King	ib.
1338.	Rebellions	62
1340.	Permanent revolt of Bengal and of the Coast of Coromandel	ib.
1344.	Restoration of the Hindú Kingdoms of Carnáta and Telingána	63
1345-6	Other Rebellions	ib.
	Rebellion of the Mogul Troops in Guzerát	64
1347.	General Revolt of the Deccan	[illegible]
	Vigour and Activity of the King	[illegible]
1351.	Death of Mohammed Tóghlak	[illegible]
	Removal of the Capital to Dengi and other Caprices of Mohammed	ib.
	Foreign Accounts of his Court and Government	[illegible]
	The Mahometan [illegible] Extent in this [illegible]	[illegible]
	Fírúz Tóghlak	[illegible]
1356.	Independence of Bengal and [illegible] recognised	[illegible]
	The King's Infirmities	[illegible]
1385.	Rivalries at his Court	ib.
1388.	His Death	[illegible]
	His Laws	[illegible]
	His public Works	[illegible]
	Gheiás u dín Tóghlak II.	[illegible]
1389.	Abubekr Tóghlak	[illegible]
1390.	Násir u dín Tóghlak	ib.
1394.	Mahmúd Tóghlak	[illegible]
	Dissolution of the Monarchy	[illegible]
1398.	Invasion of Tamerlane	[illegible]
	Defeat of the Indian Army	[illegible]
	Sack, Conflagration, and Massacre of Delhi	ib.
[illegible]99.	Tamerlane retires from India	78
	His Character	79
	Anarchy at Delhi	80

CHAP. II.

SHÁH JEHÁN, TILL 1657.

CHAP. II.

THE influence of Núr Jehán expired with her husband; and the fruit of all her long intrigues was lost in a moment. Her favourite, Shehriár, was absent, and Asof Khán, who was all along determined to support Sháh Jehán, immediately sent off a messenger to summon him from the Deckan. In the mean time, to sanction his own measures by the appearance of legal authority, he released Prince Dáwar, the son of Khusru, from prison, and proclaimed him king.* Núr Jehán, endeavouring to support the cause of Shehriár, was placed under a temporary restraint by her brother; and from that time, although she survived for many years, her name is never again mentioned in history.†

Asof Khán takes part with Sháh Jehán.

Imprisons the empress.

Asof Khán then continued his march to Láhór. Shehriár, who was already in that city, seized the royal treasure, bought over the troops, and, forming a coalition with two sons of his uncle, the late

Defeats Shehriár, who is put to death.

* Kháfi Khán.

† She died in A. D. 1646, A. H. 1055. She was treated with respect, and allowed a stipend of 250,000*l.* a year. She wore no colour but white after Jehángír's death, abstained from all entertainments, and appeared to devote her life to the memory of her husband: she was buried in a tomb she had herself erected close to that of Jehángír at Láhór. (*Kháfi Khán.*)

BOOK X.

Prince Dániál, marched out to oppose Asof Khán. The battle ended in his defeat: he fled into the citadel, was given up by his adherents, and he was afterwards put to death with the sons of Dániál, by orders from Sháh Jehán.*

Sháh Jehán arrives from the Deckan, and is proclaimed at Agra. A. D. 1628, Jan. 26.; A. H. 1037, Jamádi al ákhir 7.

The new emperor lost no time in obeying the summons of Asof Khán. He left the Deckan accompanied by Mohábat, and on his arrival at Agra caused his accession to be proclaimed, and took formal possession of the throne.†

The highest honours were conferred on Asof Khán and Mohábat, and great promotions and distributions of money were made to the friends and adherents of the emperor. Among his first acts were, to abolish the ceremony of prostration; to restore the Mahometan lunar year in ordinary correspondence; and to make some other slight changes favourable to the Mussulman religion.

When firmly established in his government, Sháh Jehán seems to have indemnified himself for his late fatigues and privations, by giving a loose to his passion for magnificent buildings and expensive entertainments. He erected palaces in his principal cities; and, on the first anniversary of his accession, he had a suite of tents prepared in Cashmír, which, if we are to believe his historian‡, it

* Kháfi Khán.

† Dáwar Shekó (also called Boláki), who had been set up for king by Asof Khán, found means to escape to Persia, where he was afterwards seen by the Holstein ambassadors in 1633. (Olearius, *Ambassadors' Travels*, p. 190.)

‡ Kháfi Khán.

took two months to pitch. He introduced new forms of lavish expenditure on that occasion; for, besides the usual ceremony of being weighed against precious substances, he had vessels filled with jewels waved round his head, or poured over his person (according to the superstition that such offerings would avert misfortunes); and all the wealth so devoted was immediately scattered among the bystanders, or given away in presents. The whole expense of the festival, including gifts of money, jewels, rich dresses and arms, elephants and horses, amounted, by the account of the same historian, to 1,600,000*l.* sterling.

Local disturbances.

He was disturbed in these enjoyments by an irruption of the Uzbeks into Cábul: they ravaged the country and besieged the capital, but retired on the approach of a light force, followed up by an army under Mohábat Khán. To this invasion succeeded the revolt of Narsing Deó, the murderer of Abul Fazl. He opposed a long resistance in Bundélcand, before he was brought to submit.*

Mohábat had only reached Sirhind on his way to Cábul, when the intelligence of the retreat of the Uzbeks was received. He was immediately recalled to the capital, and directed to prepare for a march into the Deckan.

History of Khán Jehán Lódi.

Khán Jehán Lódi was an Afghán of low birth, but with all the pride and unruliness of his nation in India. He had held great military charges in

* Kháfi Khán.

BOOK X.

the reign of Jehángír, and commanded in the Deckan under Parvíz at the time of that prince's death. Being left with undivided authority, he thought it for his advantage, perhaps for that of the state, to make peace with the son of Malik Amber, now at the head of the Nizám Sháhi government. He gave up what still remained to the Moguls of Sháh Jehán's conquests, and entered into a close intimacy with his late enemies.

When Sháh Jehán set out to assume the throne, he refused to join him, marched into Málwa, laid siege to Mándu, and seemed to be aiming at independence. He returned to obedience when Sháh Jehán's accession was secure; and it was thought prudent, at first, to confirm him in his government, and afterwards to be content with removing him to that of Málwa, while the Deckan was given to Mohábat Khán.

Having co-operated in the reduction of Rája Narsing Deó, he was invited to court, and treated with great attention; but, before he had been long there, he received intimations from some of his friends that the emperor harboured designs against him, and was only waiting an opportunity to find him off his guard. These suggestions, whether true or false, made an impression on his jealous nature. He refused to attend on the king, assembled his troops round the palace he inhabited, and stood prepared to defend himself against any attempt that might be made on him. Negotiations then took place, and were so successful that all

differences appeared to be removed, when some new circumstance excited Khán Jehán's distrust, and decided him to run all risks rather than remain within the power of men on whose faith he could not rely. One night, soon after dark, he assembled all his troops, placed his women in the centre on elephants, and marched openly out of Agra with his kettle-drums beating, at the head of 2000 veteran Afgháns, and accompanied by twelve of his own sons. He was pursued within two hours by a strong body of the royal troops, who overtook him at the river Chambal. He had scarcely time to send his family across the river, when he was obliged to cover their retreat by engaging the very superior force that was in pursuit of him. The severest part of the action was between the Afgháns and a body of Rájpúts, who dismounted and charged with pikes, according to their national custom. Rája Pírti Sing Ráhtór and Khán Jehán were engaged hand to hand, and separated with mutual wounds. After a long resistance, Khán Jehán plunged into the stream, and effected his passage with the loss of a few men drowned, besides those he had lost in the action. The royal troops did not, at first, venture to follow him; and when they had been joined by reinforcements, and were emboldened to renew the pursuit, Khán Jehán had got so much the start of them, that he was able to make his way through Bundélcand into the wild and woody country of Góndwána, from whence he

CHAP. II.

His flight from Agra.

BOOK X.

soon opened a communication with his old ally, the king of Ahmednagar.

His proceedings in the Deckan.

The affair now assumed so serious an aspect that Sháh Jehán thought it necessary to take the field in person, and moved into the Deckan at the head of a great armament.

The emperor marches against him.

A. D. 1629, October; A. H. 1039, Rabi ul awal.

He halted, himself, at Burhánpúr, and sent on three detachments, or rather armies*, into the hostile territory.

State of the Deckan.

The three Deckan monarchies had, at this time, recovered their ancient limits, and (except the fort of Ahmednagar, which still held out in disregard of Khán Jehán's cession) the Moguls were reduced to the eastern half of Cándésh and an adjoining portion of Berár. The greatest of the Deckan kingdoms was that of Ahmednagar, which was contiguous to the Mogul territory. Mortezza Nizám Sháh (the king set up by Malik Amber) was well inclined to act for himself on the death of that minister; but he would, perhaps, have remained a pageant, if the sons of Malik Amber had possessed talents equal to their father's. The fact was far otherwise; and Mortezza soon displaced and imprisoned Fatteh Khán, the eldest of them, and afterwards conducted the administration himself. He did so with so little ability, that his kingdom became a scene of faction, affording every advantage to his foreign enemies.†

Bijapur

Ibrahím A'dil Sháh of Bíjapúr, who died about

* The native historian estimates them at 50,000 men each.

† Grant Duff. Kháfi Khán.

CHAP. II.

the same time with Amber, had left his country in a much more prosperous condition to his son, Mohammed A'dil Sháh; and Abdullah Kutb Sháh of Golcónda, who was probably aggrandising himself at the expense of his Hindú neighbours in Télingána, took no part in the quarrels of the Mahometan kings.

By the time Sháh Jehán reached Burhánpúr, Khán Jehán had moved from Góndwána into the country under Ahmednagar. The Mogul armies, in consequence, marched into that territory, and were assisted by a simultaneous movement from the side of Guzerát. Khán Jehán, after some unavailing attempts by himself and his allies to make head against this disproportioned force, retired to the southward, and eluded the Mogul detachments by moving from place to place. At length A'zim Khán, the most active of Sháh Jehán's officers, by a succession of forced marches, succeeded in surprising him, took his baggage, and forced him to seek shelter by retiring among the hills and woods, where the whole of the enemy's force could not be brought to bear on him. He then kept retreating; sometimes checking his pursuers by defending favourable positions, and sometimes escaping from them by long and unexpected marches. In this manner he reached Bíjapúr. He expected to persuade the king to take his part; but he found Mohammed A'dil Sháh entirely disinclined to enter on such a contest, and was obliged once more to return to the territories of the king of Ahmed-

Khán Jehán driven out of Ahmednagar.

Pursued by A'zim Khán.

Fails in obtaining an asylum at Bíjapúr.

BOOK X.

nagar. Mortezza Nizám Sháh had himself been hard pressed during this interval, and two of the greatest of the Hindú chiefs under him had gone over to the enemy. He had still sufficient confidence to try the effect of a decisive battle. He assembled his army at Doulatábád, and took post in strong ground among the neighbouring passes: this advantage did not compensate for the superior numbers of his enemies; he was defeated, and obliged to seek protection in his forts and in desultory warfare. Meanwhile Khán Jehán, overwhelmed by the defeat of his allies, the destruction of their country, and the additional calamities of famine and pestilence with which it was now visited, determined to quit the scene, and to take refuge (as was supposed) with the Afgháns near Pésháwer, where all the north-eastern tribes were at that time up in arms. If such was his intention, he was unable to accomplish it: after passing the Nerbadda near the frontier of Guzerát, he crossed all Málwa towards Bundélcand, where he hoped to be able to revive the spirit of insurrection; but the rája of that country turned against him, and cut off his rear-guard under his long-tried and attached friend Deria Khán; and, being overtaken by the Moguls, he sent off his wounded, and made a stand with the remains of his force, now reduced to 400 Afgháns. His resistance, though long and desperate, was vain: his party was destroyed or dispersed, and he was obliged to fly with a few devoted adherents. He endeavoured to force his way into the hill fort

His ally, the king of Ahmednagar, defeated.

Khán Jehán flies from the Deckan.

CHAP. II.

of Cálinjer, was repulsed with the loss of his son, and was at last overtaken at a pool where he had stopped from exhaustion; and, after defending himself with his usual gallantry and receiving many wounds, was struck through with a pike by a Rájpút, and his head was sent as a most acceptable present to the Mogul emperor.*

Is cut off in Buudélcand.

A. D. 1630, A. H. 1040.

The war with Nizám Sháh was not concluded by the removal of its original cause. At this time a destructive famine desolated the Deckan. It began from a failure of the periodical rains in A. D. 1629, and was raised to a frightful pitch by a recurrence of the same misfortune in 1630. Thousands of people emigrated, and many perished before they reached more favoured provinces; vast numbers died at home; whole districts were depopulated; and some had not recovered at the end of forty years.† The famine was accompanied by a total failure of forage, and by the death of all the cattle; and the miseries of the people were completed by a pestilence such as is usually the consequence of the other calamities. In the midst of these horrors, A'zim Khán carried on his operations against Mortezza Nizám Sháh; and that prince, ascribing all his disasters to the misconduct of his minister, removed him from his office, and conferred it on Fatteh Khán, son of Malik Amber, whom he released from prison for the purpose.

Continuance of the war with Ahmednagar.

Famine and pestilence in the Deckan.

The prospect of the ruin of the Nizám Sháh,

The king of Bijapúr

* Grant Duff. Kháfi Khán. † Kháfi Khán.

BOOK X.

which now seemed at hand, alarmed Mohammed A'dil Sháh, who, though pleased, at first, with the humiliation of his hereditary enemy, was not insensible of the danger certain to result to himself from the entire subversion of the neighbouring monarchy. He therefore brought a seasonable relief to the weaker party, by declaring war with the Moguls. But his assistance came too late to preserve Mortezza Nizám Sháh from the consequences of his own imprudence: Fatteh Khán, more mindful of former injuries than recent favours, and ambitious of recovering the authority once possessed by his father, applied all the power which had been confided to him to the destruction of the donor; and, aided by the weakness and unpopularity of Mortezza himself, was soon strong enough to put that prince and his chief adherents to death, and to take the government into his own hands. At the same time, he sent to offer submission, and a large contribution to the Moguls, and placed an infant on the throne, with an open profession that he was to hold his dignity in subordination to Sháh Jehán.

joins the king of Ahmednagar.

Murder of the king of Ahmednagar by his minister, Fatteh Khán,

who submits to Sháh Jehán.

His terms were immediately accepted, and Sháh Jehán turned his whole force against Bíjapúr. Fatteh Khán, however, evaded the fulfilment of his promises, was again attacked by the Moguls, and once more joined his cause with that of A'dil Sháh. He was afterwards reconciled to the Moguls; and various similar changes took place in the

War with Bíjapúr continues.

Tergiversation of Fatteh Khán.

progress of the war, from his perfidious and shifting policy.

Siege of Bíjapúr.

During one of those vicissitudes, the king of Bíjapúr was borne down by the superior force of his enemies, and was constrained to take refuge in his capital, where he was besieged by a great army under the command of Asof Khán. In this desperate situation, he must have shared the fate of his former rival, if he had not found resources in his own abilities and address. While he used every exertion to defend his town, and to harass the assailants, he amused Asof Khán, and delayed his operations by a variety of well-contrived artifices: sometimes he entered on negotiations himself, and held out hopes of his immediately yielding to Sháh Jehán's demand, without the risk of further hostilities; at other times, he engaged Asof Khán in intrigues with chieftains who pretended to make bargains for their defection, and sometimes led him into disasters by feigned offers from individuals to desert their posts when attacked, or to admit his troops by night into parts of the fortifications intrusted to their charge. During all this time, disease and famine were playing their parts in the camp of Asof Khán; and he at last found himself under the necessity of raising the siege, and revenged himself by cruelly ravaging the unexhausted parts of the kingdom.*

Failure of the siege.

The emperor returns to Delhi.

It was about the time of this failure that Sháh

* Grant Duff. Kháfi Khán.

BOOK X.

Jehán returned to his capital, leaving Mohábat Khán in the supreme government of the Deckan.* The operations carried on under that general led, at length, to Fatteh Khán's being shut up in the fort of Doulatábád, where he defended himself, with occasional assistance from the king of Bíjapúr; and the fate of the Nizám Sháhi monarchy seemed to rest on the result of the struggle. It was decided by a general action, in which the combined force of the Deckanis was defeated in an attempt to raise the siege, and Fatteh Khán soon after surrendered and entered into the Mogul service, while the king whom he had set up was sent off a prisoner to Guáliór.†

A. D. 1632, March; A. H. 1041, Rámzán.

A. D. 1633, February; A. H. 1042.

Ill success of the operations in the Deckan.

The king of Bíjapúr, being now left alone, made overtures of negotiation, which were not favourably received. He then continued to defend himself; and all the efforts of Mohábat Khán were ineffectual to subdue him. An important point of the war was the siege of Perinda, on his failure in which, Mohábat Khán was obliged to fall back on Burhánpúr and desist from aggressive operations.‡ He had before been put under the nominal command of the emperor's second son, Shújá, who was a boy; and he was now recalled to court, and the Deckan was divided into two commands, under Kháni Dourán and Kháni Zemán.

A. D. 1634.

These officers were less successful than their

* Kháfi Khán. † Grant Duff.

‡ Grant Duff. There is a considerable difference between his dates and those of Kháfi Khán at this period.

CHAP. II.

predecessor. Mohammed A'dil Sháh continued to hold out, and the Nizám Sháh monarchy, which seemed to have come to an end on the surrender of Fatteh Khán, was revived by a chief whose family were afterwards to act an important part as the founders of the Maratta nation. This was Sháhjí Bosla, who had risen to considerable rank in the time of Malik Amber, and had distinguished himself as a partisan during the late wars. After the fall of Doulatábád, he drew off to the rugged country in the west of the Deckan; and, some time after, was so strong as to set up a new pretender to the throne of Ahmednagar; and, in time, to get possession of all the districts of that kingdom from the sea to the capital. *

Sháhjí Bosla attempts to restore the king of Ahmednagar.

The Deckan, therefore, was as far as ever from being subdued; and Sháh Jehán perceived the necessity of returning in person to that country, to make another effort to reduce it.

He marched from Agra towards the end of 1635†, and, on arriving in the Deckan, he adopted his former plan of breaking his army into divisions, and sent them, in the first instance, to recover the kingdom of Ahmednagar. When they had driven Sháhjí from the open country, and reduced many of his principal forts, Sháh Jehán turned his whole force on Bíjapúr, took several strong places, and constrained Mohammed A'dil Sháh once more to shut himself up in his capital. The talents which

The emperor returns to the Deckan.

A. D. 1635, November; A. H. 1045, Jamádi ul awal.

Failure of another attempt on Bíjapúr.

* Grant Duff. Kháfi Khán. † Kháfi Khán.

BOOK X.

had delivered him during the former siege did not desert him on this occasion. He laid waste the country for twenty miles round Bíjapúr, destroying every particle of food or forage; filled up the wells, drained off the reservoirs, and rendered it impossible for any army to support itself during an attack on the city.

The Moguls were therefore reduced to the plunder of his territories, and met with frequent losses from the spirit and activity of his detachments. Both parties, ere long, were wearied with this sort of warfare; and, A'dil Sháh making the first overture, peace was concluded, on terms much more favourable than he could have expected. He consented to an annual payment of 200,000*l.* a year to Sháh Jehán; but he was to receive, in return, a share of the Nizám Sháhi dominions, which much extended his territory on the north and east.

Peace with Bíjapúr. A. D. 1636, A. H. 1046.

Sháhjí held out for some time longer: at length he also submitted, gave up his pretended king, and entered into the service of the king of Bíjapúr with the consent of Sháh Jehán.

Submission of Sháhjí Bosla.

At an early period of this invasion, Sháh Jehán had overawed the king of Golcónda, and had forced him to desist from reciting the name of the king of Persia in the public prayers, and to agree to pay a regular tribute.*

The emperor exacts a tribute from Golcónda.

These transactions being concluded, Sháh Jehán returned to his capital, and the kingdom of Ahmednagar was at length extinguished for ever.

Returns to Delhi. A. D. 1637, A. H. 1046.

* Grant Duff. Khafi Khán.

While Sháh Jehán's attention was [illegible] engaged with the Deckan, some events of less moment were taking place in other quarters. The Portuguese fort of Húgli, not far from Calcutta, was taken, after a siege, by the governor of Bengal (1631.) There were revolts of the Bundélas, in the first of which the son of Narsing Deó was killed. One portion of the troops on the eastern frontier completed the settlement of Little Tibet (1634 and 1636); another was defeated and almost destroyed in an attempt to conquer Srínagar (1634); and a third, which invaded the petty state of Cúch Behár from Bengal, was compelled, by the unhealthiness of the climate, to relinquish the country after they were in possession (1637).

Local disturbances and successes in Hindostan.

The most important occurrence of these times was the acquisition of Candahár, the governor of which, Ali Merdán Khán, found himself exposed to so much danger from the tyranny of his sovereign, the king of Persia, that he gave up the place to Sháh Jehán, and himself took refuge at Delhi. He was received with great honour, and was afterwards, at different times, made governor of Cashmír and Cábul, and employed on various wars and other duties. He excited universal admiration at the court by the skill and judgment of his public works, of which the canal which bears his name at Delhi still affords a proof, and by the taste and elegance he displayed on all occasions of show and festivity.

Recovery of [illegible] hár. Ali [illegible] Khán.

A. H. [illegible] A. H. 1047.

His military talents were first tried in an invasion

Invasion of Balkh.

nd Badakhshán. Those provinces had [illegible] in the hands of the Uzbeks since they were lost by Mírza Sólimán, and were now held by Nazar Mohammed, the younger brother of Imám Kúli, sovereign of all the territory beyond the Oxus, from the Caspian Sea to Mount Imaus.

The revolt of Nazar Mohammed's son, Abdul Azíz, encouraged by his powerful uncle, tempted Sháh Jehán, who had enjoyed several years of repose, to assert the dormant rights of his family: A. D. 1644, A. H. 1054. Ali Merdán penetrated the range of Hindú Cush and ravaged Badakhshán; but the advance of the winter, and the fear of being cut off from the southern countries, compelled him to retreat without having gained any solid advantage. Next year, the enterprise was attempted by Rája Jagat Sing*, whose chief strength lay in a body of 14,000 Rájpúts, raised in his own country, but paid by the emperor.

The spirit of the Rájpúts never shone more brilliantly than in this unusual duty: they stormed mountain passes, made forced marches over snow, constructed redoubts by their own labour, the rája himself taking an axe like the rest, and bore up against the tempests of that frozen region as firmly as against the fierce and repeated attacks of the Uzbeks.

But, with all these exertions, the enterprise now appeared so arduous that Sháh Jehán himself re-

* Probably the rája of Cóta.

CHAP. II.

solved to move to Cábul, and to send on his son, Prince Morád, under the guidance of Ali Merdán Khán, with a large army, into Balkh.* This expedition was completely successful: Morád was joined by some of Nazar Mohammed's sons, and afterwards received the submission of that chief; but, just as he had taken possession of the capital, a new rupture took place (with some suspicion of bad faith on the part of the Moguls). Nazar Mohammed, now divested of his defensible places, was obliged to fly to Persia; and his dominions were annexed, by proclamation, to those of Sháh Jehán. But this conquest was not long left undisturbed: Abdul Azíz collected a force beyond the Oxus, and sent numerous bands of plunderers to lay waste the newly conquered territory. Sháh Jehán had, by this time, returned to Delhi; and Morád, tired of the service, and impatient of the control of Ali Merdán, had left his province without leave, and was sent away from court in disgrace. The charge of restoring order was therefore imposed on Prince Aurangzíb, while the king himself again repaired to Cábul to support him. Aurangzíb at first obtained a great victory over the Uzbeks; its effects, however, were by no means decisive, for Abdul Azíz crossed the Oxus in person, and so harassed the Moguls, that Aurangzíb, after some partial successes, was obliged to seek protection from the walls of Balkh itself.

A. D. 1645, A. H. 1055. Sháh Jehán moves to Cábul. Balkh reduced by Prince Morád and Ali Merdán Khán.

A. D. 1646, July; A. H. 1056, Jamádi al ákhir. Overrun by the Uzbeks from beyond the Oxus.

Aurangzíb sent against them.

A. D. 1647, A. H. 1057.

Is besieged in Balkh.

* Kháfi Khán says 50,000 cavalry and 10,000 foot.

BOOK X.

Shâh Jehán abandons his conquest.

About this time, Nazar Mohammed, having failed to obtain aid in Persia, threw himself on the clemency of Shâh Jehán; and the latter prince, perceiving how little his prospects were advanced by such an expenditure of blood and treasure, came to the prudent resolution of withdrawing from the contest: and that he might do so with the less humiliation, he transferred his rights to Nazar Mohammed, then a suppliant at his court. Aurangzíb was accordingly directed to make over the places that remained in his possession; and he began his retreat from Balkh under continual attacks from the Uzbeks of Abdul Azíz's party. When he reached the passes of Hindú Cush, the persecution was taken up, for the sake of plunder, by the mountaineers of the Hazáreh tribes, and, to complete his misfortunes, the winter set in with violence; and though the prince himself reached Cábul with a light detachment, yet the main body of his army was intercepted by the snow, and suffered so much, in this helpless condition, from the unremitting assaults of the Hazárehs, that they were glad to escape in separate bodies with the loss of all their baggage and almost all their horses.

Disastrous retreat of Aurangzíb.

About the end of A. D. 1647, A. H. 1057. Candahár retaken by the Persians.

The tranquillity purchased by the relinquishment of Balkh was first disturbed by an attack on Candahár by the Persians. During the weak and tyrannical reign of Shâh Safi, and the minority of his son, Shâh Abbás II., the Moguls had been

* Khâfi Khán.

CHAP. II.

allowed to enjoy the fruits of Ali Merdán's desertion unmolested; but as Abbás advanced towards manhood, his ministers induced him to assert the dignity of his monarchy by restoring it to its ancient limits. He assembled a large army, and marched against Candahár. He showed much judgment in beginning the siege in winter, when the communication between India and Cábul was cut off by the snow, while his own operations went on unobstructed in the mild climate of Candahár. The consequence was, that, although Aurangzíb and the vizír, Saád Ullah Khán, were ordered off in all haste from the Panjáb, and although they made their way with great exertions through the mountains, they arrived too late to save Candahár, which had been taken after a siege of two months and a half. The exhausted condition of the army after their winter march compelled Aurangzíb and Saád Ullah to halt and refit at Cábul; while the king of Persia withdrew to Herát, leaving a strong garrison in Candahár.*

A. D. 1648, A. H. 1058.

The Indian army came before that city in May, 1649. They immediately opened their batteries, and the contest was actively conducted on both sides, with springing of mines, assaults by the besiegers, and sallies by the garrison. These operations were not interrupted by the approach of an army sent by Sháh Abbás to raise the seige. Aurangzíb was contented with sending a detachment

Aurangzíb sent to recover it.

A. H. 1059, Jamádi al awal.

* Kháfi Khan.

BOOK X.

to oppose the attack, and remained, himself, in his lines before the city. The force he had employed was sufficient to repel the Persians, but it could not prevent their destroying the forage and cutting off the supplies of the besiegers; and as the governor defended his town with as much skill as obstinacy, Aurangzíb was at length constrained to raise the siege, and commence his retreat to Cábul above four months after he had opened his batteries.* Sháh Jehán, who had followed Aurangzíb to Cábul, marched from that city before the prince's return, and was not overtaken by him until he had reached Láhór.

A. D. 1649, about Sept.; A. H. 1059. Ramazán. Fails in the siege of Candahár.

The next year passed in inaction, to which the king's usual visit to Cashmír forms no exception. The time he spent in that delicious retirement was devoted to feasts and dances, to gardens, excursions by land and water, and other pleasures congenial to the climate and scenery.

Second attempt on Candahár under Aurangzíb.

In the year next succeeding, Aurangzíb and the vizír, Saád Ullah, were again dispatched to Candahár, with a numerous and well-equipped army and ample provision of tools and workmen to conduct all the operations of a siege.†

A. D. 1652, A. H. 1061.

These great preparations were as unavailing as before; and Aurangzíb, after exhausting every resource supplied by the skill and courage of Saád

* Kháfi Khán.

† It is worthy of remark, that, with so great a force assembled on purpose for a siege, there were only eight battering guns, and twenty smaller pieces of ordnance.

Ullah and the bravery of the Rájpúts, was compelled to return to Cábul, and was sent to be viceroy of the Deckan.

Its failure.

Sháh Jehán was not discouraged by his repeated failures, and next year prepared for a still greater effort than had yet been put forth.

Great expedition under Prince Dárá Shekó.

His eldest son, Dárá Shekó, though treated as superior in station to the rest, was kept at court, and looked with envy on the opportunities of distinction enjoyed by his brothers, especially Aurangzíb, of whom he seems to have entertained a sort of instinctive jealousy. Urged by these feelings, he entreated Sháh Jehán to allow him to try his skill and fortune at the siege of Candahár, and was put at the head of an army much exceeding that formerly employed. It assembled at Láhór in the winter of 1652, and commenced its march in the spring of the next year, Sháh Jehán himself following as usual to Cábul.

A. D. 1653, A. H. 1063.

Siege of Candahár.

Dárá opened his trenches, as Aurangzíb had done before him, on a day and hour fixed by the astrologers, and ordered by the emperor before the army set out on its march. He began the siege on a scale proportioned to his armament. He mounted a battery of ten guns on a high and solid mound of earth, raised for the purpose of enabling him to command the town; and he pushed his operations with his characteristic impetuosity, increased, in this instance, by rivalry with his brother. He assembled his chiefs, and besought them to support his honour, declaring

BOOK X.

his intention never to quit the place till it was taken; he urged on the mines, directed the approaches, and, the beseiged having brought their guns to bear on his own tent, he maintained his position until their fire could be silenced by that of his artillery. But, after the failure of several attempts to storm, and the disappointment of near prospects of success, his mind appears to have given way to the dread of defeat and humiliation; he entreated his officers not to reduce him to a level with the twice-beaten Aurangzíb; and he had recourse to magicians and other impostors, who promised to put him in possession of the place by supernatural means. Such expedients portended an unfavourable issue; and accordingly, after a last desperate assault, which commenced before day-break, and in which his troops had at one time gained the summit of the rampart, he was compelled to renounce all hope, and to raise the siege, after having lost the flower of his army in the prosecution of it. He was harassed on his retreat both by the Persians and Afgháns; and it was not without additional losses that he made his way to Cábul, whence he pursued his march to Láhór.

A. D. 1653, September; A. H. 1063, Shawál 9.

Failure and retreat of Dárá Shekó.

A. D. 1653, November; A. H. 1064, Moharram.

Thus terminated the last attempt of the Moguls to recover Candahár, of which they had held but a precarious possession from the first conquest of it by Báber.

End of A. D. 1653 to 1655, A. H. 1064 and 1065.

It was followed by nearly two years of undisturbed tranquillity. During that time Sháh Jehán, having completed a revenue survey of his posses-

sions in the Deckan, which is said to have occupied him for nearly twenty years*, gave orders for the adoption of the system of assessment and collection introduced by Tódar Mal.†

Death of the vizír, Saád Ullah Khán.

The same period is marked by the death of the vizír, Saád Ullah Khán, the most able and upright minister that ever appeared in India. He makes a conspicuous figure in all the transactions of Sháh Jehán, and is constantly referred to as a model in the correspondence of Aurangzíb during the long reign of that monarch. Kháfi Khán says that his descendants, in *his* time, were still distinguished for their virtues and intelligence, near a century after the death of their ancestor; and contrasts the respectability of their conduct with the effeminacy and frivolity of the other nobles of that æra.

Renewal of the war in the Deckan under Aurangzíb.

The next year was destined to put an end to this state of repose, and to light up a conflagration which was never effectually suppressed, and was not extinguished until it had consumed the empire.

Since the last pacification, Abdullah Kutb Sháh had paid his tribute regularly, and had shown a desire to secure the favour of Sháh Jehán, who, but for a particular concurrence of circumstances, would probably never have wished to molest him.

Intrigues of Aurangzíb at Golcónda. Mír Jumla.

The prime minister of Abdullah was a person named Mír Jumla. He had formerly been a diamond merchant, and had been known and respected throughout the Deckan for his wealth and abilities

* Grant Duff's "History of the Marattas," vol. i. p. 126.

† Kháfi Khán.

BOOK X.

long before he attained his present high station. His son, Mohammed Amín, a dissolute and violent young man, had drawn on himself the resentment of Abdullah Kutb Sháh, and had involved his father in a dispute with the court. Mír Jumla was absent in command of an army in the eastern part of the kingdom of Golcónda; and, finding himself unable to obtain such concessions as he desired from his own sovereign, determined to throw himself on the protection of the Mogul. He applied to Aurangzíb, to whom, as well as to the emperor, he was already known. Such an opportunity of interference afforded an irresistible temptation to a man of Aurangzíb's intriguing disposition, and he strongly recommended the case of Mír Jumla to his father's favour. Sháh Jehán, influenced by this advice, dispatched a haughty mandate to Abdullah Sháh to redress the complaints of his minister; but Abdullah was further irritated by this encroachment on his independence, and committed Amín to prison, while he sequestrated the property of Mír Jumla. Sháh Jehán, now provoked in his turn, sent orders to his son to carry his demands into effect by force of arms; and Aurangzíb, who had been waiting impatiently for this result, entered with alacrity on the duty, and executed it in a manner entirely suitable to his wily nature.

Treacherous attack on Heiderábád by Aurangzíb.

Without any further manifestation of hostility, he sent out a chosen force, under pretence of escorting his son, Sultán Mohammed, to Bengal, for the purpose of celebrating his nuptials with the

CHAP. II.

daughter of his own brother, Prince Shujá, who was viceroy of that province. The road from Aurangábád to Bengal made a circuit by Masulipatam, so as to avoid the forests of Góndwána, and thus naturally brought the prince within a short distance of Heiderábád, the capital of Golcónda. Abdullah Sháh was preparing an entertainment for his reception, when he suddenly advanced as an enemy, and took the king so completely by surprise that he had only time to fly to the hill fort of Golcónda, six or eight miles from the city; while Heiderábád fell into the hands of the Moguls, and was plundered and half burned before the troops could be brought into order. Aurangzíb had, before this, found a pretence for assembling an army on the nearest point of his province; and being joined by fresh troops from Málwa, he had ample means of sending on reinforcements to Golcónda. Mír Jumla also in time drew near, and was ready to turn his master's arms against himself. Abdullah Sháh, on his first flight to the hill fort, had released Mohammed Amín, and given up the sequestrated property; and he did all in his power to negotiate a reasonable accommodation; while at the same time he spared no effort to procure aid from Bíjapúr: no aid came, and the Moguls were inexorable; and, after several attempts to raise the siege by force, he was at last under the necessity of accepting the severe terms imposed on him; to agree to give his daughter in marriage to Sultán Mohammed, with a

A. D. 1656, January; A. H. 1066, Rabi al awal.

BOOK X.

Submission of the king of Golcónda.

dowry in territory and money; to pay a crore of rupees (1,000,000*l.* sterling) as the first instalment of a yearly tribute; and promise to make up the arrears of past payments within two years.

Sháh Jehán would have been content with easier terms, and did in fact make a great remission in the pecuniary part of those agreed on; but the rest were executed, and the Mogul prince returned to Aurangábád. Mír Jumla remained in the Mogul service, became the chosen counsellor of Aurangzíb, and was afterwards one of the most useful instruments of his ambitious designs.

A. D. 1656, May; A. H. 1066

Unprovoked war with Bíjapúr.

Aurangzíb had scarcely reaped the fruits of his success in Golcónda before an opportunity was afforded him of gaining similar advantages over the neighbouring kingdom. The peace with Bíjapúr had remained unbroken since the last treaty. Mohammed A'dil Sháh had successfully cultivated the friendship of Sháh Jehán, but had excited the personal enmity of Aurangzíb by a close connection with Dárá Shekó. On his death, which took place in November, 1656 *, he was succeeded by his son, Ali, a youth of nineteen; and Sháh Jehán was tempted, by the persuasion of his younger son, to deny that the minor was the real issue of the late king, and to assert his own right to decide on the succession to his tributary. Though the force of the kingdom of Bíjapúr was still undiminished, it was in no state of preparation for

* Grant Duff. It corresponds to Moharram 1067.

war; and a large portion of its army was employed at a distance in wars with the Hindú petty princes of Carnáta. Aurangzíb, therefore, met with little difficulty in his invasion of the territory; and a fortunate accident having thrown the strong frontier fort of Bidr into his hands, he advanced without further obstruction to the capital.* The suddenness of the attack had prevented the mode of defence by destroying the country, so successfully practised on former occasions. No resource, therefore, was left to the new king, but to sue for peace on the most unfavourable terms. Even those were peremptorily rejected by Aurangzíb; and he would probably ere long have obtained possession both of the capital and the county, if he had not been called off by a matter that touched him more nearly than the conquest of any foreign kingdom.

A. D. 1657, March; A. H. 1067.

* Grant Duff.

CHAP. III.

FROM 1657 TO THE DEPOSAL OF SHÁH JEHÁN.

BOOK X.

Dangerous illness of the emperor.

THE emperor had been seized with an illness of so serious a nature, that it not only threatened an immediate transfer of the crown to Dárá Shekó, but invested him at the moment with the administration of his father's government. This state of affairs, involving all Aurangzíb's prospects of aggrandizement and even of safety, turned his exertions towards the seat of the monarchy, and for a long time withdrew his attention from the affairs of the Deckan.

Characters and pretensions of his sons.

Dárá Shekó.

Sháh Jehán had four sons, all of an age to render them impatient of a subordinate station. Dárá Shekó was in his forty-second year; Shujá was forty; and Aurangzíb thirty-eight. Even Morád, the youngest, had long been employed in great commands.* Dárá Shekó was a frank and high-spirited prince, dignified in his manners, generous in his expense, liberal in his opinions, open in his enmities; but impetuous, impatient of opposition, and despising the ordinary rules of prudence as signs of weakness and artifice. His overbearing temper made him many enemies; while his habitual indiscretion lessened the number as well as the con-

* Gladwin's History of Jehángír.

Shujá. Aurangzíb.

fidence of his adherents. Shujá was not destitute of abilities, but given up to wine and pleasure. Aurangzíb was a perfect contrast to Dárá Shekó. He was a man of a mild temper and a cold heart; cautious, artful, designing; a perfect master of dissimulation; acute and sagacious, though not extended in his views; and ever on the watch to gain friends and to propitiate enemies. To these less brilliant qualities he joined great courage, and skill in military exercises; a handsome, though not athletic, form; affable and gracious manners; and lively agreeable conversation. He was so great a dissembler in other matters, that he has been supposed a hypocrite in religion. But, although religion was a great instrument of his policy, he was, beyond doubt, a sincere and bigoted Mussulman. He had been brought up by men of known sanctity, and had himself shown an early turn for devotion: he at one time professed an intention of renouncing the world, and taking the habit of a fakír; and throughout his whole life he evinced a real attachment to his faith in many things indifferent to his interest, and some most seriously opposed to it. His zeal was shown in prayers and reading the Korán, in pious discourses, in abstemiousness (which he affected to carry so far as to subsist on the earnings of his manual labour), in humility of deportment, patience under provocation, and resignation in misfortunes; but, above all, in constant and earnest endeavours to promote his own faith and to discourage idolatry and in-

BOOK X.

fidelity. But neither religion nor morality stood for a moment in his way when they interfered with his ambition; and, though full of scruples at other times, he would stick at no crime that was requisite for the gratification of that passion.

His political use of religion arose from a correct view of the feelings of the time. Akber's innovations had shocked most Mahometans, who, besides the usual dislike of the vulgar to toleration, felt that a direct attack was made on their own faith. Jehángír's restoration of the old ritual was too cold to give full satisfaction; and though Sháh Jehán was a more zealous Mussulman, Dárá openly professed the tenets of Akber, and had written a book to reconcile the Hindú and Mahometan doctrines. No topic, therefore, could be selected more likely to make that prince unpopular than his infidelity, and in no light could the really religious Aurangzíb be so favourably opposed to him as in that of the champion of Islám. In this character he had also an advantage over Shujá, who was looked on with aversion by the orthodox Mahometans from his attachment to the Persian sect of the Shías.

Morád.

Morád was brave and generous, but dull in intellect, and vulgar in his pursuits. He was abundantly presumptuous and self-willed; but his object never was more exalted than the indulgence of his humours, and the enjoyment of sensual pleasures.*

* The characters of the princes are taken from Bernier, modified by the facts in Kháfi Khán, and by some passages in Aurangzíb's letters. The following is given by that monarch

Sháh Jehán had, by the same mother as his sons*, two daughters. To the eldest, Pádsháh Bégam, he was devotedly attached. She was endowed with beauty and talents, and was a great support to the interest of Dárá Shekó. Roushanárá, the second daughter, had fewer personal attractions and less influence; but her talent for intrigue, and her knowledge of the secrets of the harem, enabled her to be of the greatest assistance to her favourite brother, Aurangzíb.

Daughters of Sháh Jehán.

It was from this princess that Aurangzíb obtained the intelligence on which he now acted. Though Sháh Jehán had only attained his sixty-seventh year, the habits of indolence and pleasure in which he had indulged seem to have latterly diminished his attention to business, and allowed a greater share of influence to Dárá Shekó, on whom, as heir apparent, he devolved such of his duties as he did not himself perform. Things were in this state when the emperor was seized with a sudden

Dárá administers the government under the emperor.

---

as Sháh Jehán's opinion of his four sons. Dárá (he said) had talents for command, and the dignity becoming the royal office, but was intolerant of all who had any pretensions to eminence; whence he was "bad to the good, and good to the bad." Shujá was a mere drunkard; and Morád, a glutton and a sensualist. Aurangzíb excelled both in action and counsel, was well fitted to undertake the burden of public affairs, but full of subtle suspicions, and never likely to find any one whom he could trust. (*Letter from Aurangzíb to his son, in the "Dastúr al Amal A'gáhi."*)

* Gladwin's History of Jehángír.

BOOK X.

disorder in his kidneys, together with a suppression of urine, which entirely incapacitated him from business, and soon brought him to the brink of the grave.* During this crisis Dárá stopped all correspondence, and detained all travellers likely to spread the news of the king's danger throughout the provinces. He could not, however, long elude the vigilance of his brothers. Aurangzíb in particular was minutely informed of all his proceedings during the whole of the struggle which followed.

A. D. 1657, October; A. H. 1067, Zí Haj 7.

Rebellion of Shujá,

The first to act on the emergency was Prince Shujá, the viceroy of Bengal. He assembled the troops of his province, and immediately marched into Behár on his way to the capital.

and of Morád.

Prince Morád, viceroy of Guzerát, soon followed his example: he seized on all the money in the district treasuries, and laid siege to Surat, where there was a governor independent of his authority, and where he thought there was a considerable sum in deposit.

Cautious measures of Aurangzíb.

Aurangzíb conducted himself with more caution. He did not assume the royal title, as Shujá and Morád had done; and although he instantly moved to his northern frontier, and urged on the preparation of his army, he made no open declaration till orders came from Dárá, in the emperor's name, to direct Mír Jumla and the other military commanders to quit his standard. Mír Jumla, after

His collusion with Mír Jumla.

* Kháfi Khán.

he joined the Moguls, had been summoned to the capital, and had for a time been intrusted with the highest offices in the state. He had afterwards been sent back to the Deckan; but his family was still at Agra, and the fear of the consequences to them made him hesitate to oppose an order of the emperor. But his embarrassment was removed by a stratagem suggested by Aurangzíb.

According to a concerted plan, he sent for Mír Jumla to his court; and when that commander, after some affected delays and alarms, presented himself, he ordered him to be made prisoner and confined in the fort of Doulatábád, while his principal officers, secretly influenced by their commander, continued to serve with Aurangzíb. Even when he had thrown off the mask he still proceeded with his usual policy. He left Dárá and Shujá to weaken each other for his profit, and applied all his art to gain Morád, whom he might hope to render an instrument in his own hands. He wrote to him with the most vehement professions of attachment, congratulating him on his accession to the crown, and declaring his own intention of renouncing the world and indulging his love of devotion in retirement at Mecca. He nevertheless offered his zealous services against the irreligious Dárá, and advised that, as their father was still alive, they should present themselves before him, when, if received with favour, they should secure him from undue influence, while they interceded for the pardon of their erring brother; meanwhile

He marches to join Morád.

BOOK X.

they should unite their forces and proceed to engage the infidel Jeswant Sing, who, it was understood, had been sent against them.* It seems incredible that Morád should have been deceived by so improbable a profession, but the coarseness of the artifice was disguised by the masterly execution; and the assiduous flatteries of Aurangzíb found a willing auditor in his brother, naturally unsuspicious, and dazzled by the prospect of assistance so necessary to the support of his feeble cause.

Defensive measures of Dárá.

Before this period Dárá had taken measures to resist the threatened attacks of his rivals. He sent Rája Jeswant Sing into Málwa to watch Morád and Aurangzíb; and to act against them, with his whole army, or by dividing it, as circumstances might suggest. At the same time he himself advanced to Agra, and dispatched an army under the command of his own son, Sólimán Shekó, assisted by Rája Jei Sing, to oppose the approach of Shujá. By this time Sháh Jehán was sufficiently recovered to resume the general control of the government; but his confidence in Dárá was only increased by the misconduct of the other princes. He wrote to Shujá, commanding him in positive terms to return to his government. Shujá pretended to consider these orders as dictated by Dárá Shekó, and probably still looked on the emperor's recovery as doubtful. He continued to move on until he met Sólimán Shekó in the neighbourhood of Benáres.

A. D. 1657, November; A. H. 1068, Rebi al awal 4.

Sháh Jehán reassumes the government.

Shujá continues to advance on Agra.

* Kháfi Khán.

CHAP. III.

A battle then took place, and Shujá, though his army was not dispersed, was defeated, and compelled to return into Bengal.

Is defeated by Sólimán, son of Dárá, and returns to Bengal.

Meanwhile Aurangzíb quitted Burhánpúr* and marched into Málwa. He there formed a junction with Morád; and the combined armies marched to attack Rája Jeswant Sing, who was encamped near Ujén. The rája drew up his army on the bank of the river Sípra, which at that season was nearly dry, but still presented a formidable obstruction from the rocky nature of its bed.

A. D. 1658, end of March; A. H. 1068, Jamádi al ákhir 25.

The battle was bravely contested by the Rájpúts, who were ill supported by the rest of the troops. It was chiefly decided by the gallantry of Morád: Jeswant Sing retired in disorder to his own country, and the rest of the army dispersed.† On rewarding his chiefs after this battle, Aurangzíb sent them all to return their thanks to Morád, as if he alone were the fountain of all honour. On the first junction he had taken an oath to adhere to that prince, and renewed all his promises with every appearance of warmth and sincerity; and throughout the whole campaign, although his abilities gave him the real control of all operations, he continued his professions of devotion and humility, always acknowledging Morád as his superior, and treating

A. D. 1658, April; A. H. 1068, Rajab. Aurangzíb and Morád defeat the imperial army under Jeswant Sing at Ujén.

* Kháfi Khán.

† Kháfi Khán. Bernier. The latter, who soon after joined the emperor's army, accuses Kásim Khán, who commanded along with Jeswant Sing, of disaffection.

BOOK X.

A. D. 1658, May; A. H. 1068, from Rejab 27. to Shábán 25.

him on all occasions with the utmost respect and attention.* After this victory the princes advanced by slow marches to the Chambal, near Gwáliór.†

Some dispositions made by Dárá Shekó for the defence of that river were rendered ineffectual by the manœuvres of Aurangzíb, and the army crossed without opposition.

Sháh Jehan's anxiety for an accommodation.

Before Jeswant Sing's defeat, Sháh Jehán, unable to bear the heat of the season, had set out on his way to Delhi. The news of that misfortune recalled him, much against his will, to Agra. He found that during his absence Dárá had thrown Amín, the son of Mír Jumla, into confinement; but, as he disapproved of the proceeding, it was immediately countermanded by the prince himself. Sháh Jehán, at this time, notwithstanding his feeble health, had ordered his tents to be prepared, and intended to take the field in person. His hope was, that he should be able to bring about an adjustment by his presence and authority, and to avoid a war which could not but bring many dangers and calamities on himself and all the parties engaged. He was dissuaded from this resolution by his brother-in-law, Sháista Khán. If it had been pursued, it would have had no effect on the princes, whatever it might on the armies; for all were now too far engaged to recede, or to trust their future safety to any thing so precarious as the life of Sháh Jehán. Dárá likewise looked with an ill eye on

* Kháfi Khán. Bernier. † Kháfi Khán.

CHAP. III.

an accommodation that must have removed him from almost unlimited power, and restored the administration to its ordinary train under the immediate control of the emperor. Urged on by this consideration, and confident in his superior numbers, he refused even to wait for Sólimán, then on his march from Benáres with the most efficient part of the army. Contrary to the earnest injunctions of Sháh Jehán he marched out at the head of an army which seemed irresistible from its numbers and equipment, but was rendered weak, in reality, by the arrogance of the commander, the disaffection of the chiefs, and the absence of the flower of the fighting men.*

Dárá marches from Agra to oppose his brothers, against the wish of Sháh Jehán.

On the 6th of Rámzán, 1068, the two armies approached each other at Samaghar, one march from Agra: they drew up face to face on the next day, but did not join battle until the succeeding morning.

A. D. 1658, beginning of June.

The action began by a charge of a body of Dárá's cavalry, under Rustam Khán. It was unable to penetrate a row of guns chained together in front of Aurangzíb's line. A second and more powerful charge, headed by Dárá himself, was equally unsuccessful; but his attack was renewed and kept up without intermission on the centre,

Is totally defeated.

* Kháfi Khán says the army consisted at Agra of upwards 70,000 horse, with innumerable elephants and guns. Bernier, though generally distrustful of native numbers, thinks it may have been 100,000 horse, 20,000 foot, and 80 pieces of artillery. He reckons Aurangzíb and Morád's army at 30,000 or 35,000 horse.

BOOK X.

where Aurangzíb was stationed. In the mean time Morád was attacked by 3000 Uzbeks, who poured in flights of arrows on him, with such rapidity that it was with difficulty he could bear up against them. His elephant gave way before the storm, and would have run off the field if Morád had not ordered its feet to be chained; thus cutting off the power of retreat for himself. This sharp contest with the Uzbeks was succeeded by a much more formidable attack. A large body of Rájpúts rushed on the prince with an impetuosity that nothing could resist. Rám Sing, their rája, in a saffron robe, and with a chaplet of pearls on his head, ran up to Morád's elephant, and hurled his pike at the prince, while he shouted to the driver to make the elephant kneel down. Morád received the pike on his shield, and nearly at the same moment laid the rája dead with an arrow.* His death only exasperated the Rájpúts, who fought with desperate fury, and fell in heaps round the prince's elephant. At this time Aurangzíb was about to move to his brother's assistance, but he had soon full employment where he was; for Dárá, having at length broken through the line of guns, charged his centre at full speed, and carried all before him, by the united force of velocity and numbers.

* Kháfi Khán. Bernier. Colonel Tod (vol. ii. p. 481.) ascribes this action to Rája Chitar Sál of Bundi, who was a distinguished commander in the reign of Sháh Jehán, and was likewise killed in this battle.

Aurangzíb alone remained unshaken: he presented his elephant wherever there was the greatest danger, and called aloud to his troops that "God was with them, and that they had no other refuge or retreat."* In the height of this contest Rája Rúp Sing leaped from his horse, and running up to Aurangzíb's elephant, began to cut away the girths with his sword. Aurangzíb was struck with his audacity, and even in that moment of alarm called out to his men to spare him; but before his voice could be heard the rája had fallen, almost cut to pieces. At this critical juncture, Morád, having at length repelled the Rájpúts, was able to turn his attention to the centre; and Dárá, who found his right thereby exposed, was obliged to abate the vigour of his front attack. His numbers, however, might in the end have prevailed; but as he was pressing forward on his elephant, conspicuous to all his troops, whom he was encouraging by his voice, and by waving his hand to them to advance, a rocket from the enemy struck the elephant, and rendered it so ungovernable that Dárá had no choice but to throw himself from its back and to mount a horse with all expedition. His disappearance struck a sudden alarm among the distant troops; and an attendant being carried off by a shot at his side, while fastening on his quiver after he mounted, those immediately round him were also thrown into confusion: the panic spread, and its

* Bernier has preserved his words in the original Hindostani.

BOOK X.

effects were soon felt throughout the whole army. The death of an Asiatic leader is often the loss of the battle: in a civil war it is the annihilation of the cause. Success seemed now useless, and every man's thoughts were turned to safety. Even the part of the line which was not engaged began to waver, while the princes pressed forward amidst the disorder of the centre, and compelled the troops opposed to them, and even Dárá himself, to take to flight.

The victory was no sooner decided than Aurangzíb threw himself on his knees and returned his thanks to Divine Providence for the mercy it had vouchsafed to him. His next care was to salute his brother, and congratulate him on the acquisition of a kingdom. He found Morád's howdah bristled with arrows, and himself wounded in several places; and, after expressing the greatest joy at *his* victory, he began to wipe the blood from his face, and to show the most affectionate attention to his sufferings.*

Dárá flies to Delhi.

While this was passing on the field, the unfortunate Dárá pursued his flight towards the city: he arrived in the evening, with 2000 horse, many of them wounded; all he now had of the great force with which he had so lately marched out.

He was ashamed to present himself before his father, to the disregard of whose opinion he owed

* Morád's howdah was preserved as a curiosity to the time of Ferókhsír, when it was seen by Kháfi Khán, who says it was stuck as full of arrows as a porcupine is of quills.

his ruin; and after securing some valuables at his own palace, he continued his flight towards Delhi, accompanied by his wife and two of his children. He had already reached the third regular stage from Agra, before he was overtaken by 5000 horse, sent by Sháh Jehán to his assistance.*

Aurangzíb enters Agra. A. D. 1658, June; A. H. 1068, Rámzán 10.

Aurangzíb marched to Agra three days after the battle. He encamped before the walls, and took immediate possession of the city. Some more days elapsed before he interfered with the interior of the royal residence. He employed the interval in humble messages to his father, pleading the necessity of his case, and protesting his inviolable

Sháh Jehán adheres to the cause of Dárá.

* In the account of the battle I have taken some circumstances from Bernier, but have preferred the general narrative of Kháfi Khán, who, besides his access to verbal and written evidence, refers to his own father, who was present in the action. Bernier lived nearer the time, and is an excellent writer; but his acquaintance both with men and books must have been limited, and his means of judging Indians imperfect; his relation, besides, is mixed with some anecdotes which look like popular inventions. Dárá's descent from his elephant (for instance) is ascribed to the insidious advice of a traitor in the moment of victory; while Kháfi Khán says he was obliged to get down in such precipitation, that he left his slippers, and mounted his horse with bare feet and without arms. Bernier afterwards relates a plot of Sháh Jehán to seize Aurangzíb, and a counter plot of the latter, which ended in the seizure of Sháh Jehán; but the story is improbable in itself, and is not alluded to by Kháfi Khán. It is necessary throughout to look closely into the accounts which favour Aurangzíb; for though Bernier himself is captivated with the open character of Dárá, his master was a personal enemy of that prince, against whom Kháfi Khán also has a strong prejudice; and both wrote after Aurangzíb had been successful, and was cried up as the Mussulman hero and the greatest of emperors.

BOOK X.

respect and duty: it is probable, indeed, that he was sincerely desirous of conciliating his father, and would have preferred carrying on the government in his name; but he found it impossible to gain his confidence or to shake his attachment to Dárá; and at length sent his own son, Mohammed Sultán, to take complete possession of the citadel, and to prevent all communications between the emperor and every one beyond its walls. Sháh Jehán was still treated with the highest respect; but, although he lived for seven years longer, his reign ends at this period. It seems unaccountable that so able a prince should have thus been dethroned without any of his old servants attempting to stir in his favour: the truth is, that his habits of indulgence had impaired his energy; and as he had long ceased to head his armies, the troops turned their eyes to the princes who led them in the field, and who had the immediate distribution of their honours and rewards. To this must be added the peculiar abilities of Aurangzíb; who was more successful in defeating conspiracies and managing factions than in any other branch of government, though he was good in all.

Rámzán 17. Is confined in his palace.

Having now no further use for Morád, Aurangzíb dismissed him from his pretended sovereignty, without even the ceremony of a quarrel or a complaint. He kept up the delusion of that simple prince by submissive behaviour and constant presents and attentions, till they had marched from Agra in pursuit of Dárá; when he one day in-

Aurangzíb imprisons Morád, and openly assumes the government.

CHAP. III.

vited Morád to supper, and so far waved his own scruples as to allow the free use of the goblet; of which Morád so fully availed himself that he was soon in a state of helpless intoxication. On this he was stripped of his arms without resistance, was cast into chains, and sent off on an elephant to Selímghar, part of the citadel of Delhi; while three other elephants were dispatched, under similar escorts, in different directions, to mislead people as to his place of confinement. He was afterwards removed to Gwáliór, the great state prison of those days. Aurangzíb then continued his march to Delhi, where he caused himself to be proclaimed emperor.* He did not put his name on the coin, and was not crowned until the first anniversary of his accession; a circumstance which has introduced some confusion into the dates of his reign.

A. D. 1658, Aug. 20.; A. H. 1068, Zí Cáad 1.

The reign of Sháh Jehán, thus harshly closed, was perhaps the most prosperous ever known in India. Though sometimes engaged in foreign wars, his own dominions enjoyed almost uninterrupted tranquillity, together with a larger share of good government than often falls to the lot of Asiatic nations.

High prosperity of India under Sháh Jehán.

Notwithstanding Sháh Jehán's love of ease and pleasure, and the time spent in his visits to Cashmír and the erection of those celebrated structures in which he took so much delight, he never remitted his vigilance over his internal government;

* Kháfi Khán.

BOOK X.

and by this, and the judicious choice of his ministers, he prevented any relaxation in the system, and even introduced important improvements, — such as his survey of the Deckan.

Kháfi Khán, the best historian of those times, gives his opinion, that, although Akber was pre-eminent as a conqueror and a lawgiver, yet, for the order and arrangement of his territory and finances, and the good administration of every department of the state, no prince ever reigned in India that could be compared to Sháh Jehán.

Whatever might be the relative excellence of his government, we must not suppose that it was exempt from the evils inherent in a despotism: we may assume some degree of fraudulent exaction in the officers of revenue, and of corruption in those of justice; and we have the testimony of European travellers to acts of extortion by custom-house officers, and of arbitrary power by governors of provinces; but, after all deductions on these accounts, there will remain enough to convince us that the state of India under Sháh Jehán was one of great ease and prosperity.*

* Tavernier, who had repeatedly visited most parts of India, says that Sháh Jehán "reigned not so much as a king over his subjects, but rather as a father over his family and children," and goes on to commend the strictness of his civil government, and to speak in high terms of the security enjoyed under it. (Page 108. of the English translation of 1678.) Pietro Della Valle, who wrote in the last years of Jehángír (1623), when things were in a worse state than under his son, gives the following account: — "Hence, generally, all live much after a

The erection of such a capital as Delhi proves great private as well as public wealth. Mandesloe describes Agra as at least twice as large as Isfahán (then in its greatest glory); with fine streets, good shops, and numerous baths and caravanserais. Nor was this prosperity confined to royal residences; all travellers speak with admiration of the grandeur of the cities, even in remote provinces, and of the fertile and productive countries in which they stood.*

Those who look on India in its present state may be inclined to suspect the native writers of exaggerating its former prosperity; but the deserted cities, ruined palaces, and choked up aqueducts which we still see, with the great reservoirs and embankments in the midst of jungles, and the decayed causeways, wells, and caravanserais of the royal roads, concur with the evidence of contemporary travellers in convincing us that those historians had good grounds for their commendation.

The whole continent of India, however, was far from being in a uniform state: vast tracts were still covered with forests; and the mountainous

genteel way; and they do it securely as well, because the king does not persecute his subjects with false accusations, nor deprive them of any thing when he sees them live splendidly, and with the appearance of riches (as is often done in other Mahometan countries), as because the Indians are inclined to those vanities, &c. &c." (Page 22. English translation of 1665.)

* Mandesloe, for Guzerát; Graaf and Bruton (in Murray's *Asiatic Discovery*), for Bengal, Behár, and Orissa; and Tavernier, for most parts of the empire.

BOOK X.

ranges often harboured wild and predatory inhabitants. Even in the best cleared parts, there were sometimes revolts of subject rájas, as in Bundélcand, during the present reign; but in that case the disturbance was confined to a district of less extent than the Tyrol, while populous provinces as large as France or England were scarcely aware of its existence.

But, after all allowances, the state of the people must have been worse than in an indifferently governed country in *modern* Europe. On the one side, there are the absence of slavery and polygamy, less personal oppression by the great, and less fear of scarcity and consequent disease; while on the other there is nothing to oppose but lighter taxation and freedom from a meddling and complicated system of law and regulation. A fairer object of comparison would be the Roman Empire, under such a prince as Severus: we should there find the same general tranquillity and good government, with similar examples of disturbance and oppression; the same enjoyment of physical happiness, with the same absence of that spirit which would tend to increase the present felicity, and which might afford some security for its duration beyond the life of the reigning monarch. The institutions, traditions, and opinions which remained from better times, must, even in this case, have given a superiority to the European empire.

Magnificence of Sháh Jehán.

Sháh Jehán was the most magnificent prince that ever appeared in India. His retinue, his

state establishments, his largesses, and all the pomp of his court, were much increased beyond the excess they had attained to under his predecessors. His expenses in these departments can only be palliated by the fact that they neither occasioned any increase to his exactions nor any embarrassment to his finances. The most striking instance of his pomp and prodigality was his construction of the famous peacock throne. It took its name from a peacock with its tail spread (represented in its natural colours in sapphires, emeralds, rubies, and other appropriate jewels), which formed the chief ornament of a mass of diamonds and precious stones that dazzled every beholder. Tavernier, a jeweller by profession, reports, without apparent distrust, the common belief, that it cost 160,500,000 livres, nearly six millions and a half sterling.

His buildings.

But his greatest splendour was shown in his buildings. He founded a new city at Delhi, built on a regular plan, and far surpassing the old one in magnificence: three wide streets (one of great length, ornamented by a canal and rows of trees, and composed of houses rising over a line of shops under arcades), led to a spacious esplanade, in the centre of which, and on the Jamna, stood the fortified palace; the spacious courts, marble halls, and golden domes of which have so often been the subject of enthusiastic description. The great mosque of the same city is a work of extraordinary elegance and grandeur.

The Táj Mahal.

But of all the structures erected by Sháh Jehán,

BOOK X.

there is none that bears any comparison with the Táj Mahal at Agra, a mausoleum of white marble decorated with mosaics, which, for the richness of the material, the chasteness of the design, and the effect at once brilliant and solemn, is not surpassed by any other edifice, either in Europe or Asia.*

* Táj Mahal is a corruption of Mumtáz Mahal, the name of Sháh Jehán's queen, whose sepulchre it forms. It stands on a marble terrace over the Jamna, is flanked at a moderate distance by two mosques, and is surrounded by extensive gardens. The building itself, on the outside, is of white marble, with a high cupola and four minarets. In the centre of the inside is a lofty hall of a circular form under a dome, in the middle of which is the tomb, inclosed within an open screen of elaborate tracery formed of marble and mosaics. The walls are of white marble, with borders of a running pattern of flowers in mosaic. The graceful flow, the harmonious colours, and, above all, the sparing use of this rich ornament, with the mild lustre of the marble on which it is displayed, form the peculiar charm of the building, and distinguish it from any other in the world. The materials are lapis lazuli, jasper, heliotrope or blood stone, a sort of golden stone (not well understood), with calcedony and other agates, cornelians, jade, and various stones of the same description. "A single flower in the screen," says Mr. Voysey, (*Asiatic Researches*, vol. v. p. 434.) "contains a hundred stones, each cut to the exact shape necessary, and highly polished;" and "yet," says Bishop Heber, "though every thing is finished like an ornament for a drawing-room chimney-piece, the general effect produced is rather solemn and impressive than gaudy." In the minute beauties of execution, however, these flowers are by no means equal to those on tables and other small works in "Pietra Dura" at Florence. It is the taste displayed in the outline and application of this ornament, combined with the lightness and simplicity of the building, which gives it so prodigious an advantage over the gloomy panels of the chapel of the Medici. The mosaics of the Táj are said, with great probability, to be the workmanship of Italians. It is singular that artists of that nation should receive lessons of taste from the Indians.

CHAP. III.

His economy.

All these vast undertakings were managed with so much economy that, after defraying the expenses of his great expeditions to Candahár, his wars in Balkh, and other heavy charges, and maintaining a regular army of 200,000 horse, Sháh Jehán left a treasure, which some reckon at near six, and some at twenty-four millions sterling, in coin, besides his vast accumulations in wrought gold and silver, and in jewels. *

His personal character.

Notwithstanding the unamiable character given of him in his youth, the personal conduct of Sháh Jehán seems to have been blameless when on the throne. His treatment of his people was beneficent and paternal, and his liberal sentiments towards those around him cannot be better shown than by the confidence which (unlike most Eastern princes) he so generously reposed in his sons.

Sháh Jehán had reigned thirty years; he was sixty-seven years old when he was deposed, and seventy-four when he died.

* Bernier says under 6,000,000*l.* (vol. i. p. 305.). Kháfi Khán says 24,000,000*l.*, and he is not likely to exaggerate, for he makes Sháh Jehán's revenue 23,000,000*l.* (only 1,000,000*l.* more than that now collected in the British portion of India), while it is generally reckoned to have been 32,000,000*l.*, and is admitted by Bernier, when depreciating it, to be greater than that of Persia and Turkey put together (vol. i. p. 303.).

BOOK XI.

AURANGZÍB (OR ÁLAMGÍR*).

CHAP. I.

FROM 1658 TO 1662.

BOOK XI.

Sólimán deserted by Jei Sing and Dilír Khán.

THOUGH Aurangzíb's main object was the pursuit of Dárá, he did not fail to attend to the motions of Sólimán, who was marching to his father's aid at the time of the fatal battle. He was a young man of twenty-five, and was assisted in his command by Rája Jei Sing, and accompanied by another general named Dilír Khán. Jei Sing, like the other Rájpút princes, had adhered to Dárá, as well on account of his lawful claims as of his liberal principles in religion; but though he had acted with decision against Shujá, the case was different with Aurangzíb. His inclinations probably favoured that prince, with whom he had served in Balkh, and his interest counselled him against opposition to the actual pos-

* Aurangzíb, on his accession, took the title of Álamgír, by which he is designated in Indian history and in all regular documents. Europeans, however, as well as some of his own countrymen, still call him Aurangzíb (properly pronounced Ourangzíb).

sessor of the throne. He determined to abandon Sólimán; Dilír Khán took the same resolution; and their defection was aggravated rather than palliated by the paltry pretexts they employed to excuse it. Sólimán, thus deprived of the strength of his army, formed a design of avoiding Aurangzíb by keeping close to the mountains, and thus making his way to join his father at Láhór. Aurangzíb frustrated his project by sending a detachment to Hardwár to intercept him; and this disappointment occasioned the desertion of most of his remaining troops. He next sought refuge in Sirinagar; but the rája refused him an asylum unless he would send away the 500 horse that still adhered to him. After a vain attempt to return to the fort of Allahábád, in which his small band was reduced to 200, he agreed to the rája of Sirinagar's terms, entered his fort with five or six attendants, and, though treated with civility, soon found that he was, in reality, in a sort of confinement.

Flies to Sirinagar, and is made prisoner by the rája.

Aurangzíb did not wait till the conclusion of these operations. After settling his affairs at Delhi, he continued his march against Dárá. That unfortunate prince, at the commencement of his flight, had halted for a few days at Delhi, where he obtained some treasure, and collected some thousand troops: he then marched rapidly to Láhór, and, finding a large sum of money in the royal treasury, began to raise an army. Before he had made much progress, he heard of the advance of Aurangzíb, and soon after, of the near approach of

Aurangzíb marches from Delhi in pursuit of Dárá.

A. D. 1658, July 28.; A. H. 1068, Zí Cáda 7.

BOOK XI.

a light detachment sent on in pursuit of him. Sháh Jehán had written to Mohábat Khán (son of the great general), who was viceroy of Cábul; and it is probable that Dárá had been expecting encouragement from him. Besides the troops of the province, Cábul would have afforded a ready refuge, in case of need, among the Afghán tribes, and an easy exit to the territories of the Uzbeks or the Persians; but these views, if entertained, were disconcerted by the prompt measures of Aurangzíb; and Dárá, unable to resist the force that threatened him, left Láhór with 3000 or 4000 horse, and took the road of Multán on his way to Sind.

Dárá flies from Láhór.

Aurangzíb returns to Delhí.

On this, Aurangzíb, who had already crossed the Satlaj, altered his course for Multán. Before he reached that city, he heard that Dárá had proceeded on his flight, and at the same time received intelligence of the advance of his brother Shujá from Bengal. He therefore gave up his march to the westward, and returned without delay to Delhi.

A. D. 1658, from Sept. 30. to Nov. 21.; A. H. 1069, from Moharram 12. to Rabi al Awal 4.

Meanwhile, Shujá had advanced to Benáres with 25,000 horse and a numerous train of artillery; and Aurangzíb, after some stay at Delhi, set out to arrest his progress. They met at Cajwa, half way between Allahábád and Etáya. Shujá was advantageously posted; and, though both drew up their armies, neither was anxious to begin the attack. On the third or fourth day, Aurangzíb was forming his line before daybreak, according to his usual practice, when he was surprised by a prodigious uproar that suddenly arose in his rear. This was

Marches against Shujá, who is advancing from Bengal.

A. D. 1659, Jan. 3.; A. H. 1069, Rabi Second 17.

Treacherous attack on his bag-

occasioned by Rája Jeswant Sing, who, though now serving in his camp, had treacherously attacked his baggage. CHAP. I.

gage by Jeswant Sing.

The rája had submitted when Dárá's case became hopeless: he had not been received with the confidence and distinction he expected, and had entered on a correspondence with Shujá, promising to fall upon the baggage at a particular hour, when the prince's army was also to attack in front. Had the co-operation been complete, it must have been entirely successful; for, although Shujá was not at his post in time, it had nearly occasioned the dispersion of his rival's army. The tumult created by the unexpected onset, combined with the darkness and their ignorance of the cause, spread the greatest confusion among the troops who were forming: some left the field, others flew to protect their baggage, and a few went over to the enemy. In the midst of this perturbation, Aurangzíb dismounted and seated himself on a portable throne, from which he issued his directions with a serene and cheerful countenance, sent a party to repel the attack, and took measures for checking the disorder which had already spread so far. In the mean time, Jeswant found that he was not supported; and, expecting to have the whole army turned upon him, was glad to recall his troops from plunder, and to retire to a place out of reach, where he could await in safety the event of the approaching contest.

By this time the sun had risen, and Shujá was

BOOK XI.

seen advancing to the attack. The battle began by a cannonade, soon followed by a close action: Aurangzíb's right was forced back, and his centre, where he was himself, was hard pressed. He was often in imminent danger; and his elephant was charged by another of greater strength, and would have been borne to the ground if the opposite driver had not been shot by one of the king's guards. But he still continued to press upon the enemy's centre, until they at length gave way and fled from the field, leaving 114 pieces of cannon and many elephants to the victor.

Defeat of Shujá.

Aurangzíb sent his son, Prince Mohammed Sultán, in pursuit of Shujá from the field of battle, and some days after dispatched a regular army to support the prince, under the command of Mír Júmla, who, having been released from his mock imprisonment, had joined the army a day or two before the engagement, and acted as second in command on that occasion. Having made these dispositions, he returned to Agra.

A. D. 1659, Jan. 15.; A. H. 1069, Jamádi al Awal 1.

That city, the most vulnerable point of his possessions, had just been exposed to considerable alarm and danger. Jeswant Sing, as soon as he perceived the victory to incline to his enemies, commenced his retreat towards his own country, and unexpectedly presented himself at Agra before the result of the battle was accurately known. He had it in his power to have made an effort for delivering and restoring Sháh Jehán; and it is probable the popular feeling was already strongly in-

Jeswant Sing threatens Agra and flies to Márwár.

clined in that direction; for Sháista Khán, who was governor, had given himself up to despair, and was on the point of swallowing poison.* He was relieved by the departure of Jeswant; who, considering how much he might lose by pushing things to extremities, pursued his march, and was soon safe among the hills and sands of Jódpúr.

A. D. 1659, Feb. 2.; A. H. 1069, Jamádi al Awal 17.

Aurangzíb, on reaching Agra, dispatched a force of 10,000 men in pursuit of him; and about the same time he received a report from Prince Sultán that the fort of Allahábád had been given up by Shujá's governor, and that Shujá himself had retired to Bengal.

Dárá Shekó appears in Guzerát, and is acknowledged in that province.

These successes were more than counterbalanced by the intelligence he received of the proceedings of Dárá Shekó. By the last accounts, that prince had deposited his baggage at Bakkar on the Indus; and, being forced by the desertion of his men and the death of his carriage cattle to relinquish his design on Sind, he had no means of escaping the detachment in pursuit of him, but by endeavouring to cross the desert to Cach. It now appeared that he had made little stay in that district, that he had entered Guzerát, and had been joined by the governor, Sháh Nawáz Khán, (one of whose daughters was married to Morád, and another to Aurangzíb himself,) and by *his* powerful assistance had occupied the whole province, including Surat and Baróch. He had opened a negotiation with the kings

* Bernier.

BOOK XI.

of the Deckan; but had turned his immediate attention to a march to Hindostan, and a junction with Jeswant Sing. Amidst the surprise occasioned by this rapid change of circumstances, Aurangzíb did not fail to perceive the increased importance of the Rájpút prince, whose territories extended from Guzerát to Ajmír; and as he never allowed his passions to interfere with his interests, he forgot the perfidy and outrage with which he had just been treated, and set all his usual arts to work to win over his rebellious dependant. He wrote a complimentary letter with his own hand, conceding the rank and titles his previous refusal of which was the ground of Jeswant's discontent; and at the same time he called in the aid of Jei Sing, to convince his brother rája of the confidence that might be placed in the king's good will, and of the ruin that awaited all who joined the hopeless cause of his rival. These arguments and concessions had their weight with Jeswant; and although Dárá had marched from Ahmedábád, and was arrived within fifty miles of Jódpúr, he sent to apprize him that he felt himself unable to contend alone with the power of Aurangzíb, and could not undertake to join him unless some other of the great Rájpút princes could be prevailed on to embark in the same cause. After repeated attempts to bring back Jeswant to his former views and promises, Dárá was obliged to renounce all hopes of his assistance, and to move with his own forces into the adjoining province of Ajmír. He had

He sets out to join Jeswant Sing.

Jeswant Sing is won over by Aurangzíb.

A. 1659, Feb. 14., A. H. 1069, Jamádi al Awal 1.

Abandons Dárá.

CHAP. I.

assembled an army of 20,000 men in little more than a month after his arrival in Guzerát, and had left that province with a considerable increase of numbers, and with the addition of thirty or forty guns. With this force he took up and fortified a commanding position on the hills near Ajmír.

Dárá is attacked and defeated by Aurangzíb.

Aurangzíb, who marched from Agra as soon as he heard of the proceedings in Guzerát, was now at Jeipúr, and soon arrived in front of Dárá's position. After cannonading for three days with loss to his own army, he ordered a general assault. It was obstinately resisted for many hours, till the death of Sháh Nawáz, who fell just as a party of Aurangzíb's troops had mounted the rampart, so disheartened Dárá, that he fled with precipitation, and his troops dispersed in all directions. Even the body of horse that adhered to his person gradually straggled and fell off, and some even plundered the treasure which he was endeavouring to save from the wreck of his resources.

Disasters of his flight to Guzerát.

He reached the neighbourhood of Ahmedábád after eight days and nights of almost incessant marching, rendered nearly intolerable by the heat and dust of a scorching season. To this were latterly added the merciless attacks of the Cólís in the hills, who hung upon his devoted band, and stripped or massacred every man who fell into the rear. It was in the midst of these calamities that Dárá was met by the celebrated traveller Bernier, who was on his way to Delhi, unconscious of what what had just been passing. As Dárá's wife was

He is met by Bernier.

BOOK XI.

wounded, and he had no physician, he obliged Bernier to turn back with him, and they remained together for three days. On the fourth they were within a march of Ahmedábád, where they counted on a secure refuge and on some repose after all their sufferings. They slept that night in a caravanserai, which afforded them protection from the attacks of the Cólís, but was so confined that Bernier was only separated by a canvas screen from the princesses of Dárá's family. About daybreak, when they were preparing for what they thought the last of their distressing marches, news was brought to Dárá that the gates of Ahmedábád were shut against him, and that if he had any regard for his own safety, he would instantly remove from the neighbourhood. These tidings were first made known to Bernier by the cries and lamentations of the women, and soon after Dárá came forth half dead with consternation. The bystanders received him with a blank silence, and Bernier could not refrain from tears when he saw him addressing himself to each of them, down to the meanest soldier, conscious that he was deserted by all the world, and distracted with the thoughts of what would become of himself and his family. Bernier saw him depart with the most melancholy forebodings. He was accompanied by four or five horsemen and two elephants: with these he made his way to Cach, and was there joined by about fifty horse and two hundred matchlockmen, who had accompanied one of his faithful adherents from

Ahmedábád shuts its gates on him.

He flies towards Sind.

Guzerát. The chief of Cach, who had been hearty in his cause when he first entered Guzerát, now received him coldly. He pursued his march towards Candahár, and reached the small territory of Jún, or Júin, on the eastern frontier of Sind. The chief of the place, who seems to have been an Afghán, was under great obligations to Dárá, and received him with every demonstration of attachment, while his only thought was how to betray him to his enemies. Dárá's wife (the daughter of his uncle, Parvíz) died at this place of her fatigues and sufferings; and the prince, with a disregard of circumstances that looks like infatuation, sent a portion of his small escort, with two of his most confidential servants, to attend her remains to Láhór. When the period of mourning permitted, he set out on prosecution of his journey to the Indus. The chief of Jún accompanied him for one march, and then returned on some pretext, leaving his brother and a body of troops, as if to attend the prince to the frontier. No sooner was he gone than his brother fell suddenly on Dárá, made him and his son, Sepehr Shekó, prisoners, and sent to all the king's officers to announce his capture.

CHAP. I.

He is betrayed by the chief of Jún, and delivered up to Aurangzíb.

The news reached Aurangzíb while he was celebrating the first anniversary of his accession. He concealed the intelligence until it was confirmed beyond doubt, when he ordered public rejoicings, and directed the feast of the accession to be prolonged. It had scarcely expired, when his prisoners arrived at the capital. Dárá, by special

It began A. D. 1659, June 6.; A. H. 1069, Rámzán 24.

He is brought to Delhi.

BOOK XI.

A. D. 1659, July 26.; A. H. 1069, Zí Cáad 15.

orders, was brought in, loaded with chains, on a sorry elephant, without housings, and was thus conducted up the most populous streets of the city. The sight awakened a general feeling of compassion and indignation; and Bernier thought an insurrection so probable, that he went into the street armed and prepared for any exigency that might arise; but the sympathy of the people was only shown in tears and groans. Dárá was exposed through all the principal places, and then led off to a prison in old Delhi. The inhabitants were less patient on the next day, when the chief of Jún was recognised on his way to court. A mob immediately assembled, who first assailed him with reproaches and curses; and, growing warmer as their numbers increased, began to throw mud; then tiles and stones; and, at last, got to such a pitch of fury, that several lives were lost, and the chief himself would have been torn to pieces if he had not been rescued by the police.

Sympathy of the people.

He is put to death.

Next day the leader of the riot was put to death. A few days after this tumult, a mock consultation was held with some of the king's counsellors and some learned lawyers, at which Dárá was pronounced worthy of death, as an apostate from the Mahometan religion. Aurangzíb, with seeming reluctance, gave his orders conformably to this opinion, and a personal enemy was selected to carry the sentence into effect. Dárá was, with his son, preparing some lentils, the only food they would touch, for fear of poison, when he saw the

executioners, and at once guessed his fate: he snatched up a small knife which he had just been using, and defended himself manfully, until oppressed by numbers. His body was exhibited to the populace on an elephant; his head was cut off and carried to Aurangzíb, who ordered it to be placed on a platter, and to be wiped and washed in his presence. When he had satisfied himself that it was the real head of Dárá, he began to weep, and, with many expressions of sorrow, directed it to be interred in the tomb of Humáyún. Sepehr Shekó was sent away, in confinement, to Gwálión.* CHAP. I.

Operations against Shujá by Prince Sultán and Mír Jumla.

During these transactions, prince Sultán and Mír Jumla were carrying on their operations against Shujá. That prince, on retiring towards Bengal, had taken up a position at Móngír, and had thrown up a strong intrenchment between the hills and

* Almost all the account of Dárá's proceedings is taken from Kháfi Khán. I have seldom used Bernier's delightful narrative, except when he was an eye-witness; for, although he does not differ in the main from the native historian, he introduces many particulars not probable in themselves, and not alluded to by the other. It is true that he must have received his accounts from persons engaged in the transactions, and *that* almost immediately after they had occurred; but such fresh materials have their disadvantages as well as their advantages. Before the subjects have been discussed and examined, each man knows but a fragment of the whole, and to it he adapts the reports he hears from others: the beaten party have always some act of treachery, or some extraordinary accident, with which to excuse their defeat; and all men take a pleasure in discovering secret histories and latent motives, which are soon forgotten unless confirmed by further testimony.

BOOK XI.

the Ganges; but Mír Jumla turned his left flank by a march through the hills, and compelled him to fall back on Ráj Mahal, where, during his long government of Bengal, he had established a sort of capital. The rainy season now set in, which, in that country, puts an end to every sort of movement by land, and Mír Jumla cantoned at some distance from Ráj Mahal. An important event to both parties had taken place before this pause. Prince Sultán had long been discontented with playing the part of a pageant under the authority of Mír Jumla; and his impatience became so ungovernable, that, although he was the eldest son and recognised heir of Aurangzíb, he entered into a correspondence with Shujá, and finally deserted to his camp. Shujá received him with honour, and gave him his daughter in marriage; but, either from disappointed expectations or natural levity of temper, Sultán became as much dissatisfied in his new situation as he had been before; and after taking an active part in the hostilities which recommenced after the rainy season, he again deserted his party, and returned to Mír Jumla's camp.

Prince Sultán goes over to Shujá.

A. D. 1659, June; A. H. 1069, Rámzán.

Returns to his allegiance;

A. D. 1660, Jan. 27.; A. H. 1070, Jumádi u Sáni 6.;

Aurangzíb, who had at one time determined on a journey to Bengal, had given it up before this news reached him. He showed himself little affected by his son's behaviour: he ordered him to be committed to prison, and kept him in confinement for many years. From this time Shujá's affairs went progressively to decay.

and is imprisoned by his father.

After a series of unsuccessful struggles, he was compelled to retreat to Dacca; and, Mír Jumla continuing to press him with vigour, he quitted his army, fled with a few attendants, and took refuge with the rája of Aracán. His subsequent story is uncertain. It would appear that the rája took some unfair steps to prevent his leaving Aracán, and that Shujá entered into a plot with the Mussulmans of the country to overturn the rája's government: this much is certain, that Shujá and all his family were cut off, and, though there were many rumours regarding them, were never heard of more.

Shujá flies to Aracán. A. D. 1660, April or May; A. H. 1070, Shábán or Rámzán. Uncertainty regarding his fate.

His ignorance of Shujá's fate left Aurangzíb in some uneasiness for a time; but that, and all his other grounds of anxiety, were removed before the end of the next year. He had attempted, by means of threats, and afterwards by force, to compel the rája of Sirinagar to give up Sólimán Shekó. The rája (whether from avarice, or policy, or sense of honour) withstood all his demands, until he had recourse to Jei Sing, his zealous agent in all negotiations with Hindús. By that chief's persuasion, the rája was, at length, induced to make over Sólimán to the imperial officers, and by them he was conveyed to Delhi.*

Sólimán given up by the rája of Sirinagar. A. D. 1661, Jan. 3.; A. H. 1071, Jamádi al Awal 11.

He was paraded through the city on an elephant, and then brought before the emperor. The chains were taken off his legs, but his hands were still

* Kháfi Khán.

BOOK XI.

secured in gilded fetters. His appearance affected many of the courtiers to tears. Even Aurangzíb put on an appearance of compassion, and when he entreated that, rather than have his strength and reason undermined by drugs (as was thought to be often the fate of captive princes), he might be put to death at once, the emperor addressed him in the mildest accents, and assured him of safety and good treatment.* It was not believed that he kept his word, for Sólimán, his brother Sepehr Shekó, and the younger son of Morád, all died in Gwáliór within a short space †; while the emperor's own son, Sultán, who was confined in the same fort, lived several years, and was partially restored to freedom.

Morád murdered in his prison.

The atrocious murder of Morád, which took place a few months after Sólimán's imprisonment, justifies the worst suspicions. That unfortunate prince had endeavoured to escape by means of a rope let down from the battlements; but the wailing of a Hindú concubine, of whom he was taking leave, drew the attention of the guard, and led to the discovery of his design. Aurangzíb felt that his own security was incomplete while his brother lived; and, as he had not even the shadow of an offence to allege against him, he instigated the son of a man who had been arbitrarily put to death by the prince while viceroy of Guzerát to complain of him as a murderer; when, after the ceremony of a

* Bernier; who was present at the interview. † Ibid.

trial, and a legal sentence, the unhappy Morád was executed in his prison.* CHAP. I.

Some time before this period Aurangzíb sent a force against the rája of Bikanír, who had deserted him in the Deckan, and still held out against him. He was reduced to submission by this expedition. A. D. 1661, November; A. H. 1072, Rabi u Sáni.

When the quiet of Bengal had been restored by the successes of Mír Jumla, it seems to have been an object with Aurangzíb to find employment for that powerful minister. To that end he engaged him in the conquest of Assám, a rich country lying along the river Barampáter, and shut in on both sides by woody mountains. Mír Jumla marched from Dacca, up the river, conquered the petty principality of Cúch Behár, overran the plain of Assám, and took possession of Ghérgóng, the capital. He announced his success with great exultation to the emperor, and boasted of his intention of pursuing his conquests, and opening the way to China. Soon after this the rainy season set in; the whole plain was flooded; the cavalry could not march, nor even forage; the natives assembled on all sides, cut off supplies and stragglers, and distressed the camp; and, as the rains subsided, a pestilential disorder broke out among the troops; so that when the season opened, Mír Jumla, although he had received reinforcements, was obliged to renounce his magnificent projects, and even required the exertion of his known talents to obtain Expedition of Mír Jumla to Assám. A. D. 1662, March 12.; A. H. 1072, Shábán 6.

* Kháfi Khán. Bernier.

BOOK XI.

such contributions and cessions from the rája as might save his honour from the appearance of a defeat. When he had accomplished this object he withdrew his army; but died before he reached Dacca, worn out with the fatigues and sufferings which, though at a very advanced age, he had encountered equally with the humblest soldier.* The emperor immediately raised his son, Mohammed Amín, to the high rank and honours which had been possessed by the deceased.

A. D. 1663, Jan. 6.; A. H. 1073, Jamádi Second 6. Death of Mír Jumla. A. D. 1663, March 31.; A. H. 1073, Rámzán 2.

The death of this powerful subject seemed to relieve Aurangzíb from every ground for jealousy or apprehension; but he had recently received a severe warning of the precarious terms on which he still held his life and empire. Soon after the fifth anniversary of his accession he was seized with a violent illness, which at first threatened his immediate death, and afterwards left him in a state of extreme bodily weakness, and almost entirely deprived of the use of speech. This unexpected calamity shook his newly established government to its foundations. Reports were current that Rája Jeswant was in full march to release Sháh Jehán, and that Mohábat Khán was coming from Cábul with the same intention. The partisans of the deposed monarch began to intrigue at the capital; while two parties were formed among the emperor's own adherents; one anxious to secure the succession to his second son, Moazzim; and the other, to

Dangerous illness of Aurangzíb.

Intrigues and agitation.

* Kháfi Khán. Bernier.

CHAP. I.

raise his third son, Akber, to the throne. These dangers were averted by the constancy and force of mind of Aurangzíb himself. On the fifth day of his illness, though scarcely rescued from the jaws of death, he caused himself to be raised up, and received the homage of his principal courtiers; and on a subsequent day, when his having a fainting fit had led to a general report that he was dead, he summoned two or three of the greatest nobles to his bed side; and although not yet recovered from the paralysis which had affected his tongue, he wrote an order, in their presence, to his sister Roushanárá, to send his great seal, which had been intrusted to her, and placed it near himself, that no use might be made of it without his special orders. The respect and admiration inspired by his conduct on these occasions had as much effect in suppressing disturbances as the prospect they afforded of his recovery.*

Firmness and self-possession of Aurangzíb.

As soon as he was able to travel he set off for Cashmír, where he hoped to regain his strength sooner than at any place in the plains.†

His recovery. A. D. 1662, Dec. 6.

While Aurangzíb was seeking repose in the north, a scene was opening in the Deckan with which his thoughts were soon to be fully employed.

Disturbances in the Deckan.

The Maratta race, it will be remembered, inhabits the country lying between the range of mountains which stretches along the south of the

Description of the Maratta country.

* Bernier. Kháfi Khán merely mentions a dangerous illness.
† Bernier.

BOOK XI.

Nerbadda, parallel to the Vindya chain; and a line drawn from Goa, on the sea coast, through Bidr to Chánda, on the Warda. That river is its boundary on the east, as the sea is on the west.

The great feature of the country is the range of Siádri, more commonly called the Ghâts, which runs along the western part of it, thirty or forty miles from the sea; and, though only from 3000 to 5000 feet high, is made very remarkable by its own peculiarities, and by the difference between the tracts which it divides. On the west it rises abruptly nearly from the level of the sea, and, on that side, presents an almost inaccessible barrier; but, on the east, it supports a table land 1500 or 2000 feet high, extending eastward with a gradual slope, far beyond the Maratta limits, to the Bay of Bengal.

The strip of land between the Ghâts and the sea is called the Cóncan, and is, in general, very rugged. Towards the coast are small rich plains producing rice; the rest is almost impervious from rocks and forests, cut by numerous torrents, which change, when near the sea, into muddy creeks, among thickets of mangrove.* The summits of the ridge itself are bare rocks; its sides are thickly covered with tall trees mixed with underwood. The forest spreads over the contiguous part of the table land to the east, a tract broken by deep

* The native legends relate that the sea once washed the foot of the Ghâts, and that the Concan was rescued from it, by a miracle of one of the gods.

winding valleys and ravines, forming fit haunts for the wild beasts with which the range is peopled. Fifteen or twenty miles from the ridge, the valleys become wide and fertile, and, by degrees, are lost in open plains, which stretch away to the eastward, covered with cultivation, but bare of trees, and rarely crossed by ranges of moderate hills. The great chain of the Ghâts receives the whole fury of the south-west monsoon, the force of which is thus broken before it reaches the plains. For several months the high points are wrapped in clouds, and beaten by rains and tempests. The moisture soon runs off from the upper tracts, but renders the Cóncan damp and insalubrious throughout the year.

The greatest of the inferior branches of hills which run east from the Ghâts is that called the range of Chándór, from one of the forts constructed on its summits. It separates the low basin of the Tápti from that of the Godáveri, on the table land. The basin of the Tápti is composed of Cándésh and Berár, fertile plains, only separated from Guzerát by the forest tract of Báglána, and differing, in many respects, from the high country, which is more peculiarly that of the Marattas.

The whole of the Ghâts and neighbouring mountains often terminate towards the top in a wall of smooth rock, the highest points of which, as well as detached portions on insulated hills, form natural fortresses, where the only labour required is to get access to the level space, which generally lies on

BOOK XI.

the summit. Various princes, at different times, have profited by these positions. They have cut flights of steps or winding roads up the rocks, fortified the entrance with a succession of gateways, and erected towers to command the approaches; and thus studded the whole of the region about the Ghâts and their branches with forts, which, but for frequent experience, would be deemed impregnable.

Account of the nation.

Though the Marattas had never appeared in history as a nation, they had as strongly marked a character as if they had always formed a united commonwealth. Though more like to the lower orders in Hindostan than to their southern neighbours in Cánara and Télingána, they could never, for a moment, be confounded with either.

They are small sturdy men, well made, though not handsome. They are all active, laborious, hardy, and persevering. If they have none of the pride and dignity of the Rájpúts, they have none of their indolence or their want of worldly wisdom. A Rájpút warrior, as long as he does not dishonour his race, seems almost indifferent to the result of any contest he is engaged in. A Maratta thinks of nothing *but* the result, and cares little for the means, if he can attain his object. For this purpose he will strain his wits, renounce his pleasures, and hazard his person; but he has not a conception of sacrificing his life, or even his interest, for a point of honour. This difference of sentiment affects the outward appearance of the two

nations: there is something noble in the carriage even of an ordinary Rájpút; and something vulgar in that of the most distinguished Maratta.

The Rájpút is the most worthy antagonist; the Maratta the most formidable enemy; for he will not fail in boldness and enterprise when they are indispensable, and will always support them, or supply their place by stratagem, activity, and perseverance. All this applies chiefly to the soldiery, to whom more bad qualities might fairly be ascribed. The mere husbandmen are sober, frugal, and industrious; and, though they have a dash of the national cunning, are neither turbulent nor insincere.

Their chiefs, in those days, were men of families who had for generations filled the old Hindú offices of heads of villages or functionaries of districts*, and had often been employed as partisans under the governments of Ahmednagar and Bíjapúr. They were all Súdras, of the same cast with their people; though some tried to raise their consequence by claiming an infusion of Rájpút blood.

The early Mahometan writers do not seem to have been aware of the existence of the Marattas. We can perceive, by the surnames of some chiefs whom they mention, that they must have belonged to that race; but the word Maratta first occurs in Ferishta, in the transactions of the year A.D. 1485; and is not then applied in a general sense. It has

* Patéls, désmúkhs, déspándís, &c. &c. See Vol. I. pp. 117. 476.

BOOK XI.

been mentioned that, in the middle of the sixteenth century, the king of Bíjapúr adopted the Maratta language, instead of Persian, for his financial papers; and, as he was substituting natives of the Deckan for foreigners in his armies, he enlisted a considerable number of Marattas among them. They were at first chiefly employed in the lowest military capacity, that of garrisoning forts: by degrees their aptitude for service as light cavalry was discovered, and they began to obtain military rank under the governments of Bíjapúr and Ahmednagar; while individuals were also engaged in the service of the Kubt Sháh, king of Golcónda. Still they are very little mentioned by the Mussulman writers, until the beginning of the seventeenth century. In the time of Malik Amber they emerge into notice, and thenceforward occupy a conspicuous part in the history of the Deckan.*

Rise of the Bósla family.

Among the officers of Malik Amber was a person named Málojí, of a respectable, though not a considerable, family, the surname of which was Bósla. He served with a few men mounted on his own horses, and was especially dependent on the protection of Jádu Ráo.

If any Maratta had a claim to Rájpút descent, it was the family of Jádu. The name is that of one of the Rájpút tribes: it was borne at the first Mahometan invasion by the rája of Deógíri, the greatest prince in the Deckan; and it is not im-

* Grant Duff, vol. i. p. 73—96.

probable that the protector of Málojí (who was désmukh of a district not far from Deógíri, may have been descended from that stock. Whatever was his origin, Lúkjí Jádu Ráo had attained to a command of 10,000 men under Malik Amber, and was a person of such consequence that his desertion to Sháh Jehán turned the fate of a war against his former master. CHAP. I.

It was long before this defection that Málojí Bósla attended a great Hindú festival at the house of Jádu, accompanied by his son, Sháhjí, a boy of five years old. During the merriment natural to such an occasion Jádu Ráo took young Sháhji and his own daughter, a girl of three years old, on his knees, and said, laughing, "that they were a fine couple, and ought to be man and wife." To his surprise, Málojí instantly started up, and called on the company to witness that the daughter of Jádu was affianced to his son. It did not require the pride of birth to raise Jádu's indignation at the advantage taken of him; and the consequence was, a rupture between him and his dependant. But Málojí was by this time on the road to fortune: he acquired a considerable sum of money, increased his party, and, being an active partisan, rose at last to a command of 5000 horse in the service of Ahmednagar, and to the possession of a large jágír, of which the chief place was Púna. He had still kept up his son's claim to the daughter of Jádu Ráo, which, in his present prosperity, was no longer looked on as so unreasonable; and Jádu Ráo at last consent-

BOOK XI.

ing, his daughter was regularly married to Sháhjí. One of the fruits of this union was Sévají, the founder of the Maratta empire.*

Sháhjí Bósla.

Sháhjí has already been mentioned as a great actor in the last events of the kingdom of Ahmednagar.† He then entered the service of Bíjapúr, and was continued in his jágír, which had fallen to that state in the partition of the Ahmednagar territory. He was afterwards employed on conquests to the southward, and obtained a much more considerable jágír in the Mysore country, including the towns of Síra and Bangalór.

Sévají Bósla.

As all Maratta chiefs were wholly illiterate, their affairs were managed by Bramins, who formed a numerous class of men of business, even under the Mahometans. A person of that cast, therefore, whose name was Dádají Cóndu, was left in charge of the jágír at Púna, and to him was committed the care of the chief's second son, Sévají; the elder accompanying his father to the Mysore. The education of a young Maratta consisted in horsemanship, hunting, and military exercises; and, as Púna is situated at the junction of the hilly country with the plains, Sévají's principal associates were the soldiery belonging to his father's horse, or the plundering highlanders of the neighbouring Ghâts. From such companions he imbibed an early love of adventure, which was increased by his fondness for listening to the ballads of his country. By the

* He was born in May, 1627. (Grant Duff, vol. i. p. 122.)

† A. D. 1636. See p. 399.

CHAP. I.

time he was sixteen he began to be beyond the control of Dádají, by whom he had been admitted to a share in the management of the jágír; and though he was generally popular for his conciliating manners, he was already suspected of sharing in several extensive gang robberies committed in the Cóncan. Those practices and his hunting excursions made him familiar with every path and defile throughout the Ghâts; and he was, before, well acquainted with their wild inhabitants. Those in the parts of the range north of Púna were Bhíls and Cólís*, and those to the south, Rámúsís; but immediately to the west of Púna were Marattas, who had long braved the dangers and hardships of that uncultivated region, and who were called Máwalis, from the appellation of the valleys where they resided. It was from among these last that Sévají chose his earliest adherents; and, as he was remarkably quick and observing, he soon perceived a way of employing them on higher objects than he had yet been engaged with.

His robberies.

His adherents.

The hill forts belonging to Bíjapúr were generally much neglected; being remote and unhealthy, they were sometimes occupied by a single Mahometan officer, with a small garrison of ill-paid local troops; at other times they were left in charge of the nearest désmúkh, or other revenue officer. Among those in the last predicament was Tórna, a strong fort, twenty miles south-west of Púna. Of this place Sévají contrived to get possession†,

He surprises a hill fort.

1646

* Hill tribes. See Vol. I. p. 367. † Grant Duff, vol. i. p. 131.

BOOK XI.

A. D. 1646.

and succeeded, by a proper application of arguments and money, in convincing the court of Bíjapúr that it was better in his hands than in those of the désmúkh. But on his afterwards fortifying a neighbouring hill, the attention of the government was seriously drawn to him, and remonstrances were addressed to Sháhjí on his son's proceedings. Sháhjí made the best excuse he could, and wrote in strong terms to Dádají and Sévají to forbid their attempting any further encroachments. The Bramin used all his endeavours to persuade his young chief to attend to these injunctions; but he did not long survive the receipt of them, and Sévají, when freed from his control, pursued his enterprises with more audacity than before. He withheld the revenue of the jágír which was due to Sháhjí; and as there were two forts within it (Chákan and Súpa), held by officers immediately under his father, he gained over the first and surprised the second; and, being now master within his own jágír, he proceeded to more extensive undertakings. He bribed the Mahometan governor to surrender Condána, or Singhar, a strong hill fort near Púna; and, by taking advantage of a dispute between two Bramin brothers, friends of his own, who were contesting the command of the still stronger hill fort of Purandar, he introduced a body of Máwalis into the place, and treacherously took possession of it for himself. *

He usurps his father's jágír.

Obtains possession of several forts.

A. D. 1647.

As all these acquisitions were made without

* Grant Duff.

bloodshed, and without disturbing the neighbouring districts, they called forth no exertion on the part of the king of Bíjapúr, who was at this time occupied with conquests to the southward, and with the magnificent buildings which he was erecting at his capital.* CHAP. I.

Revolts against the government of Bíjapúr. A. D. 1648.

But the time was come when Sévají's own views required that he should throw off the mask.† The signal of open rebellion was the plunder of a convoy of royal treasure in the Concan; and before the court recovered its surprise at this outrage, it heard that five of the principal hill forts in the Ghâts had fallen into the hands of Sévají. Almost immediately after this, a Bramin officer of his surprised and made prisoner the Mahometan governor of the northern Concan, and not only took possession of Calián, where he resided, but occupied the whole of his province, and compelled him to give orders for the surrender of all his forts. Sévají was transported with this success. He received the governor with respect, and dismissed him with

Takes possession of the northern Concan.

* "Thus did Sévají obtain possession of the tract between Chakun and the Neera; and the manner in which he established himself, watching and crouching like the wily tiger of his own mountain valleys, until he had stolen into a situation from whence he could at once spring on his prey, accounts both for the difficulty found in tracing his early rise, and the astonishing rapidity with which he extended his power, when his progress had attracted notice, and longer concealment was impossible." (Grant Duff; of whose clear and animated account of Sévají that inserted in the text is a mere abstract.)

† Grant Duff.

BOOK XI.

honour. His first care in his conquest was, to restore Hindú endowments, and revive old institutions. He had been brought up in a strong Hindú feeling, which, perhaps, was, at first, as much national as religious; and out of this sprung up a rooted hatred to the Mussulmans, and an increasing attachment to his own superstitions. This inclination fell so well in with his policy, that he began to affect peculiar piety, and to lay claim to prophetic dreams, and other manifestations of the favour of the gods.

His attachment to the Hindú religion.

The court of Bíjapúr, when at length awakened to Sévají's designs, was still misled by the belief that he was instigated by his father. They therefore dissembled their displeasure until they had an opportunity of making Sháhjí prisoner. His seizure was effected under pretence of a friendly entertainment by a chief of the family of Górpara, on whom Sévají afterwards most amply revenged his treachery.* Sháhjí's assurances that he was innocent of his son's transgressions received little credit from the court of Bíjapúr; and, after being allowed a reasonable time to put a stop to the insurrection, he was thrown into a dungeon, and told that the entrance would be built up after a certain period, unless Sévají should make his submission in the interval. Sévají was seriously alarmed by this threat; but reflection convinced him that submission was not the way to gain safety from so

The imprisonment of Bíjapúr since Sháhjí as a hostage for his son.

A. D. 1649.

* Grant Duff.

CHAP. I.

treacherous an enemy. He held out as before, and made overtures to Sháh Jehán, whose territories he had carefully abstained from injuring. The emperor received his application favourably, took him into his service, and appointed him to the rank of a commander of 5000. It was probably owing to *his* powerful interposition that Sháhjí was released from his dungeon, although he remained for four years a prisoner at large in Bíjapúr. Tranquillity prevailed during this interval, Sévají being restrained by fears for his father, and the government of Bíjapúr by the apprehension that Sévají might call in the Moguls.

A. D. 1649 to 1653.

Sháhjí released.

At the end of that time the disorders in Carnáta rendered Sháhjí's presence necessary to the interests of the government. His own jágír had been overrun, and his eldest son killed, while all the surrounding country was in arms, and threatened the speedy expulsion of the Bíjapúr authorities.

Renewal of Sévají's encroachments.

No sooner was his father released and the attention of the Bíjapúr government turned to the affairs of Carnáta, than Sévají began with fresh activity to renew his plans of aggrandizement. The whole of the hilly country south of Púna, from the Ghâts inclusive to the upper Kishna, was in the hands of a Hindú rája, whom Sévají could never prevail on to join in his rebellion. He now procured his assassination, and profited by the consternation which ensued to seize on his territory. After this atrocity he surprised some hill forts and built others,

BOOK XI.

and went on extending his authority until Prince Aurangzíb was sent down to the Deckan in 1655. Sévají at first addressed the prince as a servant of the Mogul government, and obtained a confirmation of his possessions from the imperial authority. But when he found Aurangzíb engaged in war with the king of Golcónda, and fancied he saw the prospect of long troubles, he determined to profit by the confusion at the expense of all the combatants, and for the first time invaded the Mogul territories. He surprised the town of Junér, and carried off a large booty; and afterwards attempted the same operation at Ahmednagar, where he met with only partial success. The rapid conquests of Aurangzíb disappointed all his hopes; and, during the prince's operations against Bíjapúr, he endeavoured, by every sort of excuse and promise, to obtain forgiveness for his rash attack. When the sickness of Sháh Jehán called off Aurangzíb to Delhi, Sévají continued to profess his devotion, and offered his zealous services, provided attention were paid to some claims he pretended to possess within the Mogul territory. The prince readily granted him forgiveness on his engaging to send a body of horse to the army, but endeavoured to reserve the question of his claims for future inquiry; and Sévají, who was as artful as himself, in like manner suspended the dispatch of his horse, and confined his services to promises and professions.

Plunders the Mogul provinces.

Obtains forgiveness from Aurangzíb. A. D. 1658.

He now renewed his attacks on Bíjapúr (where the king had been succeeded by his son, a minor);

Afzal Khán sent against him from Bíjapúr.

and the regency, at length aware of the danger of neglecting his advances to power, dispatched a large army against him. The commander was Afzal Khán, who to the usual arrogance of a Mahometan noble joined an especial contempt for his present enemy. But that enemy knew well how to turn his presumption to account: he affected to be awed by the reputation of Afzal Khán, and to give up all hopes of resisting his arms. He sent humble offers of submission to the khán, who deputed a Bramin high in his confidence to complete the negotiation. This man Sévají won over, and by his assistance Afzal Khán was easily persuaded that Sévají was in a state of great alarm, and was only prevented surrendering by his apprehension of the consequences. During these negotiations, Afzal advanced through intricate and woody valleys to the neighbourhood of the hill fort of Partábghar, where Sévají was residing, and the Maratta consented to receive his assurances of forgiveness at a personal interview, if the khán would concede so much to his fears as to come unattended for the purpose of meeting him. Afzal Khán on this quitted his army, and went forward with an escort, which he was afterwards persuaded to leave behind and advance with a single attendant. He was dressed in a thin muslin robe, and carried a straight sword, more for state than any expectation of being required to use it. During this time Sévají was seen slowly descending from the fort: he advanced with a timid and hesitating air, accompanied by

CHAP. I.

BOOK XI.

one attendant, and to all appearance entirely unarmed; but under his cotton tunic he wore a shirt of chain armour, and besides a concealed dagger, he was armed with sharp hooks of steel, which are fastened on the fingers, but lie concealed in the closed hand, and are known by the descriptive name of "tiger's claws." The khán looked with contempt on the diminutive figure which came crouching on to perform the usual ceremonies of meeting; but at the moment of the embrace, Sévají struck his claws into his unsuspecting adversary, and, before he could recover from his astonishment, dispatched him with his dagger. He had, before this, drawn his troops from all quarters by secret paths into the woods round Afzal's army; and, on a signal from the fort, they rushed at once on the Mussulmans, who were reposing in insolent security, and slaughtered and dispersed them almost without resistance.* As soon as the victory was secure, Sévají issued orders to spare the fugitives: vast numbers fell into the hands of the conqueror, after wandering in the woods until subdued by hunger. They were all treated with humanity: many of them who were Marattas entered into Sévají's service, and a chief of that nation, who refused to forfeit his allegiance, was dismissed with presents. During his whole career, Sévají, though he inflicted death and torture to force confessions of concealed treasure, was never personally guilty of any *useless* cruelty.

Is assassinated by Sévají,

and his army dispersed.

A. D. 1659, October.

* Grant Duff.

CHAP. I.

This victory gave a fresh impulse to Sévají's progress. He overran all the country near the Ghâts, and took possession of all the hill forts, and was going on to complete the reduction of the Concan, when he was recalled by the march from Bíjapúr of an army much more formidable than the first. He threw part of his troops into forts, and employed the rest to cut off the enemy's supplies*; but he allowed himself to be shut up in the almost inaccessible fort of Panála, and would have been compelled to surrender after a siege of four months, if he had not contrived, with his usual mixture of boldness and dexterity, to quit the place during a dark night, after he had amused the besiegers with the prospect of a capitulation. His escape was ascribed at Bíjapúr to treachery in their general, Sídí Jóhar, an Abyssinian, whose indignation was excited by this calumny, and added to the elements of discord already abundant at Bíjapúr.

Another army sent from Bíjapúr.

A. D. 1660, May.

The king now took the field in person, and brought such a force along with him as Sévají was unable to resist. His operations during the whole of this invasion were desultory and ill-directed; and before the end of a year he found himself stripped of almost all his conquests. The king of Bíjapúr's affairs now obliged him to turn his attention to Carnáta, where his presence was further required by the revolt of Sídí Jóhar. He was employed in that country for two whole years, during

The king of Bíjapúr takes the field.

A. D. 1661, January.

Recovers most of Sévají's conquests.

A. D. 1662.

* Grant Duff.

BOOK XI.

which Sévají recovered and increased his territories.

Sévají makes a very favourable peace.

At the end of that time a peace was mediated by Sháhjí; and Sévají remained in possession of a territory including upwards of 250 miles of the country on the sea (being the part of the Concan between Goa and Calián), while above the Ghâts its length was more than 150 miles from the north of Púna to the south of Mirich on the Kishna. Its breadth, from east to west, was, at the widest part, 100 miles. In this small territory the hardiness and predatory habits of his soldiers enabled him to maintain an army of 7000 horse and 50,000 foot.*

Extent of his territory.

A. D. 1662.

* Grant Duff.

CHAP. II.

FROM 1662 TO 1681.

CHAP. II.

IT was about this period that Aurangzíb was attacked by the violent sickness which exposed his life to so much danger.* He had previously appointed his maternal uncle, Sháista Khán, to the viceroyalty of the Deckan, and that officer was now residing at Aurangábád.

Sévají's rupture with the Moguls. About the end of A. D. 1662, A. H. 1073.

It does not appear what led to an open rupture between Sévají and the Moguls; but soon after the peace with Bíjapúr we find Sévají's horse ravaging their country nearly to Aurangábád, and himself taking their forts in the neighbourhood of Junér.

To put an end to these aggressions, Sháista Khán marched from Aurangábád, drove Sévají's army out of the field, took the fort of Chákan, and finally took up his ground at Púna, within twelve miles of Singhar, the hill fort into which Sévají had retired. At Púna, Sháista occupied the house in which Sévají had passed his early days; and it was probably the local knowledge thus acquired that suggested a plan for chastising the intruder. The khán had taken every precaution to guard against the advance of troops, and also against the admis-

Sháista Khán marches against him.

Occupies Púna.

Night exploit of Sévají.

* See page 452.

BOOK XI.

sion of Marattas individually into the town; and in these circumstances, and with his troops cantoned around him, he thought himself as secure as if he were in a peaceful country. But Sévaji, who was well aware of all that was passing, left Singhar one evening after dark, and, posting small bodies of infantry on the road to support him, went on with twenty-five Máwalis to the town. He gained admission by joining a marriage procession, with the conductor of which he had a previous concert. Being now within the line of guards, he proceeded direct to the house, and entered by a back door before any person within had a suspicion of danger. So completely was Sháista Khán surprised, that he had barely time to escape from his bedchamber, and received a blow from a sword which cut off two of his fingers as he was letting himself down from a window into the court below. His son and most of his attendants were cut to pieces in a moment. Sévají's retreat was as rapid as his attack: he was joined by his parties on the road as he retired, and ascended to Singhar amidst a blaze of torches, which made his triumph visible from every part of the Mogul camp. This exploit, so congenial to the disposition of his countrymen, is the one of all his actions of which the Marattas still speak with the greatest exultation. It was attended with consequences that could scarcely have been foreseen; for Sháista Khán imputed his danger to treachery on the part of Rája Jeswant Sing, who had, not long before,

CHAP. II.

been sent to reinforce him; and the dissensions of the leaders crippled the army, until Aurangzíb removed Sháista Khán to the government of Bengal, and sent his son, Prince Móazzim, to command, with the assistance of Jeswant Sing. Before the prince's arrival, Jeswant had withdrawn to Aurangábád, after an attempt to reduce Singhar; and Sévají was preparing to take a full retaliation for the attack he had been exposed to. During his operations in the mountains, his chief force was in his infantry; but the Marattas had been distinguished in the Bíjapúr armies for their services as light cavalry, and it was in this shape that Sévají now resolved to employ them. After gaining intelligence of the state of affairs where he was going, and deceiving his enemies by various feigned movements, he suddenly set off with 4000 horse, and came at once on the rich and defenceless city of Surat, in a part of the country which was thought to be beyond the reach of his arms. He plundered it at leisure for six days; and though beaten off from the English and Dutch factories, where some of the native merchants had also taken refuge, he carried off an ample booty, and lodged it in safety in his fort of Réri, or Ráighar, in the Concan.

Prince Móazzim sent against him.

Sévají plunders Surat.

A. D. 1664, Jan. 5.; A. H. 1074, Jamádi Second 15.

It was soon after this expedition that Sévají heard of the death of Sháhjí. Although of a great age, he was killed by a fall in hunting. He had restored his jágír to perfect order, and had extended his conquests to the southward (under the name of the king of Bíjapúr), until they compre-

Death of Sháhjí.

His possessions in the south of India.

BOOK XI.

hended the country near Madras and the principality of Tanjore.

Maritime exploits of Sévají.

Sévají was now again at war with Bíjapúr, and chiefly carried on his operations in the Concan, where he had established his capital at Ráighar. He collected a fleet, took many Mogul ships, and on one occasion embarked with a force of 4000 men on 87 vessels, and, landing at a remote point in the province of Canara, sacked Barcelór, a wealthy sea-port belonging to Bíjapúr, and plundered all the adjoining tract, where there was not the slightest apprehension of a visit from such an enemy. Nor did he, during these employments, leave the country quiet above the Ghâts: he sent troops to ravage the territory of Bíjapúr, and led, in person, a destructive inroad into the Mogul dominions. This injury did not exasperate Aurangzíb so much as the capture of some vessels conveying pilgrims to Mecca, and the violation of Surat, which derives a sort of sanctity from being the place of embarkation for those devotees. Sévají had added another provocation to these offences: soon after his father's death, he had assumed the title of rája, and began to coin money, one of the most decisive marks of independent sovereignty. A large army was therefore sent to the Deckan, at the head of which was Rája Jei Sing, the constant engine in all difficult affairs with Hindús; but the emperor's suspicious temper made him still adhere to the system of divided authority, and Dilír Khán was associated on equal terms in the command. These appoint-

A. D. 1665, February.

Sévají assumes sovereignty.

Rája Jei Sing sent against him.

ments superseded Jeswant Sing and Prince Móazzim, who returned to Delhi. As Aurangzíb anticipated little opposition from Sévají, Jei Sing had orders, as soon as he should have reduced the Maratta, to employ his arms in the conquest of Bíjapúr. CHAP. II.

These chiefs crossed the Nerbadda in February, and advanced unopposed to Púna, when Jei Sing undertook the siege of Singhar, and Dilír Khán that of Purandar. Both places held out; but Sévají seems himself to have despaired of successful resistance; and he may, perhaps, have looked to some recompence for the temporary sacrifice of his pride, in the advantages he might gain by co-operating with the Moguls against Bíjapúr. He opened a negotiation with Jei Sing; and, after receiving assurances, not only of safety, but of favour, from the emperor, he privately withdrew himself from his own army, and went, with a few attendants, to the rája's camp. He was received with great distinction, and on his part made the humblest professions of fidelity. An agreement was concluded, by which Sévají was to give up twenty out of the thirty-two forts he possessed, together with the territory attached to them. The remaining twelve forts, with their territory, and all his other possessions, he was to hold as a jágír from the Mogul emperor, in whose service his son Sambají, a boy of five years old, was to receive the rank of a commander of 5000. In addition to these advantages, Sévají was to be entitled to a sort of

Submission of Sévají. A. D. 1665.

1665

BOOK XI.

per centage on the revenue of each district under Bíjapúr: and this grant was the foundation of the ill-defined claims of the Marattas, which afforded them such constant pretexts for encroachment on foreign territories in later times. These terms, except the last (which was not noticed), were distinctly confirmed in a letter from Aurangzíb to Sévaji. He now joined the Imperial army with 2000 horse and 8000 infantry; and the whole body commenced its march on an invasion of Bíjapúr.

He co-operates with Jei Sing against Bíjapúr.

The Marattas distinguished themselves in this campaign, and Sévají was gratified by two letters from Aurangzíb; one complimenting him on his services, and the other containing great but general promises of advancement, and inviting him to court, with a promise that he should be allowed to return to the Deckan. Won by these attentions, and by the cordiality with which he was treated by Jei Sing, Sévají made over his jágír to three of his chief dependents, and set off for Delhi, accompanied by his son Sambají, and escorted by 500 chosen horse and 1000 Máwalis.

Goes to Delhi.

Aurangzíb had now an opportunity of uniting Sévají's interests to his own by liberal treatment, and of turning a formidable enemy into a zealous servant, as had been done before with so many other Hindú princes: but his views in politics were as narrow as in religion; and, although he could easily suppress his feelings to gain any immediate advantage, he was incapable of laying aside his prejudices, or making such full and free concessions,

Haughty reception by Aurangzíb.

as might secure permanent attachment. Moreover, he despised as well as disliked Sévají: he felt the insults offered to his religion and his dignity the more, because they came from so ignoble a hand; and he so far mistook the person he had to deal with as to think he would be most easily managed by making him sensible of his own insignificance.

Accordingly, when Sévaji was about to enter Delhi, an officer of inferior rank was sent, on the emperor's part, along with Rám Sing, the son of Jei Sing, who went out to meet him; and his reception, when he came to court, was conducted in the same spirit. Sévají performed his obeisance, and presented his offerings, in the most respectful manner, and probably intended to have made his way, as usual, by suppleness and humility; but when he found he was received without notice, and placed, undistinguished, among the officers of the third rank*, he was unable any longer to control his feelings of shame and indignation; he changed colour, and, stepping back behind the line of courtiers, sank to the ground in a swoon. When he came to himself, he reproached Rám Sing with the breach of his father's promises, and called on the government to take his life, as it had already deprived him of his honour. He then retired, without taking leave, or receiving the honorary dress usual on such occasions.† Aurangzíb was

* Commanders of 5000, the station which had been promised to his infant son.

† Kháfi Khán.

BOOK XI.

not prepared for this decided conduct; he ordered Sévaji's motions to be watched, while he professed to wait for a report from Jei Sing as to the promises he had really made to him.

From this time, Sévají's whole thoughts were turned to the means of making his escape, which was soon rendered more difficult by guards being posted round his residence. He applied for leave to send back his escort, with whom he said the climate of Delhi did not agree; and, as this arrangement seemed to leave him more than ever in the power of the government, it was willingly agreed to. He next took to his bed on pretence of sickness, gained over some of the Hindú physicians who were allowed to attend him, and by their means established a communication with his friends without. He also made a practice of sending presents of sweetmeats and provisions to be distributed among fakírs and other holy men, Mahometan as well as Hindu; and thus accustomed his guards to the passage of the large baskets and hampers in which those donations were conveyed.

Sévají escapes from confinement.

At length, one evening, when he had concerted his measures with those without, he concealed himself in one of the hampers, and his son in another, and was carried out unquestioned through the midst of the sentinels. His bed was occupied by a servant; and a long time elapsed before his escape was suspected. In the mean time, he repaired to an obscure spot, where he had a horse posted, mounted it with his son behind him, and made the best of

his way to Mattra. At this place were some of his chosen companions in assumed characters; and he himself put on the dress of a Hindú religious mendicant, shaving off his hair and whiskers, and rubbing over his face with ashes. In this disguise he pursued his journey by the least suspected roads, to the Deckan, leaving his son at Mattra in charge of a Maratta Bramin.

LIBRARY OF THE BOMBAY BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY

Arrives at Ráighar.

It must have required much address to elude his pursuers, who had a long time to be prepared for him before he made good his retreat to Ráighar. He reached that place, on his return, nine months after his departure for Delhi.*

A. D. 1666, December.

Death of Sháh Jehán.

A. D. 1666, December; A. H. 1076, Rejeb.

Soon after Sévají's flight died Sháh Jehán. Though always confined to the citadel of Agra, he had been treated with great respect, and allowed an ample establishment and complete authority within the palace. He carried this control so far as to prevent the removal of Dárá's daughter, whom Aurangzíb wished to marry to a son of his own; and also to withhold some valuable crown jewels which the emperor was anxious to possess: on these subjects, several letters of remonstrance and expostulation passed between him and his son.

Prosperous state of Aurangzíb's empire.

This was the most prosperous period of the reign of Aurangzíb. Every part of his own dominions was in the enjoyment of perfect tranquillity. His governor of Cashmír had just brought Little Tibet

* The English factors at Carwar, in the Concan, write, September 29th, "*If it be true* that Sévají has escaped, Aurangzíb will quickly hear of him to his sorrow."

BOOK XI.

under his authority; and his viceroy of Bengal made an acquisition of more real value in the fine country of Chittagong, on the eastern shore of the Bay of Bengal.

He had also received marks of respect from most of the neighbouring powers. The sheríf of Mecca, and several other princes of Arabia, sent embassies; as did the king of Abyssinia, and the khán of the Uzbeks. The most important came from the king of Persia, and was returned by an embassy of unusual splendour. But this last interchange of missions did not lead to permanent friendship; for some questions of etiquette arose between the monarchs, which led to so much irritation on the part of Sháh Abbás II., that he assembled an army in the neighbourhood of Candahár; and Aurangzíb was thinking seriously of moving in person against him, when he heard of the sháh's death, and the discontinuance of all his preparations.

Failure of Jei Sing's attack on Bíjapúr.

The only exception to the general prosperity of the empire was the ill success of its army in the territory of Bíjapúr. Jei Sing's operations in that country had at first gone on to his wish; but as soon as he had formed the siege of the capital, the old plan of defence was adopted against him: the surrounding country was reduced to a desert, and all his supplies were cut off by plundering horse. The king of Golcónda also secretly assisted his neighbour; and Jei Sing, perceiving that he had no chance of success, retreated, not without loss and difficulty, to Aurangábád. He was removed

after this failure, and died on his way to Delhi. Prince Móazzim was sent to replace him, with Jeswant Sing to assist: Dilír Khán, who was unacceptable to the prince as well as to the rája, was left as an additional check on both.

His death.

Return of Prince Moazzim and Jeswant Sing.

A. D. 1667, A. H. 1077.

Jei Sing's misfortune was of the utmost importance to Sévají. During his struggle and retreat he had withdrawn all his troops from the country near the Ghâts, had evacuated many forts, and left others with scarcely any garrisons. Many of these were occupied by Sévají's officers before he himself reached the Deckan; and his own arrival was speedily followed by still more extensive acquisitions.

Progress of Sévají.

The change in the Mogul commanders was yet more to Sévají's advantage. Jeswant Sing had a great ascendancy over Prince Móazzim, and was much better disposed to the Hindús than to the government which he served; and it was, moreover, believed that he was not inaccessible to the influence of money. By these means combined, Sévají enlisted him on his side; and, through his and the prince's aid, obtained a peace with Aurangzíb on terms exceeding his most sanguine hopes. A considerable portion of territory was restored to him, and a new jágír granted to him in Berár. His title of rája was acknowledged, and all his former offences seemed to be buried in oblivion.

He makes peace with the emperor.

Thus delivered from his most powerful enemy,

Levies tribute on

BOOK XI.

Bíjapúr and Golcónda.

Sévají turned his arms against Bíjapúr and Golcónda; and those states, weak within, and threatened by the Moguls, were unwilling to enter on a new contest with their formidable neighbour, and averted the evil by the humiliating expedient of agreeing to an annual tribute.

His internal arrangements. A. D. 1668 and 1669, A. H. 1078 and 1079.

A long period of tranquillity which followed was employed by Sévají in giving a regular form to his government; and none of his military successes raise so high an idea of his talents as the spirit of his domestic administration. Instead of the rules of a captain of banditti, we are surprised to find a system more strict and methodical than that of the Moguls. The army, both horse and foot, was formed into uniform divisions, commanded by a regular chain of officers, from heads of ten, of fifty, &c. &c., up to heads of 5000, above which there was no authority except that of the general appointed to command a particular army; and these officers were not feudal chiefs, but servants of the government, placed over soldiers mustered and paid by *its* agents. Both troops and officers received high pay, but were obliged to give up their plunder of every description to the state. The most minute attention to economy pervaded every department of Sévají's service.

His civil government was equally regular, and very rigorous, both towards its own officers and the heads of villages; and this, in checking oppression of the cultivators, no less than frauds against the state. His civil officers were all Bramins, and

CHAP. II.

those of the highest rank were often employed in military commands also.

Schemes of Aurangzíb to entrap Sévají.

The real motive of Aurangzíb's concessions was the hope of getting Sévají again into his power, without the expense and damage of a protracted war with him. He pursued his object with his usual patience, enjoining Prince Móazzim and Jeswant Sing to keep up a constant intercourse with Sévají, and let slip no opportunity of making him their prisoner. They were even directed to feign disaffection to his own government, and to show a disposition for a secret and separate alliance with the Marattas.* But Sévají turned all the em-

A. D. 1670, A. H. 1080.

* Grant Duff. He, however, doubts whether Móazzim ever gave in at all to the emperor's design, and whether he ever attempted to deceive Sévají by a show of disaffection; but it seems probable that he must, to a certain extent, have conformed to his instructions; and that it was his consequent proceedings that gave rise to the story first told by Catrou (or Manucci), of a mock rebellion of Prince Móazzim, got up by his father's desire, for the double purpose of finding out his secret enemies and of discrediting his son, in case that prince should ever be disposed to rebel in earnest. According to this account, Prince Móazzim openly declared against his father, and was joined by Jei Sing and all the rest of the army, except Dilír Khán, and had actually marched to the river Chambal (towards Agra), before he professed to renounce his design. The only use (it says) made by Aurangzíb of the knowledge obtained at so great a hazard was, to secure himself against one of his enemies by poisoning Jei Sing. But Jei Sing had been removed from the Deckan before the prince's arrival, and was dead before the date of the pretended insurrection. This last inconsistency was discovered by Orme, who does not doubt the rest of the story; but the absurdity of the whole is laid open in a few words by Grant Duff (vol. i. p. 221.). It is not the

BOOK XI.

peror's plans against himself: he conciliated Móazzim and Jeswant by bribes and presents, and made them his instruments in deceiving Aurangzíb. That monarch was too sagacious not to discover in time the failure of his scheme; and when he had ascertained it beyond doubt, he gave orders for an open attempt to seize Sévají; which of course involved a renewal of the war.

Aurangzíb breaks the peace.

Sévají surprises Singhar.

The first blow struck by Sévají was the recovery of Singhar, near Púna. The Moguls were as sensible as he was of the importance of this place, and maintained in it a strong garrison of Rájpúts, under an experienced officer. Yet it was surprised by 1000 Máwalis, under Sévají's great friend and confidant, Tánají Málúsri, who contrived to climb up that apparently inaccessible rock in the night time, and to escalade the walls, before they were discovered by the guards. They, however, met with an obstinate resistance; and it was not without the loss of their leader, and a large proportion of their number, that they at length

only occasion in which the wily character of Aurangzíb has led to his being suspected of deep schemes and intrigues in which he never was engaged. Dow substitutes Jeswant Sing for Jei Sing, and makes Móazzim's rebellion a real one, which, he says, was only frustrated by a succession of skilful operations on the part of Dilír Khán, after Aurangzíb himself had been obliged to take the field. He seems to draw his account from the "Bondela Memoirs," afterwards translated by Scott (*Deckan*, vol. ii. p. 24.); but he goes beyond his authority in some things, and omits the Bondéla's statement (doubtless an erroneous one) that Sévaji actually joined the prince.

overpowered the garrison. Sévají was so much impressed with the difficulty and importance of the undertaking, that he conferred a silver bracelet on every individual of the survivors.

Ravages the Mogul territory.

He failed in some attacks on other forts, but reduced a much greater number, and occupied much territory: he also again plundered Surat, carried his ravages over Cándésh, and, for the first time, levied the *chout*, afterwards so celebrated in Maratta history. It was a permanent contribution of one fourth of the revenue, and exempted the districts that agreed to it from plunder as long as it was regularly paid. Sévají also equipped a powerful fleet, and renewed his attacks on his old enemies, the Abyssinians of Jinjera, who held a small principality as admirals to the king of Bíjapúr. This attack was injudicious; for it led to the Abyssinians placing themselves under the Moguls, and thus increasing the power of Sévají's only formidable enemy.

A. D. 1670, December; A. H. 1081.

Chout.

The rapidity of Sévají's progress was owing to the inadequacy of the force under Móazzim, whom Aurangzíb long refused to reinforce from distrust: and when, at last, he was convinced of the necessity of having more troops in the Deckan, he sent down an army of 40,000 men, under Mohábat Khán, and entirely independent of the prince's authority. Nor was he by any means entirely satisfied even with this new commander: shortly before his march from Delhi he took offence at some of his proceedings, and ordered one of the

A. D. 1671, A. H. 1081.

BOOK XI.

ministers to remonstrate with him in private. The arrival of his army was attended with no corresponding result. Móazzim remained inactive at Aurangábád; and Mohábat Khán, after undertaking some sieges, was obliged to suspend his proceedings by the approach of the rainy season.

Defeats the Moguls in a field action.

When he again began operations, Sévají sent an army to raise a siege in which Mohábat was engaged, and the latter, in an injudicious attempt to cover the siege, exposed a body of 20,000 men to a total defeat by the Marattas.* This was the first field action won by Sévají's troops, and the first instance of success in a fair conflict with the Moguls. It seems to have made a strong impression on the beaten party: they immediately concentrated their forces on Aurangábád, and both Móazzim and Mohábat were soon after recalled; Khán Jehán, the viceroy of Guzerát, was sent to take their place; Aurangzíb's exertions were required in another quarter, and the war languished for a period of several years.

A. D. 1672, A. H. 1082.

Khán Jehán made viceroy of the Deckan.

Suspension of active operations in the Deckan.

What drew off Aurangzíb's attention was, the increasing importance of a war which had for some time been going on with the north-eastern Afgháns. It was always a matter of difficulty to remain at peace with those tribes; but, as the communication with Cábul and other western countries lay

Aurangzíb occupied by a war with the north-eastern Afgháns.

* There are doubts about this battle, which some say was with a detachment of Dilír Khán's, and others, of Mohábat's. The obscurity arises from the same cause as the defeat, — the divided command of the Mogul army.

through their lands, it was necessary to find some means of keeping them quiet; and as the tribes upon the road were also the most open to attack, it was generally managed, between threats and pensions, to retain them in a certain degree of submission to the royal government. The more powerful tribes were let alone, and remained quiet within their own limits. But, from the numerous small communities, and the weakness of the internal government even in the large ones, there must often have been acts of aggression by individuals, which required forbearance on the part of the royal officers. As Aurangzíb was very jealous of his authority, and as he knew nothing of the structure of society among the Afgháns, it is not unlikely that he suspected the chiefs of countenancing these irregularities underhand; but, from whatever cause it proceeded, he fell out with the whole of the tribes, even including the Eusofzeis. This was the state of things in A. D. 1667, when Amín Khán, the son of the celebrated Mír Jumla, and the successor to his rank and title, was appointed governor of Cábul, and gained such success as for a time prevented the disturbances increasing, although they never were entirely suspended. But, in A. D. 1670, the Afgháns regained their superiority, defeated Amín Khán in a great battle, and totally destoyed his army: even his women and children fell into their hands, and were obliged to be redeemed by the payment of a ransom.

BOOK XI.

The Afgháns, about the same time, set up a king, and coined money in his name.*

A. D. 1673, about Jan.; A. H. 1083, Rámzán.

The emperor at last determined to conduct the war in person. He marched to Hasan Abdál, and sent on his son, Prince Sultán, whom he had now released and intrusted with the command of an army. He probably was prevented going himself by the fear of committing his dignity in a strong country, where great blows could not be struck, and where great reverses might be sustained.

From A. D. 1673, January, to A. D. 1675, October; A. H. 1083, Rámzán, to A. H. 1086, Jamádi 2., or thereabouts.

This war occupied Aurangzíb for more than two years†, and was carried on through his lieutenants after his own return to Delhi, until the increased disturbances in India, and the hopelessness of success, at length compelled him to be contented with a very imperfect settlement. But although the contest was of such importance at the time, it had no permanent influence on the history of India; and the events of it, though varied and interesting, may be imagined from those already related under the reign of Akber.‡

* The Indian writers seem to consider this person as an Afghán chief; but such a nomination is equally inconsistent with the feelings and institutions of that people; and (although the authority is, no doubt, inferior) I am inclined to believe, with the Europeans, that the pretended king was an impostor, who was passed off for Shújá, whom the Afgháns represented to have taken refuge among them, and whose pretensions to the throne of India would furnish good means of annoying Aurangzíb.

† Kháfi Khán.

‡ This war derives additional interest from the picture of it preserved by one of the principal actors. Khúsh Khál, the khán

CHAP. II.

A. D. 1676, A. H. 1087. Aurangzíb returns to Delhi.

Insurrection of the Satnarámi religionists.

The emperor had scarcely returned from this unsuccessful expedition, when an extraordinary insurrection broke out near the capital. A sect of Hindú devotees, called Satnarámis, were settled near the town of Nárnól: they were principally engaged in trade and agriculture; and, though generally peaceable, carried arms, and were always ready to use them in their own defence. One of their body, having been mobbed and beaten by the comrades of a soldier of the police, with whom he had quarrelled, collected some of his brethren to retaliate on the police. Lives were lost, and the affray increased till several thousand Satnarámis were assembled; and the chief authority of the place having taken part against them, they defeated a band of troops, regular and local, which he had got together; and finally took possession of the town of Nárnól. An inadequate force sent against them from Delhi was defeated, and served only to add to their reputation; a repetition of the same circumstance raised the wonder of the country, and, joined to their religious character, soon led to a belief that they were possessed of magical powers: swords would not cut, nor bullets pierce them; while their enchanted weapons dealt death at every

---

of the tribe of Khatak, was a voluminous author, and has left several poems, written at this time, for the purpose of exciting the national enthusiasm of his countrymen. They are remarkable for their high and ardent tone, and for their spirit of patriotism and independence, so unlike the usual character of Asiatics.

BOOK XI.

blow. The belief that they were invincible nearly made them so in reality. Many of the zemíndárs of the neighbourhood took part with them; no troops could be got to face them; and as they approached Delhi, Aurangzíb ordered his tents to be prepared to take the field, and with his own hand wrote extracts from the Korán, to be fastened to the standards, as a protection against enchantment. The absolute necessity of resistance, and the exertions of some chiefs, both Mussulman and Hindú, at last prevailed on the royal troops to make a stand, when the insurgents were defeated and dispersed with great loss. But the previous success had tempted many of the Hindú population to take up arms, and had thrown the whole provinces of Ajmír and Agra into such confusion that Aurangzíb thought his own presence necessary to restore order.*

Aurangzíb's bigotry.

These disturbances had irritated his temper, already ruffled by his failure beyond the Indus; and led him, while he was still in Delhi, to take the last step in a long course of bigotry and impolicy, by reviving the jeziá or capitation tax on Hindús.

At the second anniversary of his accession (A. D. 1659), he forbade the solar æra, as an invention of fire worshippers, and directed the Mahometan lunar year to be used on all occasions; and in this resolution he persevered, notwithstand-

* Kháfi Khán.

ing long-continued remonstrances from his official people, on the disadvantage of a calendar that did not agree with the seasons. *

His vexatious treatment of the Hindús.

At the same time he appointed a mullah, with a party of horse attached to him, to suppress all drinking and gambling houses, and to check all ostentatious display of idol worship. † Not long afterwards, he abolished all taxes not expressly authorised by the Mahometan law, and all duties on goods sold at the great Hindú fairs, which he considered as polluted by their original connection with idolatry. His remissions, as far as they were carried into effect, were productive of great inequality; the unauthorised taxes being chiefly those that fell on bankers, great traders, and other inhabitants of towns, whom the new rule would have left nearly exempt from contribution. The land revenue remained as before; and the customs and road duties, which were by much the most vexatious of all, were rather increased than diminished. ‡

But, in fact, the alteration produced a heavy loss to the state, without affording any relief to the subject; except in a few cases where the exaction was likely to attract notice, the revenue officers and jágírdárs confined the remission to their accounts with the government, and levied the taxes without diminution on those under their authority. Some years later he forbade fairs on Hindú festivals

* Kháfi Khán. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid.

BOOK XI.

altogether; and about the same time he issued an edict against music, dancing, and buffoons, and discharged all the singers and musicians attached to the palace. He likewise forbade astrology, and dismissed the astrologers previously attached to the court. He also discountenanced poets, who used to be honoured and pensioned, and abolished the office and salary of royal poet. It is even distinctly related that he prohibited the composition and recitation of poetry*; but this extreme austerity must have been of very short duration, for his own notes and letters are filled with poetical quotations, and sometimes with extemporary verses made by himself. His prohibition of history was more permanent; he not only discontinued the regular annals of the empire, which had before been kept by a royal historiographer, but so effectually put a stop to all record of his transactions, that, from the eleventh year of his reign, the course of events can only be traced through the means of letters on business and of notes taken clandestinely by private individuals. A few years later he took off one half of the customs paid by Mahometans, while he left those of Hindús undiminished. Among other minute reforms, he made further changes in the mode of saluting him; and discontinued his public appearance at the window of his palace, for fear of affording an opportunity for the ceremony of adoration. Though few of these alterations bore di-

* Kháfi Khán.

rectly on the Hindús, they all tended to stir up a scrupulous and captious spirit, and to mark the line between the followers of the two religions which it had been the policy of former monarchs to efface.

His present measures were far more decidedly intolerant; for, although he began with an equitable edict, by which all claims on the government were to be received in the courts, and tried according to the Mahometan law, yet, at the same time, a circular order was sent to all governors and persons in authority to entertain no more Hindús, but to confer all the offices immediately under them on Mahometans only.

It was found quite impracticable to comply with this order; and, in fact, most of the above edicts remained a dead letter, and had no other effect but to excite alarm and disaffection.

He revives the jezía, or poll tax on infidels.

But no such laxity appeared in the levy of the jezía. The poll tax so called was imposed, during the early conquests, on all infidels who submitted to the Mahometan rule, and was the test by which they were distinguished from those who remained in a state of hostility. The revival of it excited the utmost discontent among the Hindús. Those at Delhi and the neighbourhood assembled in crowds, and besieged the king's palace with their complaints and clamours. No attention was paid to these remonstrances. On the next Friday, when the king was going in procession to the mosque, he found the streets completely choked

BOOK XI.

by the crowd of suppliants. He waited some time in hopes that a passage might be opened by fair means; but as the mob continued to hold their ground, he ordered his retinue to force their way through; and many persons were trampled under foot by the horses and elephants. This harsh conduct was successful in striking terror, and the tax was submitted to without further demur.

A. D. 1677. A. H. 1088.

General disaffection of the Hindús.

The effects of these fanatical proceedings were not long in showing themselves. At the beginning of this reign, the Hindús served the state as zealously as the Mussulmans; and that, even when employed against people of their own religion; but their attachment declined as they had experience of the new system; discontent spread among the inhabitants of the emperor's own dominions; the Rájpúts began to be disaffected; and every Hindú in the Deckan became at heart a partisan of the Marattas.*

* Kháfi Khán. The general sentiment of the time is well shown in a letter to Aurangzíb, commonly ascribed to Jeswant Sing. It cannot be his work; for it is the letter of an open enemy, whose dominions are about to be invaded; and Jeswant Sing was serving against the Afgháns when the jezía was imposed, and continued beyond the Indus till his death: it must, besides, have been written at a later period, after the decline of the empire had become apparent. It is also assigned to Ráj Sing, rána of Oudipúr, as well as to a rája named Subah Sing; and the Marattas claim it for Sévají (Grant Duff, vol. i. p. 219.). It is not improbable that it is the work of some private Hindú politician, who chose this way of publishing a sort of manifesto against the government. It is not destitute of ability. It maintains the principles of toleration, which are violated by the jezía;

CHAP. II.

These religious animosities were kindled into a flame by an event which took place a few months after the imposition of the jezía. Rája Jeswant Sing died at Cábul, leaving a widow and two infant sons. The widow immediately set out for India without leave or passports; and, on her being stopped at the Indus, her escort made an attempt to force the guard at Attok, and afterwards did effect their passage by some neglected ford. This violence afforded a pretext for Aurangzíb to get the children into his power. He refused them admission into Delhi, and surrounded their encampment with his troops.

Oppressive measures against the widow and children of Rája Jeswant Sing.

But on this occasion the Rájpúts united considerable address to their accustomed courage. Their leader, Durga Dás, obtained leave to send off part of the escort with their women and children to their own country: along with this party he dispatched the ráni and her infants in disguise, while he substituted two children of the same age for the young princes, and employed one of her female attendants to personate the ráni; all which was rendered more easy by the privacy of the

They escape from Delhi.

exalts the liberality of the former princes of the house of Teimúr; and contrasts the flourishing state of the empire in their time with that of the present reign; when men of all classes and religions are discontented, the revenue gone to ruin, the people oppressed and yet the treasury empty, the police neglected, the cities insecure, and the forts falling into decay. [A translation of this letter is given in "Orme's Fragments," p. 252. A closer translation, with the Persian, was published by Mr. Weston, in 1803.]

BOOK XI.

women's apartments. In spite of these precautions many hours had not elapsed before Aurangzíb's suspicions were awakened, and he sent orders that the ráni and her children should be brought into the citadel. His fears of their actual escape were for the time removed by the obstinacy of the Rájpúts, who refused to give up the widow and children of their rája, and declared themselves ready to die in their defence. His attention was now occupied in overcoming their resistance: troops were sent against them, whom they gallantly repulsed; at length, after the loss of the greater part of their number, the supposed ráni and her family were seized, while Durga Dás and the survivors dispersed for the time; and, again assembling at a distance, retired to their own country. Their protracted defence had given time for the ráni to effect her escape. She arrived in safety in Jódpúr, and her eldest son, Ajít Sing, lived to enjoy a long reign over Márwár, and to be a formidable enemy to Aurangzíb for all the rest of that monarch's life. His identity, however, was long exposed to question; for Aurangzíb, with his usual adroitness, received the supposititious children as the undoubted issue of Rája Jeswant Sing, directed them to be honourably treated, and afterwards employed their pretensions in aid of his attacks on Jódpúr.

Combination of the Rájpúts.

This outrage towards the family of one of their body, combined with the imposition of the jeziá, disposed the Rájpúts to unite in their own defence. Rája Rám Sing of Jeipúr or Ambér, whose family

CHAP. II.

was connected with that of the emperor by so many intermarriages and the distinguished services of several generations, retained his attachment even at the present crisis; but Ráj Sing, rána of Oudipúr or Mewár, entered heartily into the cause of the children of Jeswant Sing, and at the same time peremptorily refused to agree to the jezía. The whole of the western part of Rajpútána being now opposed to him, Aurangzíb assembled an army and marched to Ajmír.* From that place he sent on detachments to ravage Márwár; and, with his main army, he made so great an impression on the rána as to reduce him to send in overtures of submission. He was allowed very favourable terms: a small cession of territory being accepted in lieu of the jeziá, and no other sacrifice demanded but a promise not to assist Jódpúr.

The emperor marches against them.

A. D. 1679, January; A. H. 1089, Zí Haj.

1679

Grants favourable terms to the rána of Méwár.

This arrangement concluded, the emperor returned to Delhi, having been absent less than eight months.† He had scarcely reached his capital, when he learned that the rána had broken the treaty (probably by giving secret assistance to Jódpúr), and before many months were over he again set out for Ajmír. On this occasion, he put forth his utmost strength and applied all his energy to the speedy suppression of the combination against him. He summoned Prince Móazzim from the Deckan and Prince A'zim from Bengal; and at a later period he ordered the viceroy of

The rána breaks the peace.

A. D. 1679, July; A. H. 1090, Rajab.

* Kháfi Khán. † Ibid.

BOOK XI.

Guzerát to invade the Rájpút territory from that quarter also. But the principal attack was made by his own army, which was sent under Prince Akber (assisted by Tohavvar Khán) direct to Oudipúr, while the rána, intimidated by the forces which threatened him on all sides, abandoned his capital, and took refuge in the Aravalli mountains. He was pursued into his retreat by Akber, who left a detachment behind him to ravage the open plains. Prince Móazzim had by this time reached U'jén, and was ordered to adopt the same course; and Prince A'zim, on his arrival, was directed against the Jódpúr territory and the adjoining part of the rána's. Their orders were, to employ part of their troops to cut off all supplies from the fugitives in the hills; and with the rest to lay waste the country, burn and destroy the villages, cut down the fruit trees, and carry off the women and children; so as to make the enemy feel all the evils of war in their utmost severity.

Devastation of the Rájpút territory.

It is consistent with Aurangzíb's character to suppose that these inhuman orders were dictated by an unfeeling policy alone; but his religious prejudices and his hatred of opposition make it probable that anger and revenge also had an influence even on his calculating temper. Whatever were the motives, the effect was to complete for ever the alienation of the Rájpúts. They were afterwards often at peace with Aurangzíb's successors, and they sometimes even furnished their contingents and professed their allegiance; but their service

Permanent alienation of the Rájpúts.

was yielded with constraint and distrust, very unlike the zealous attachment which formerly made them the prop of the monarchy.

During all this time, the Rájpúts kept a body of 25,000 horse, chiefly Ráhtórs of Jódpúr, in the field, with which, aided by their infantry in the hills, they occasioned much distress and some danger to their adversaries: they cut off convoys, attacked detachments, defended favourable positions, and sometimes gained important advantages by surprises and night attacks. But Durga Dás, who still acted a prominent part in their councils, did not trust to force alone for the deliverance of his country. He endeavoured to open a negotiation with Prince Móazzim, and to draw him off from his allegiance by offers to support him in possessing himself of the crown. These prospects seem, for a time, to have had some charms even for Móazzim, a prince of mature years, and next in succession to the throne; but on his rejection of them, they were eagerly embraced by Prince Akber, the youngest of the brothers, who was then only twenty-three, and who, in his boyhood, had been considered as the chosen heir of his father. * He at once entered into Durga Dás's views; and although Prince Móazzim warned the emperor of the plots which were going on, yet Aurangzíb was attached to Akber, whose youth, he thought, prevented his being dangerous, and at the same time,

Prince Akber joins the Rájpúts with his army.

* Bernier, vol. i. p. 193.

BOOK XI.

he entertained the greatest jealousy of Móazzim himself. He therefore set down his information to envy, or some worse motive, and took no step to guard against Akber's infidelity, until he heard that Durga Dás was encamped beside him, and that he had assumed the title and all the functions of a king. Tohavvar Khán became his prime minister; Majáhid Khán, another great nobleman, also accepted of an office; and the rest of the army, destitute of a leader, continued submissive to the authority which they had been accustomed to obey.

Is proclaimed emperor.

Aurangzíb had sent all his troops on different detachments; and had scarcely 1000 men with him at Ajmír, when he heard that Akber was in full march against him. He instantly called in Móazzim, with as many of his troops as he could assemble; but they produced nothing capable of opposing Akber, now at the head of 70,000 men. Aurangzíb's situation seemed hopeless; and, to render it still more desperate, he gave way to his old suspicions of Móazzim, and ordered his guns to be pointed on that prince's division. But he did not lose his penetration even in this perplexity: conjecturing that the bulk of Akber's army had been surprised into revolt, rather than led to it by any real disaffection, he sent an officer of ability, who was brother to Majáhid Khán, with a small body of horse, to get as near as he could to the enemy, and try to open a communication with his brother. Majáhid, who had never sincerely united with Akber, took the first opportunity of coming

Marches against Aurangzíb.

Dangerous situation of he emeror.

His presence of mind.

over to his brother. His example was followed by other chiefs; and the general inclination was so evident, that Tohavvar Khán, when next day sent out with the advanced guard, came forward as if to engage with that opposed to him, and at once passed over to the emperor's side.

Defection of Akber's army.

It is not clear whether there was a real or affected suspicion that he came over with treacherous intentions; or whether, which is extremely improbable, he really did entertain such designs; but a report was set on foot, that he intended to assassinate the emperor, and, on his refusing to give up his arms, force was used, and he was cut down close to the royal pavilion.

Meanwhile, his desertion, and that of so many other men of all ranks, struck the Rajpúts with dismay; and, finding themselves left to oppose the whole Mussulman army, they thought it necessary at last to attend to their own safety; only Durga Dás remaining, with 3000 horse, to protect Prince Akber on his retreat. That prince was left with scarcely a single Mahometan soldier; and all he could expect from the Rájpúts was to be allowed to share in their privations. He therefore resolved to seek an asylum with the Marattas; and, eluding pursuit by a march through the hills into Guzerát, he made his way to the Concan, and arrived in safety, still escorted by Durga Dás, with 500 Rájpúts.*

Akber flies to the Marattas.

A. D. 1681, June 1.

* Letters from Bombay, quoted in Orme's "Fragments," p. 267.

BOOK XI.

Protracted war with the Rájpúts.

But the war with Mewár and Jódpúr, though it had returned into its old channel, continued unabated. The Moguls went on with their ravages: the Rájpúts retaliated by similar inroads into Málwa; and having, at length, caught the spirit of intolerance from their persecutors, they plundered the mosques, burned the Korán, and insulted the mullahs. The chief sufferer by this system of hostility was the rána of Oudipúr, whose fertile territory lay nearest the Moguls, and was occupied by their troops; while the remote and barren tracts under Jódpúr were less exposed to such an impression. Aurangzíb himself was desirous of putting an end to a struggle which withdrew him from more important affairs; and, by his contrivance, the rána was induced to make overtures, which were immediately and favourably received. The jezía was passed over in silence, the small cession formerly made in lieu of that impost was now given as a penalty for having assisted Akber; but all the other articles were favourable to the rána, whose honour was saved by a clause promising the restoration of Ajít Sing's country to him when he should come of age.* This treaty allowed Aurangzíb to draw off his army, without discredit, to the Deckan, where its presence could no longer be dispensed with; but it did little towards the real restoration of tranquillity. The western Rájpúts were still in arms; the war with

* Orme's Fragments, p. 106. Tod's Rajasthan, vol. i. p. 388.

the rána was renewed at no distant period, and the whole of the Rájpút states, except Jeipúr and the little principalities towards the east, continued in a state of open hostility till the end of Aurangzíb's reign. The capitals remained in the hands of the Moguls; but, though the dissensions among the Rájpúts prevented their making solid acquisitions, they still severely harassed the troops in their own country, and often laid waste the neighbouring provinces.*

* Tod's Rajasthan, vol. ii. p. 69, &c. Colonel Tod's account of the transactions subsequent to the treaty is probably rectified from the Mahometan newspapers (akhbárs) of the day, which he mentions were in his possession. It is certainly quite unlike the Rájpút legends; being distinct and consistent, and constantly referring to dates, which coincide with those of events related by other authors.

CHAP. III.

FROM 1681 TO 1698.

BOOK XI.

Affairs of the Deckan resumed.

THE continuance of this warfare did not prevent Aurangzíb from turning all the resources he could command to the settlement of the Deckan, where many changes of moment had taken place while he was engaged in other quarters. When his forces were first drawn off for the war with the Afgháns (A. D. 1672), Khán Jehán, his general in the Deckan, found himself too weak to prosecute active hostilities against the Marattas; and would probably have been unable to defend his own province, if their leader had been disposed to attack it.

Sévají's conquests from Bíjapúr.

But while things were in this position, the king of Bíjapúr died, and the state of discord into which his country fell offered greater temptations to Sévají than were presented by any attack on the Moguls. The part of Bíjapúr which most attracted him on this occasion, was that on the sea, with the adjoining Ghats; and in the course of the years 1673 and 1674 A. D., after a succession of battles and sieges, he made himself master of the whole of the southern Concan (except the points held by the English, Abyssinians, and Portuguese), and of a tract above the Ghâts, extending further to the east than the upper course of the Kishna. Though Sévají had long borne the privileges of sovereignty,

CHAP. III.

he conceived it suitable to the undertakings he had now in view to assume the exercise of them with greater solemnity than before. He was therefore again inaugurated at Ráighar with all the ceremonies of a Mogul coronation, including his being weighed in gold and distributing rich presents to all around him. At the same time he changed the titles of his principal officers from Persian to Shanscrit; and while he thenceforth assumed all the pomp of a Mahometan prince, he redoubled his attention to the duties of his religion, and affected greater scrupulosity than ever in food and other things connected with cast.*

Is crowned at Ráighar with additional solemnity.

The long period for which Sévají had been employed in his conquests encouraged the Moguls to make an incursion into his possessions soon after this ceremony; but they had reason to repent their temerity. Sévaji, without moving in person, sent detachments into the Imperial territory, and these bands took two forts, plundered the country to the heart of Candésh and Berár, and even penetrated into Guzerát as far as Baróch, where for the first time they crossed the river Nerbadda. These incursions took place in 1675; and as he hoped they might induce the Moguls to refrain from disturbing him again, they left Sévají at liberty to execute a design that had long occupied

Makes an incursion into the Mogul territory,

and first crosses the Nerbadda.

* Mr. Oxenden, who was envoy from Bombay to Sévají, was present at his coronation, and describes it as much more splendid than would have been expected among early Marattas. It took place on the 6th of June, 1674.

BOOK XI.

Sévají's expedition to the south of India.

his thoughts. This was the recovery of his father's jágír, and a further extension of his conquests in the south of India. The jágír had hitherto remained in the hands of his younger brother, Véncají, who held it under the nominal supremacy of the government of Bíjapúr. Sévají was therefore now at liberty either to claim it as heir, or to conquer it as an enemy; and his views were particularly directed to it from his having lately been joined by Ragunát Náráin, the Bramin who had formerly managed it on the part of Sháhji, and had afterwards been minister to Véncají, until a recent quarrel. This man was useful to Sévají both from his knowledge and connections. But as he could not safely set out on so remote an expedition without leaving a friend in his rear, he took advantage of the jealousy of Bíjapúr and fears of the Moguls entertained by the king of Golcónda, and proposed an alliance to him against their common enemies. His overtures being encouraged, he marched for Golcónda with an army of 30,000 horse and 40,000 infantry. He halted for some time at Golcónda to make a definitive settlement of his alliance; when it was agreed that he was to share with the king whatever conquests he made beyond his father's jágír, and that the king was to supply him with a sum of money and a train of artillery, reserving all his other forces to keep the armies of Bíjapúr and the Moguls in check. Having thus secured his rear, Sévají crossed the Kishna at Carnúl, proceeded through

Towards the end of A. D. 1676.

A. D. 1677, March.

CHAP. III.

Cadapa, and, passing close to Madras *, presented himself before Jinjí (Gingee) 600 miles from his own territories. Jinjí was a strong and important hill fort belonging to Bíjapúr, but was given up in consequence of a previous understanding with the commander. The heavy part of his army, which he had left behind, next laid siege to, and ultimately took, Vellór; while Sévají had a personal interview with his brother, and endeavoured to persuade him to give him a share of their father's possessions. Having failed in this negotiation, he took A'rní and various other forts, and forcibly occupied the whole of Sháhjí's jágír in the Mysore. While thus employed, he heard of the invasion of Golcónda by the Moguls and the government of Bíjapúr; on which he marched off to the north, leaving his conquests in charge of his half-brother, Santají, who had joined him on his first arrival. As soon as Sévají was out of reach, Véncají made an attempt to recover his possessions; and the dispute terminated in a compromise, by which Véncají was to retain the jágír, ut pay half the revenue to Sévají, who was to keep to himself the places which *he* had conquered from Bíjapúr. The king of Golcónda had by this time come to a settlement with the Moguls; and Sévají, after conquering the districts of Belári and Adóni on his way, passed on to Ráighar, which he reached after an absence of eighteen months.

He takes Jinjí

and Vellór,

and recovers all his father's jágír in Mysore.

About the middle of A. D. 1678.

* First week of May, 1677. Wilks's Mysore, from the "Madras Records."

BOOK XI.

The Moguls, under Dilír Khán, invade Golcónda.

The invasion of Golcónda was owing to a change in the policy of the Moguls. Khán Jehán had been removed, and succeeded by Dilír Khán, perhaps the best of Aurangzíb's officers. His force was still small; but a considerable portion of his troops were Patáns, like himself, and he made up for all deficiencies by his own vigour and activity. The king of Bíjapúr was still a minor, and various revolutions had taken place among his ministers and guardians. Dilír formed a union with one of them, and made the above-mentioned attack on Golcónda. The regent of Bíjapúr, who acted with him on that occasion, died soon after; and Dilír, by supporting the claims of an Abyssinian, named Masáúd, to succeed him, acquired a perfect ascendancy in the councils of Bíjapúr. But Aurangzíb, not satisfied with these advantages, sent down prince Móazzim, as viceroy, to advance further demands, which Dilír, as general, was to enforce. In execution of this plan, Dilír renewed the war with Bíjapúr, and laid siege to the capital. The regent, in despair, had recourse to Sévají, who, not finding himself strong enough to attack the besieging army, invaded and laid waste the Mogul territory with more than ordinary severity. He was nearly cut off, on his retreat, or rather flight, from one of those inroads; but, almost immediately afterwards, appeared in greater strength than ever, and took several forts from the Moguls. But Dilír Khán still persevered in the siege, and the regent, reduced to extremity, entreated Sévají

Lay siege to Bíjapúr. A. D. 1679.

CHAP. III.

to come to his assistance before it was too late. Sévají had set off for this purpose, when he was surprised by the intelligence that his son, Sambají, had deserted to the Moguls. This young man, who had none of his father's qualities, except his courage, had given himself up to debauchery; and having attempted to violate the wife of a Bramin, was imprisoned, by Sévají, in one of his hill forts. He now escaped from his place of confinement, and fled to Dilír, who received him with open arms, intending to make use of him among the Marattas as a counterpoise to his father. The embarrassment this occasioned to Sévají was only temporary, for Aurangzíb, disapproving of Dilír's views, ordered Sambají to be sent prisoner to his own camp; and Dilír, whose honour was pledged for his safety, connived at his return to his father. Meanwhile, the defence of Bíjapúr had surpassed expectation: Sévají, as soon as he recovered from his first surprise, had renewed his exertions; and Dilír Khán, finding his supplies cut off, was obliged to raise the siege. The price of Sévají's alliance was a cession of the territory between the Tumbadra and Kishna, and of all the king's rights over the jágír of Sháhjí. This last acquisition gave him the right, as his success did the power, of exercising a more effectual control over his brother; and Véncají's mortification at the change had led him to the thoughts of renouncing worldly affairs; when all Sévají's designs were cut short by an

Sévají's son, Sambají, deserts to the Moguls.

He returns to his father.

Siege of Bíjapúr raised.

BOOK XI.

illness which carried him off on the 5th of April, 1680, in the fifty-third year of his age.

Death of Sévají. His character.

Though the son of a powerful chief, he had begun life as a daring and artful captain of banditti, had ripened into a skilful general and an able statesman, and left a character which has never since been equalled or approached by any of his countrymen. The distracted state of the neighbouring countries presented openings by which an inferior leader might have profited; but it required a genius like his to avail himself as he did of the mistakes of Aurangzíb, by kindling a zeal for religion, and, through that, a national spirit among the Marattas. It was by these feelings that his government was upheld after it passed into feeble hands, and was kept together, in spite of numerous internal disorders, until it had established its supremacy over the greater part of India. Though a predatory war, such as he conducted, must necessarily inflict extensive misery, his enemies bear witness to his anxiety to mitigate the evils of it by humane regulations, which were strictly enforced. His devotion latterly degenerated into extravagances of superstition and austerity, but seems never to have obscured his talents or soured his temper.

Unsuccessful attempt to set aside Sambají.

When Sambají returned from the Mogul camp, he was again placed in confinement at Panálla, and was there when his father died. This circumstance, and some expressions of uneasiness which had fallen from Sévají regarding the future conduct of his

eldest son, afforded a pretext for alleging that he designed the succession for the second, Rája Rám, a boy of ten years old. The intrigues of this young prince's mother gained acceptance to the story; and the Bramin ministers, who dreaded Sambají's violence, and looked with pleasure to a long minority, affected to receive it as authentic, and sent orders for the close arrest of Sambají, concealing Sévají's death till that object should be accomplished.

He is acknowledged rája.

But Sambají, who was a prisoner at large within Panálla, contrived to get possession of the secret, and announced his own accession to the garrison, who immediately acknowledged his authority. He did not at first venture out of his strong hold; but the public opinion was favourable to his right; the Bramin ministers fell out among themselves; a force that was sent to besiege him was gained over to his interest; and he at length made his entry into Ráighar as undisputed sovereign (June, 1680).

Sambají's cruelty.

His prudence, up to this time, had gone far to remove the prejudice entertained against him; but the favourable impression was effaced by his cruelties after his accession. He put the widow of Sévají to a painful and lingering death; he imprisoned her son, Rája Rám; threw the Bramin ministers, who had been most active against him, into irons; and beheaded such of his other enemies as were not protected by the sanctity of their class. The same prevalence of passion over policy ap-

BOOK XI.

peared in his foreign proceedings. Sévají had always been in a state of hostility with the Abyssinians of Jinjera, and had occasionally made great efforts to reduce them. Sambají's first operations were against these people; and, as they were near neighbours to his capital, he took a personal interest in the war, and for a long time gave up his whole thoughts to subduing them, as if he had had no other enemy in the world. He was not diverted from this pursuit even by the arrival of Prince Akber in his camp (June, 1681). He received the prince with honour, and acknowledged him as emperor, yet showed no intention of rendering his pretensions useful by supporting them against Aurangzíb. The arrival of Akber suggested to the party still secretly opposed to Sambají the possibility of obtaining his sanction to the claim of Rája Rám. Their plot was soon discovered; many of their leaders were trampled to death by elephants; and among the sufferers was one of the chief Bramin ministers, whose eminent services to Sévají seemed to protect him from capital punishment almost as much as his sacred order.

His obstinacy in besieging Jinjera.

Joined by Prince Akber.

Plots against his authority.

Executions.

Gives himself up to a favourite, Calúsha.

The disaffection to Sambají's government produced by these executions was increased by other causes. He neglected or persecuted his father's ministers, while he threw his own affairs, without reserve, into the hands of Calúsha, a Bramin from Hindostan, who had gained his favour by encouraging his vices, as well as by his insinuating manners and superficial accomplishments.

CHAP. III.

With the aid of this counsellor, he eagerly prosecuted his operations against Jinjera (A. D. 1682). He endeavoured to construct a mound to connect the island with the main land, and he afterwards attempted an assault by means of boats. All his exertions were in vain; and when he was constrained to raise the siege, the Abyssinians increased his mortification by sallying out and plundering his villages. They soon after injured him still more sensibly by entirely defeating his fleet at sea. Exasperated by these affronts, he charged the Europeans settled on the coast with having contributed to produce them: he began hostilities in person against the Portuguese, with whom Sévají had also been at war, and nearly proceeded to the same extremity with the English, although they had hitherto always been treated as friends. These petty operations were interrupted by attacks from the Moguls, the precursors of the appearance of Aurangzíb. Sambají's chiefs had not been entirely inactive in the Deckan during his own occupation with the Abyssinians; but great relaxation had been introduced into discipline; and it was increased, along with all other disorders, by the habits to which the rája had given himself up. His whole time was spent in idleness and debauchery: the vast treasures left by Sévají were soon dissipated; and, although Calúsha added to the general disaffection by increasing the land revenue, the income of the state was inadequate to its expenditure. The troops, left long in arrears, appropriated the plun-

Fails at Jinjera.

Decline of his affairs in the Deckan.

BOOK XI.

der taken on expeditions to their own use, and degenerated from the comparatively regular bands of Sévají into the hordes of rapacious and destructive freebooters which they have ever since remained.

A. D. 1683. Aurangzíb arrives in the Deckan.

By this time Aurangzíb had made his treaty with the rána of Oudipúr; and, after leaving a detachment to ravage the Jódpúr territory, moved with the whole force of his empire to the conquest of the Deckan.

His views.

It would appear to have been sound policy for Aurangzíb to have combined with the kings of Bíjapúr and Golcónda in putting down Sambají, and restoring the tranquillity of the Deckan; but he, perhaps, thought that those monarchs were more jealous of him than of the Marattas, and would not sincerely unite with him, so that Sambají would never want a retreat while they had dominions in which to harbour him. It is at least as probable that the acquisition of the kingdoms of Bíjapúr and Golcónda was Aurangzíb's primary object, and that he judged the reduction of Sambají to be a necessary consequence of success in his other more important undertaking. He had seen with pleasure the wars of those kings with each other, and with the Marattas; had fomented their internal disorders; and seemed so far blinded as to think that every thing that threw the Deckan into confusion must turn to his advantage.

A. D. 1683. His first advance was to Burhánpúr, where he made a long halt, as he afterwards did at Aurang-

ábád. He was occupied during those periods on political and financial arrangements; and, by a sort of infatuation, he took this occasion to enforce the strict exaction of the jezía, which the common sense of his officers had led them to avoid. CHAP. III.

Before he had left Burhánpúr, he sent Prince A'zim with a considerable force to reduce the hill forts near the junction of the Chandór range with the Ghâts, and Prince Móazzim, with a still larger one, to overrun the Concan, and penetrate to the south of Sambají's country, and the borders of that of Bíjapúr. It is as difficult to see any general design in the employment of these armies as to understand the principles on which their operations were conducted. The strong fort of Sálér was given up by previous concert to Prince A'zim, and this petty intrigue may have tempted Aurangzíb to detach a force to this unconnected point; but to send a large army of cavalry* among the rocks and thickets of the Concan, where there were no roads, no forage, and no field for the employment of horse, shows a want of judgment that it is quite impossible to explain. Móazzim marched the whole length of the Concan unopposed; yet, by the time he got to the neighbourhood of Goa, he had lost almost the whole of his horses and cattle, and even his men began to suffer from scarcity. The pressure was increased by Sambají, who stopped up the Ghâts, while his cruizers cut off

His first operations.

A. D. 1684.

Destruction of Prince Móazzim's army in the Concan.

* Orme says 40,000.

BOOK XI.

the vessels that were sent with supplies by sea; and Móazzim thought himself fortunate when he was able to emerge into the country above the Ghâts with the remains of his dismounted army. He was pursued by the effects of an unwholesome climate and unusual food, and lost a great portion of his men by an epidemic which broke out at Wálwa, near Mirich, on the Kishna, where he encamped for the period of the rains.

Invasion of Bíjapúr.

When the season opened he was directed to enter the territory of Bíjapúr from the south-west, so as to co-operate with Prince A'zim, who, after failing in his expedition against the forts, was dispatched with a powerful army to invade Bíjapúr; while Aurangzíb himself advanced to Ahmednagar, leaving a reserve under Khán Jehán at Aurangábád.

A. D. 1685.

This movement gave Sambají an opportunity to retaliate the invasion of his country. He gradually assembled a body of horse in the north of the Concan, behind the right flank of Aurangzíb's armies, which from thence moved rapidly along their rear, sacked and burned the great city of Burhánpúr, and then drew off again to the Concan, leaving all the country through which it had passed in a blaze. So secret as well as rapid were the movements of this body, that Khán Jehán, marching on a point where he thought to intercept it, found himself entirely off the line of its retreat.

Sambají ravages the country in the emperor's rear.

Meanwhile Prince A'zim had taken Sólapúr, and was advancing towards Bíjapúr; but he found

himself unable to cope with the army that was sent out to oppose him, and was compelled to retreat beyond the Bíma; while Móazzim, too weak to attempt any movement by himself, was obliged to wait for reinforcements, by which he was escorted to Ahmednagar with the wreck of his fine army. CHAP. III.

After these failures Aurangzíb advanced in person to Sólapúr, and sent on Prince A'zim with his army reinforced: although the distance was so short, the Bíjapúr troops cut off the prince's supplies, and would have destroyed his army, if a large convoy of grain had not been skilfully conducted into his camp by Gházi u dín.* The impression he made was still small, until Aurangzíb, at a later period, moved on to the siege in person. Failure of the invasion of Bíjapúr. A. D. 1686.

It was in the present stage of the war that the Marattas, seeing the Moguls drawn off to the south, made another bold inroad into the territory in their rear, plundered the city of Baróch, and retreated after ravaging the adjoining part of Guzerát. It is not clear whether Sambají sent out this expedition from motives of his own, or in concert with the Deckan kings. He had about this time entered into a defensive alliance with the king of Golcónda; and on this fact becoming known to Aurangzíb, he did not allow his attention to be drawn off to Sambají, but immediately made it a ground of quarrel with Golcónda, and sent an Sambají plunders Baróch.

* The ancestor of the present Nizám.

BOOK XI.

Aurangzíb invades Golcónda.

army to invade that kingdom. From his usual distrust of powerful armies and great commanders, the force he sent was insufficient; and ere long he was constrained to send his son, Prince Móazzim, with a large body of troops, to support the first army, and take the command of the whole. The government of Golcónda was in a very different state from the distracted condition of Bíjapúr. The king, Abul Hasan, though indolent and voluptuous, was popular; and his government and finances were ably conducted by Madna Pant, a Bramin, to whom he wisely gave his full confidence. But the exclusive employment of this minister was odious to the Mussulmans, and especially to I'brahím Khán, the commander-in-chief, into whose hands the power would probably have fallen under any different arrangement. When Móazzim drew near, this man deserted to him with the greater part of his army. Madna Pant was murdered in a simultaneous tumult in the city; the king fled to the hill fort of Golcónda, and Heiderábád was seized and plundered for three successive days. Móazzim did his best to check this breach of discipline; and it gave the utmost displeasure to the emperor, not so much from humanity, or even policy, as on account of the quantity of treasure lost to the crown, which he violently suspected that Móazzim had embezzled for his own ambitious purposes, as he himself had done on a similar occasion under Sháh Jehán. Having thus effectually crippled the king of Golcónda, he granted him peace for a

great pecuniary payment, and turned his whole forces to the reduction of Bíjapúr.

Makes peace with the king.

The army of that monarchy appears at this time to have melted away; for, although the walls of the city are six miles in circumference, Aurangzíb was able to invest it completely, while he employed a portion of his army on a regular attack and breach. So well was the blockade kept up, that by the time the breach was practicable the town was distressed for provisions; and as the garrison, though small, was composed of Patáns, it was thought prudent to give them favourable terms. Aurangzíb entered the place on a portable throne through the breach, the young king was made prisoner, and Bíjapúr, ceasing to be a capital, was soon reduced to the deserted condition in which it now stands.*

Aurangzíb, in person, moves against Bíjapúr.

Takes the capital, and destroys the monarchy.

A. D. 1686, Oct. 15.

* "The walls, which are of hewn stone, and very lofty, are to this day entire, and, being surmounted by the cupolas and minarets of public buildings, still present to the spectator, from without, the appearance of a flourishing city; but, within, all is solitude, silence, and desolation. The deep moat, the double rampart, and the ruins of the splendid palaces in the citadel, attest the former magnificence of the court. The great mosque is a grand edifice, and the tomb of Ibrahim Adil Shah, already mentioned, is remarkable for its elegant and graceful architecture; but the chief feature in the scene is the mausoleum of Mohammud Adil Shah, the dome of which fills the eye from every point of view; and, though in itself entirely devoid of ornament, its enormous dimensions and austere simplicity invest it with an air of melancholy grandeur, which harmonises with the wreck and desolation that surround it." (Grant Duff, vol. i. p. 340.) One is at a loss, in seeing these ruins, to conjecture how so small a state could have maintained such a capital.

BOOK XI.

Aurangzíb breaks the peace with Golcónda.

No sooner had Bíjapúr fallen than Aurangzíb determined to break the peace with Golcónda; and the means he employed were as base as the design was perfidious. He drew his army near on pretext of a pilgrimage, and he obtained jewels and gifts of all sorts from the unfortunate king, anxious at any cost to purchase his friendship, or at least his compassion; but during all this interval he was intriguing with the ministers of Golcónda, and debauching the troops; and when his plot was ripe for execution, he published a manifesto denouncing the king as a protector of infidels, and soon after laid siege to his fort. From this moment Abul Hasan seemed to cast aside his effeminacy; and, though deserted by his troops, he bravely defended Golcónda for seven months, till it also was given up by treachery; and he then bore his misfortunes with a dignity and resignation that has endeared his memory to his subjects and their descendants even to this day.

A. D. 1687, September.

Imprisons Prince Móazzim.

During this siege, the unsleeping suspicions of Aurangzíb were stirred up by some indiscreet communications between Abul Hasan and Prince Móazzim. The object of this intercourse was to procure the prince's intercession with his father; but to Aurangzíb it appeared to afford a confirmation of all his former surmises, and he lost no time in securing Móazzim, who remained in more or less strict confinement for nearly seven years. Móazzim seems never to have given any cause for these alarms. All accounts give him credit for

caution and moderation. Bernier says, no slave could be more obedient, or seem more devoid of ambition: he, however, hints that this was rather too like Aurangzíb's own conduct in his youth; and perhaps the same reflection may have occurred to the emperor.*

Effects of these conquests.

Aurangzíb had now attained the summit of his wishes, but had sown a harvest of which he and his posterity were to reap the bitter produce. The governments which in some degree kept up order in the Deckan being annihilated, the frame of society which depended on them was dissolved, and the scattered materials remained as elements of discord. Though the Patáns and foreign mercenaries may have obtained service with the emperor, the rest of the troops of both armies were obliged to join Sambají, or to plunder on their own account. The distant zemíndárs seized every opportunity to make themselves independent, and, among all the wars and robberies to which they betook themselves, were always ready to befriend the Marattas, whom they looked on as the patrons of anarchy: those most within reach of the Moguls were disaffected to their conquerors; and from this motive, and the new-born feeling of religious opposition, were always ready to assist their enemies: so that, in spite of a short gleam of prosperity after the fall of Golcónda, Aurangzíb might date from that event a train of vexations and disasters which followed him to the grave.

Disordered state of the Deckan.

* Bernier, vol. i. p. 120.

BOOK XI.

He was not remiss in taking advantage of his present good fortune. He took possession of all the territories of Bíjapúr and Golcónda, even their latest southern conquests: he seized on Sháhjí's jágír in the Mysore, confining Véncají to Tanjore, and compelling the Marattas in Sévají's late acquisitions to fly to their forts; but in all these countries he had little more than a military occupation: the districts were farmed to the Désmuks and other zemíndárs, and were governed by military leaders, who received 25 per cent. for the expense of collecting, and who sent up the balance, after paying their troops, to the king; unless, as often happened, assignments were made for a period of years on fixed districts for the payment of other chiefs.

Aurangzíb takes possession of Bíjapúr and Golcónda, as far as Tanjore. A. D. 1688.

During all these great events Sambají remained in a state of personal inertness, ascribed by the Maratta historians to the enchantments of Calúsha, but naturally explained by the stupor and mental debility produced by a course of drunkenness and debauchery.

Inactivity of Sambají.

Prince Akber, disgusted with his manners, and hoping nothing from such an ally, quitted his court and repaired to Persia, where he lived till A. D. 1706. The chiefs exerted themselves individually against the Moguls, notwithstanding the inefficiency of their rája; but, in spite of their resistance, the open country belonging to the Marattas was gradually taken possession of, and Aurangzíb was preparing for a systematic attack on the forts, when the activity of one of his officers unexpectedly

Prince Akber goes to Persia.

CHAP. III.

threw his principal enemy into his hands. Sambají was enjoying himself, with a small party of attendants, in a favourite pleasure-house, at Sangaméswar in the Concan, when intelligence of his unguarded situation was brought to Tokarrab Khán, the Mogul officer at Colapúr.* Though this place is only fifty or sixty miles from Sangaméswar, it is separated from it by the range of Ghâts; and as Tokarrab Khán was only a governor of a district, his neighbourhood (if it could so be called) gave little uneasiness to Sambají or those about him. Being an active and enterprising soldier, he set off with a small body of troops, and took his measures so well that he reached Sangaméswar before his march was suspected. Sambají might still have escaped; for, before his house was surrounded, some of his followers ran in with information of the arrival of the Moguls; but Sambají was in a state of intoxication, and replied by threatening them with punishment for such insulting intelligence. Soon after Tokarrab made his appearance; most of the attendants fled; Calúsha was wounded in endeavouring to save his master; and both were made prisoners and sent in triumph to the imperial head quarters.†

Sambají made prisoner.

* Grant Duff. From a letter in the "Rakáimi Karáim" (the forty-first in the India House copy), it appears that the plan originated with Aurangzíb himself, and was executed in strict conformity to his orders. Tokarrab, by that letter, seems to have been besieging Parnála.

† Calúsha is generally, but erroneously, believed to have betrayed his master.

BOOK XI.

They were led through the camp on camels, amidst the din of drums and other noisy instruments, and surrounded by an innumerable multitude, who flocked to see their dreaded enemy; and, after being exhibited before Aurangzíb, they were ordered into confinement. Aurangzíb probably intended to spare his prisoner, for a time at least, as an instrument for gaining possession of his forts; but Sambají, now roused to a sense of his degradation, courted death, and replied to an invitation to become a Mussulman by language so insulting to the emperor, and so impious towards his prophet, that an order was given for his immediate execution. The sentence was probably issued on the ground of blasphemy; for it was attended with studied barbarity, very unlike the usual practice of Aurangzíb. His eyes were first destroyed with a hot iron, his tongue was cut out, and he was at last beheaded along with his favourite, Calúsha.

Put to death.

A.D. 1689, August.

Though his person had been despised by the Marattas, his fate was pitied and resented; and the indignation and religious hatred of the nation was raised to a higher pitch than ever.

Strong as was the animosity of the Marattas, their chance of resistance appeared to be very small. The overwhelming force of Aurangzíb, his personal reputation, even the pomp and grandeur which surrounded him, and the very name of the Great Mogul, struck them with an awe which they had not experienced in their former wars with his lieutenants. Their weakness became more con-

Weakness of the Marattas.

CHAP. III.

spicuous when Aurangzíb, remaining, himself, near Púna, sent a force to lay siege to their capital of Ráighar. The principal chiefs had assembled there on the death of Sambají, had acknowledged his infant son, afterwards called Sáho, as rája, and had nominated his uncle, Rája Rám, to be regent.

Aurangzíb sends a detachment to besiege Ráighar.

They then, after providing the fortress with a garrison and provisions, withdrew with the regent, to be ready for any service that might arise. Ráighar held out for several months, until a secret ascent was disclosed to the Moguls by a Máwalí chief, whom some personal disgust, combined with the general despondency, induced to this act of treason.* On this it was resolved that the regent, instead of exposing to risk the last representative of Sévají, should withdraw to the distant fortress of Jinjí in the Carnatic; while his forts in the Deckan were to be put in a good state of defence, and his troops dispersed in their villages, ready to profit by better times. Rám Rája accordingly proceeded with a few followers in disguise through

Regency of Rája Rám.

Ráighar taken.

A. D. 1690.

Rája Rám escapes to Jinjí.

* It seems unaccountable that these forts, which, at some times, are taken by a dozen at a time, at others held out for years against well-equipped armies; but they are often ill garrisoned, and without provisions; the garrison is often paid by lands which lie under the fort, and make them dependent on the enemy; even good garrisons are often surprised from overconfidence in the strength of the place, and sudden despair when they find difficulties overcome which they thought insurmountable. When such forts are in good order, with properly prepared garrisons and stores, it requires all the military resources and active courage of Europeans to make an impression on them.

BOOK XI.

Is proclaimed rája.

System of defence adopted by the Marattas.

the hostile provinces between him and Jinjí. When he reached that place, he proclaimed his arrival, and assumed the title of rája, on the ground of the captivity of his nephew. He was fortunate in an adviser in Prillád, one of the Bramin ministers, who had sufficient talents to gain an ascendancy over the other ministers and chiefs, and judgment to see that it was not desirable, even if it had been practicable, to do more than give a common scope to the general efforts.

Without the pervading genius of Sévají, the Marattas would never have been formed into a nation; but now, when all were animated by one spirit, the nature of the people and their mode of war required that it should be left to operate by individual exertions. The plan best adapted to them was, to bend before a blow, to offer nothing tangible for the enemy to attack, and to return to the charge with undiminished vigour whenever it suited them to take the part of assailants. Accordingly, their chiefs who were in possession of lands lost no time in making their submission to the Mogul, and none were louder in professions of zeal and attachment than they; but they almost all kept up a communication with the rebels, allowed their retainers to join them, even sent parties secretly under their own relations to share in plundering expeditions, and did more mischief as spies and hollow confederates than they could have done as open enemies. The soldiers, also, when they had no efficient government or regular treasury to look to, formed

each his own plan for his individual profit. The thirst for plunder was always the strongest passion of the nation, from the first robbers under Sévají to the most opulent times of the monarchy. Their only word for a victory is, "to plunder the enemy;" and though they readily combine for common objects, yet even then the mass is moved by each man's eagerness for his separate booty. When this spirit was called into activity, it required but a moderate interference on the part of the government to give it a direction that rendered it more formidable than the courage of disciplined armies.

Zulfikár Khán sent to reduce Jinjí.

When the Maratta government appeared to have been expelled from the Deckan, Aurangzíb dispatched Zulfikár Khán, the son of Assad Khán, who had distinguished himself by the capture of Ráighar, to give it its death-blow by the reduction of Jinjí. Zulfikár, on his arrival, found that his force, though considerable, was not sufficient to reduce, or even to invest, the place. He applied to Aurangzíb for reinforcements, and in the mean time employed part of his army in levying contributions on Tanjore* and other southern countries. Aurangzíb was in no condition to furnish the reinforcements desired. He had sent his son, Cámbakhsh, with an army to reduce Wákinkéra, a fort not far from Bíjapúr, which, though only held by the head of one of the predatory tribes of the Deckan, was strong enough to baffle all his efforts.

* Called by the Marattas "Chandáwar."

BOOK XI.

Marattas renew the war by desultory operations under independent leaders.

A still greater demand for troops was created by the re-appearance of the Marattas themselves. No sooner was Rám Rája settled in Jinjí, than he dispatched his two most active chiefs, Santaji Gorpara and Danají Jádu, to make a diversion in his own country. Before they arrived, some bands of discharged Bíjapúr troops had begun to plunder on their own account; and as soon as these well-known leaders made their appearance, Maratta horsemen issued from every village, and flocked to join their standards. Rám Chander Pant, who was left at Sattára, in the civil charge of what little territory remained to the Marattas, had assembled some troops within his own districts, and by appealing to the predatory spirit before adverted to, he now called a new and most efficient army at once into existence. His plan was, to confer on every man of influence amongst the soldiery a right to levy the *chout*, and other claims of the Maratta government, on all places not in its possession, and to plunder and lay waste every country that refused this tribute. The contributions were to go to the payment of the troops, the booty to the actual captors, and each chief was authorised to impose, for his personal benefit, a new exaction, called *ghás dána*, or *corn and hay money*. This invitation put every horseman in the country in motion. Most of the principal Maratta names appear (and many for the first time) as leaders of independent parties of various strength, which set out to enrich themselves at the expense of the Mogul's subjects; sometimes

A. D. 1692.

each acting singly, and sometimes with a general concert, and fixed plans for rendezvous and retreat. The armies of Santají and Danají, though under the control of those chiefs, acted much on the same system: the Marattas spread, at once, in all directions, and the whole Deckan was filled with fire and rapine, terror and confusion.

Comparison of the Mogul and Maratta armies.

It was now that the Mogul and Maratta systems of war were fairly brought into competition, and it soon appeared with which side the advantage lay. The long tranquillity and mild government and manners established by Akber, and the greater mixture with the Hindús, first began to soften the character of the northern conquerors of India. The negligence of Jehángír's reign, and the internal quiet of Sháh Jehán's, were respectively unfavourable to discipline and to military spirit; and by the time we are speaking of, both were very sensibly impaired. The nobles had far advanced towards the sloth and effeminacy for which they have since been noted; and even those who retained their energy were unsuited to active service. They all went into the field in coats of wadding, that would resist a sword, and over that chain or plate armour, and were mounted on large and showy horses, with huge saddles, and ample housings of cloth or velvet, from which many streamers of different coloured satin, and often pairs of the bushy ox tails of Tibet, hung down on each side. The horse's neck, and all the harness, were loaded with chains, bells, and ornaments of the

precious metals; and as each soldier imitated his superior as far as his means would admit, they formed a cavalry admirably fitted to prance in a procession, and not ill adapted to a charge in a pitched battle, but not capable of any long exertion, and still less of any continuance of fatigue and hardship.

To their individual inefficiency was added a total relaxation of discipline. In spite of all Aurangzíb's boasted vigilance, the grossest abuses had crept into the military department. Many officers only kept up half the number of their men, and others filled the ranks with their menials and slaves. Such comrades corrupted the soldiers by their example, and extinguished spirit by degrading the military character. The indulgence and connivance necessary for chiefs so conscious of their own delinquencies completed the ruin of the troops. They could neither be got to keep watch nor to remain alert on picket, and their sluggish habits would have prevented them ever turning out on an emergency, even if the time required to adjust their bulky housings and heavy defensive armour had not put it out of the question.*

The emperor's camp equipage was in all the pomp of peaceful times. Each nobleman endea-

* "The Frenchmen praised the high pay, and said the service was diversion: nobody would fight or keep watch, and only forfeited a day's pay when they failed to do either." (Gemelli Carreri, in *Churchill's Collection*, vol. iv.) See also the Bondéla Narrative in *Scott's Deckan*," vol. ii.

voured to imitate this magnificence; even private soldiers attended to comfort in their tents, and the line of march presented a long train of elephants, camels, carts, and oxen, mixed up with a crowd of camp followers, women of all ranks, merchants, shopkeepers, servants, cooks, and all kinds of ministers of luxury, amounting to ten times the number of the fighting men. This unwieldy host soon eat up a country, and the people suffered further from the insolence and licence of the soldiery.*

The Marattas, as has been said, were little active men, accustomed to hard work and hard fare. Their usual food was a cake of millet with perhaps an onion; their dress, a small turban, tight breeches covering their thighs, and a scarf or sash rolled round their middle. When their body was not bare, it was covered by a light cotton tunic.

Their arms were a sword and a matchlock, but oftener a bamboo spear 13 or 14 feet long; their national weapon, which they used with extraordinary skill. Their horses were those of their own country; small, strong, and active; capable of enduring great fatigue; and taught to bound forward, or stop, or to wheel round when at full speed, on the slightest pressure from their rider's leg. They had a pad for a saddle, with a blanket folded over

* Gemelli Carreri saw Aurangzíb's cantonment at Galgala (March, 1695). He describes it as an enormous assemblage, said greatly to exceed a million. The king's and prince's tents occupied a space of upwards of three miles in circumference, and were fortified with a ditch, palisades, and falconets.

BOOK XI.

it. When stationary, few except the chiefs had tents; and on their inroads, each man slept on the ground, with his spear stuck by him and his bridle tied to his arm, ready to leap on horseback on the slightest alarm of the approach of an enemy.

An assemblage of such troops never stood the heavy charge of a body of Moguls, but dispersed at once, and scampered off singly to the nearest hills or broken ground. If the enemy left their ranks to pursue them, they cut off single horsemen, or rapidly assembled behind a ravine, or in some other situation where it was not safe for small parties to attack them; and, when the disheartened pursuers turned back with their horses exhausted, the Marattas were upon them in a moment, charged in on them, if there was an opening or confusion, but generally hung loosely on their flanks and rear, sometimes dashing up singly to fire their matchlocks into the mass, or even to dispatch a straggler with their long spears. Their chief excellence, as well as their delight, was in the plunder of a convoy. The favour of the country people gave them full information, while it kept the Moguls in darkness, till they were suddenly assailed on the line of march, and saw the camels and cattle, carrying the grain and stores they were escorting, swept off in a moment. They would then form a compact body to protect those which were carrying treasure; but, with such a prize before them, the Marattas were irresistible: the party was generally obliged to take post; the Marattas cut off the communications, and

CHAP. III.

perhaps even the water; and, at the end of a day or two, the Moguls were obliged to surrender; the men were stripped of their horses and their valuables, and the chiefs detained for a ransom.

As Aurangzíb drew a great proportion of his recruits and treasures from Hindostan, Santají and Danají threw themselves between his army and that country. They intercepted several convoys, defeated more than one detachment, and gained such a superiority that the Moguls began to change their contempt for them into fear and dread. A. D. 1693.

In this state of discouragement Aurangzíb perceived the necessity of adopting some measure which, if it did not bring the war to an end, might recover his reputation and restore the spirit of his troops. He resolved on the vigorous prosecution of the operations against Jinjí: he had withdrawn Cámbakhsh from Wákinkéra, and he now sent that prince with a fresh army to assume the conduct of the siege; but, according to his usual practice, he appointed Assad Khán, the father of Zulfikár Khán, to serve with him, and committed the real direction of all operations to those noblemen. This arrangement disgusted both parties: the prince was displeased at the little solid authority intrusted to him, and the others thought it hard that Zulfikár should be deprived of the dignity of the command and the honour of the victory.* A. D. 1694.

Siege of Jinjí committed to Prince Cámbakhsh.

Disgust of Zulfikár.

So completely was Zulfikár led away by his re-

* Grant Duff; Kháfi Khán; and the Bondéla Narrative, in *Scott's Deckan.*

BOOK XI.

sentment, that he listened to overtures from the Maratta Bramins (ever on the watch to profit by such dissensions); and by indecisive operations on his own part, as well as by affording intelligence to the enemy, he enabled them to spin out the siege for no less than three years.

He obstructs the siege.

At the end of that time, Santají Górpara resolved on a bold attempt to relieve his rája. Leaving the rest of the Maratta hordes to keep Aurangzíb in occupation, he called in Danají Jádu, and set off for Jinjí with 20,000 of their best cavalry. He passed rapidly through the intervening country, and came on the besieging army with such celerity, that before they could arrange their cumbrous body for mutual support, his advance had surprised one of their divisions, plundered its tents, and made the commander prisoner; and he himself immediately after defeated a considerable body of troops sent out in haste to oppose him. He then drove in the outposts, destroyed the foragers, and cut off all supplies and intelligence from the camp. He next circulated reports of the emperor's death, which were easily believed in such a moment of calamity; and under favour of that rumour, he made proposals to Cámbakhsh to support his claim to the throne. Cámbakhsh, who seems to have apprehended sinister designs on the part of Assad and Zulfikár, gave ear to these communications, while his intercourse with the enemy in like manner alarmed those officers. One night Cámbakhsh ordered his immediate contingent to get under

Santají Górpara advances to raise the siege. A. D. 1697.

Cámbakhsh placed under re-

arms, and the two generals assuming (whether justly or otherwise) that this was a direct attempt to go over to the Marattas, immediately placed the prince under restraint.* This step increased the alarms and dissensions in the army to such a pitch, that they were soon compelled to blow up their cannon, abandon their batteries, and concentrate on one spot, where they intrenched themselves, and were besieged in their turn. At length an agreement was entered into between the parties; the Moguls were to be allowed to withdraw about twenty miles to Vandiwash, and were there to await the further orders of the emperor.

straint by Zulfikár.

Retreat of the besiegers.

On the first advance of Cámbakhsh and Assad Khán, Aurangzíb had moved southward, and cantoned at Galgala on the Kishna. In the next year he retired to Birmapúri, near Panderpúr, on the Bíma, where he erected a permanent cantonment, and remained for several years. He now made a movement to Bíjapúr, and at the same time sent orders expressing his total disapprobation of the proceedings of his generals. He directed Cámbakhsh to be sent up to court, and received him with marked kindness†: at the same time he recalled Assad Khán; but, with unaccountable inconsistency, left the sole command of the army to Zulfikár Khán, who, though the ablest of his

Aurangzíb cantons on the Bíma.

Releases Cámbakhsh.

* Report of Assad and Zulfikár to Aurangzíb, quoted by the emperor in the forty-seventh note of the "Rakáim i Karáim:" also Grant Duff; Kháfi Khán; and Bondéla Narrative.

† Forty-eighth and forty-ninth notes of the "Rakáim i Karáim."

BOOK XI.

officers, he could not *now* expect to find the best affected. The war, when renewed, assumed a desultory character. Zulfikár levied contributions at Tanjore; and Santají totally destroyed a very strong Mogul detachment under an officer of rank and reputation near Chítaldrúg in the Mysore: other conflicts took place, with various success, in different parts of the country; but the general result must have been favourable to the Moguls, as they were able, in the end, to resume the siege of Jinjí.

Increased disaffection of Zulfikár.

A. D. 1697.

He renews the siege, but protracts the operations.

During the operations in the field, Zulfikár performed the part of a zealous and able officer; but, on recommencing the siege, he renewed his intercourse with the Marattas, and evidently made it his object to protract the fall of the place.*

Resentment of the emperor.

But it was difficult to carry on such practices under a prince of Aurangzíb's penetration; and in the course of the next year Zulfikár found that he must either take Jinjí or expect to be recalled in disgrace. He performed a last act of friendship in advising Rája Rám to escape; and then, prosecuting his operations with vigour and in earnest, he, before long, made himself master of the fortress.

Jinjí taken. A. D. 1698.

* All Zulfikár's intrigues with the enemy appear from Maratta MSS. referred to by Captain Grant Duff, and are asserted (probably on similar authority procured at Mysore) by Colonel Wilks. They are unknown to the writers on the Mogul side; but the Bondéla accuses Zulfikár of purposely prolonging the war. His object, probably, was to retain his large command and important possession until the death of the emperor, which his very advanced age made men expect to be of early occurrence.

CHAP. IV.

FROM 1698 TO THE DEATH OF AURANGZÍB.

CHAP. IV.

THE unexpected recovery of Zulfikár's strength, which had put it in his power to renew the siege, was probably occasioned by dissensions among the Marattas, which now broke into an open quarrel. Danají Jádu had fallen out with Santají, and had received the support of the rája, who was jealous of the renown of the latter chief; and as Santají was unpopular, in consequence of his attempts to keep up discipline, a party was formed in his own camp; he was compelled to fly, and was at length overtaken and put to death on the spot. Before this catastrophe, Rája Rám had established his residence at Sattára, and he now assumed the active control of the whole government. He took the field himself, at the head of the largest Maratta army that had ever yet been assembled, and, proceeding to the north of the Godáveri, levied the *chout* and other dues on such places as submitted, and ravaged the rest as far as Jálna in Berár. At this point his progress was checked in consequence of a change in the system of the Moguls. Hitherto Aurangzíb had, for the most part, had his head-quarters at Birmapúrí, sometimes sending a detachment under his son, Prince A'zim, to reduce a hill fort or repel an incursion, but generally trust-

Dissensions among the Marattas.

Murder of Santají Górpara.

Rája Rám takes the field in person.

New plan of Aurangzíb, — a besieging and pursuing army.

BOOK XI.

ing the defence of the country to detachments stationed at different parts of it. At present his plan was to bring his whole force into efficiency, by leading one part, in person, against the enemy's forts, while another under Zulfikár Khán, nominally commanded by one of his grandsons, should pursue their field armies wherever they might direct their course. Had this plan been earlier adopted, it might have been attended with success; but disturbances had reached too great a height to be put down by any merely military dispositions. Although Zulfikár Khán began by driving back Rája Rám, as has been mentioned, and during the succeeding years repeatedly defeated the Marattas, and in some degree restored the courage of the Mussulmans, yet he found himself, at the end of that time, in a worse situation than when he began. A defeat to the Marattas was like a blow given to water, which offers no resistance to the stroke and retains no impression of its effect: their army dispersed at the moment to unite again on the same day or the next. But a defeat to the Moguls was attended with loss and humiliation; and even their partial success did not stop the waste of their resources and embarrassment of the finances of their government, which every day increased their difficulties and undermined their strength.

Exhaustion of the Moguls.

Aurangzíb's personal operations gave a promise of more solid advantage. He quitted his cantonment, to the great regret of his officers, who had

Sieges by the emperor in person.

CHAP. IV.

erected comfortable dwellings, and founded a sort of city; and, after reducing some other forts, he sat down before Sattára. By a dexterous feint he contrived to take that place unprepared: it nevertheless made a desperate defence, and did not surrender till the siege had lasted for several months.

Takes Sattára.

A. D. 1700, April.

Before it fell, Rám Rája had died, and had been succeeded by his son, Sévají, under the regency of Tára Bái, the widow of the deceased and mother of the young rája. This event had little effect on the war. Aurangzíb went on with his plan; and in the course of the next four or five years had taken almost all the principal forts possessed by the Marattas. Many of the sieges were long and bloody *, and various expedients and stratagems were employed by both parties in the conduct of them; but they were too monotonous to bear description, and the result was as has been stated.

Death of Rája Rám.

Aurangzíb goes on taking forts.

In reviewing these laborious undertakings, it is impossible not to admire the persevering spirit with which Aurangzíb bore up against the difficulties and misfortunes that overshadowed his declining years. He was near sixty-five when he crossed the Nerbadda to begin on this long war,

Spirit and perseverance of Aurangzíb.

* Aurangzíb writes thus of one of them to his son, Prince A'zim: "You will have received accounts of the calamities of the siege of Kélna, and of the unheard-of condition and intolerable sufferings of the followers of Islám. Praise be to God that the afflictions of this devout band have at length been brought to a conclusion." He then prays for happy results, and ascribes the past disasters to a judgment on his own wickedness and neglect. (Thirty-eighth note of the "Dastúr ul Aml.")

BOOK XI.

Difficulties and hardships to which he was exposed.

and had attained his eighty-first year before he quitted his cantonment at Birmapúri. The fatigues of marches and sieges were little suited to such an age; and in spite of the display of luxury in his camp equipage, he suffered hardships that would have tried the constitution of a younger man. While he was yet at Birmapúri, a sudden flood of the Bíma overwhelmed his cantonment in the darkness of the night, and during the violence of one of those falls of rain which are only seen in tropical climates: a great portion of the cantonment was swept away and the rest laid under water; the alarm and confusion increased the evil; 12,000 persons are said to have perished, and horses, camels, and cattle without number. The emperor himself was in danger, the inundation rising over the elevated spot which he occupied, when it was arrested (as his courtiers averred) by the efficacy of his prayers. A similar disaster was produced by the descent of a torrent during the siege of Parli, the fort he took next after Sattára; and, indeed, the storms of that inclement region must have exposed him to many sufferings, during the numerous rainy seasons he spent within it. The impassable streams, the flooded valleys, the miry bottoms, and narrow ways, caused still greater difficulties when he was in motion; compelled him to halt were no provisions were to be had; and were so destructive to his cattle as sometimes entirely to cripple his army. The violent heats, in tents, and during marches, were distressing at

other seasons, and often rendered overpowering by failure of water: general famines and pestilences came more than once, in addition to the scarcity and sickness to which his own camp was often liable; and all was aggravated by accounts of the havoc and destruction committed by the enemy in the countries beyond the reach of those visitations. But in all these discouragements Aurangzíb retained his vigour. He alone conducted every branch of his government, in the most minute detail. He planned campaigns and issued instructions during their progress; drawings of forts were sent for him to fix on the points of attack; his letters embrace measures for keeping open the roads in the Afghán country, for quelling disturbances at Multán and Agra, and even for recovering possession of Candahár; and, at the same time, there is scarcely a detachment marches or a convoy moves in the Deckan without some orders from Aurangzíb's own hand.

His indefatigable industry.

The appointment of the lowest revenue officer of a district, or the selection of a clerk in an office, is not beneath his attention; and the conduct of all these functionaries is watched by means of spies and of prying inquiries from all comers, and they are constantly kept on the alert by admonitions founded on such information. This attention to particulars is not favourable to the real progress of business, any more than it is indicative of an enlarged genius; but, combined, as it was in Aurangzíb, with unremitting vigilance in all the

His attention to details.

BOOK XI.

greater affairs of the state, it shows an activity of mind that would be wonderful at any age.

His distrust of all around him.

These labours were the penalty he paid for his former offences against his father. The fate of Sháh Jehán seems never for an instant to have been absent from his thoughts. To avoid a similar destiny, he retains all power and all patronage, and by removing his chiefs from place to place prevents their forming permanent connections with anybody but himself.

His management of his sons,

His sons are the constant objects of his observation and his management: he surrounds them with spies, gives them colleagues in command, places trustworthy persons in inferior situations about them, exercises an open control over all their proceedings; and at the same time never fails, by familiar and affectionate letters, and by constant presents and attentions, to conciliate their attachment and prevent their feeling the irksomeness of their situation.

and courtiers.

To similar motives also, though partly to his natural disposition, must be attributed the considerate manner in which he treats his officers, and the sort of court which he appears to pay to all of them: he condoles with their loss of relations; inquires about their illnesses; confers honours in a flattering manner; makes his presents more acceptable by the gracious way in which they are given; and scarcely ever passes a censure without softening it by some obliging expression. His extreme leniency to all offences that do not touch his power or his religious prejudices seems also

to have had its source in an unwillingness to make enemies, no less than in the real easiness of his temper. After all, he does not seem to have been successful in winning attachment; and with his sons, he seems at heart to have trusted much more to fear than affection. Though he released Móazzim after seven years' imprisonment (A. D. 1694), he seems always to have regarded him with dislike and apprehension. He sent him to the remote government of Cábul, constantly resisted his wishes to return, even for a time, and endeavoured to engage him in an expedition which might carry him to the most distant part of his province and might completely absorb his resources. He at first approved of the seizure of Cámbakhsh, though afterwards convinced of his innocence; and his behaviour on one occasion to his favourite, Prince A'zim, shows at once his policy in the management of his sons and his innate love of artifice and dissimulation. Having imbibed a suspicion that this prince was meditating independence, he sent for him to court; and as the prince made excuses and showed alarm, he offered to meet him slightly attended on a hunting party. A'zim, on this, set out, and Aurangzíb secretly surrounded the place of meeting with chosen troops: as the prince got more and more within his toils, the old emperor found a succession of pretences for requiring him gradually to diminish the number of his attendants, until, when he reached the place where his father was, they were reduced to three persons.

BOOK XI.

As nobody offered to undertake the duty, he was obliged to leave two of his companions to hold his horses; and he with the remaining attendant were disarmed before they were admitted to the royal presence. On this he gave himself up for lost, and had no doubt that he was doomed to a long or perpetual imprisonment. But when he was introduced to his father, he was received with an affectionate embrace: Aurangzíb, who was prepared for shooting, gave his loaded gun to him to hold, and then led him into a retired tent, where he showed him a curious family sword, and put it naked into his hand that he might examine it; after which he threw open his vest, on pretence of heat, but in reality to show that he had no hidden armour. After this display of confidence, he loaded A'zim with presents, and at last said he had better think of retiring, or his people would be alarmed at his detention. This advice was not premature: A'zim, on his return, found his whole camp on the point of breaking up, and his women weeping and lamenting his supposed fate. Whether he felt grateful for his easy dismission does not appear; but it is recorded that he never after received a letter from his father without turning pale, or recovered his composure until he had satisfied himself of the contents of it.*

Increased disorders of the state.

But all Aurangzíb's arts and all his industry were insufficient to resist the increasing disorders

* Kháfi Khán.

CHAP. IV.

of the state, which now pressed upon him from every quarter. The Rájpúts were still in open hostility: their example had long since been followed by the Játs near Agra: against these last, as at a later period against some insurgents at Multán *, it had been necessary to send a force under a prince of the blood. Zulfikár's force began to be exhausted, and the inefficacy of his former exertions became more and more apparent. The Marattas seemed to multiply as the Mogul armies decayed: after reducing the Deckan to a desert, they had spread over Málwa and made a powerful inroad into Guzerát; leaving their traces every where, in pillaged towns, ravaged fields, and smoking villages.

Successes of the Marattas.

The grand army still went on taking forts; but its last success was scarcely less ignominious than a defeat: it was the taking of Wákinkéra, which, though only a fortified village, belonging to a chief of banditti, required the presence of the emperor and a siege of several months to subdue it. These acquisitions began at this time to be balanced by corresponding losses. The Marattas were in a condition to attempt the recovery of their strong holds, and the forts which it had cost so many labours to gain, were one by one falling into their possession. As the calls on the grand army increased, its power went on to decline. The troops became more timid than ever; the cattle were worn out

They begin to recover their forts.

Exhausted state of the army.

* Probably the Síks, under Guru Govind.

BOOK XI.

and could not be replaced from the wasted state of the country; provisions failed from the same reason, and the means of obtaining them from a distance were cut off by the emptiness of the treasury.

Disorder of the finances.

Notwithstanding vast remittances from Hindostan, the finances had long since fallen into confusion; and as their state became more painful, Aurangzíb withdrew his attention from them.* He was irritated by applications for arrears of pay, and used peevishly to answer such demands by saying that he did not want the troops, and if they were not pleased with his service they might quit it.† He even disbanded some bodies of horse, with the intention of easing the finances. But regular pay was indispensable to troops situated like his; and when it had been long withheld, they began to break into open mutinies, which were quieted by temporary expedients.‡

Grand army hard pressed by the Marattas.

All his difficulties were increased as the Marattas drew closer round the army. At times they plundered up to the very skirts of the camp, intercepted

* Aurangzíb's letters, and Khâfi Khán.

† Khâfi Khán. The army was for a long time very regularly paid. Gemelli Carreri, in 1695, says the troops were paid punctually every two months, and would not bear any irregularity.

‡ He writes, on one occasion, to Zulfikár Khán, that he is stunned with the clamours of "these infernal foot soldiers," who are croaking like crows in an invaded rookery. In another letter he reminds him of the wants of the exchequer, and presses him to search for hidden treasures, and to hunt out any that may have fallen into the hands of individuals. Many of his notes dwell on his pecuniary embarrassments.

CHAP. IV.

the supplies, carried off the cattle, cut up the foragers, insulted the pickets, and made it impossible for any one to show his head out of the lines without a powerful escort. If an ordinary detachment was sent to check them, they repelled or destroyed it. If a great effort was made, they vanished, and perhaps did not again appear till they had plundered some distant town, and left time for their pursuers to weary themselves by forced marches in a wrong direction.* They now treated the power of the emperor with derision. Those in his service mixed and feasted with those opposed to him, and on such occasions they used to mimic the pompous manners and devout ejaculations of the Mussulmans, and to pray with mock solemnity for long life to their best patron, Aurangzíb. So low was the emperor reduced, that he was persuaded by Cámbakhsh to authorise overtures to the enemy; and if the negotiations had not been broken off by the exorbitance and insolence of the Marattas, he would probably have agreed to release Sáho Rája, and grant (in such forms as might save his dignity) an annual per centage on the revenue of the Deckan.

Retreats to Ahmednagur.

Aurangzíb's last military operation was a retreat to Ahmednagar, the nature of which may be conceived from his exhausted cattle and dispirited troops. All hurried on in disorder and dejection, deafened with the incessant firing kept up by the

* Bondéla Narrative, in Scott's "Deckan," vol. ii.

BOOK XI.

marksmen, alarmed by the shouts and charges of the lancers, and every moment expecting a general attack to complete their dispersion and destruction. Such, indeed, was the fate of a portion of the army; and it is a subject of pious exultation to the Mussulman historians that the emperor himself escaped falling into the hands of the enemies whom he had once so much despised.*

Ahmednagar, from whence, twenty years before, he had marched in so much power and splendour on his conquests, received the remains of his ruined greatness, and was soon to witness the close of his earthly career.

Declining health of the emperor.

His health had, of late, become gradually impaired; he with difficulty overcame one illness that threatened his life; and although he continued his public appearance and his attention to business, his spirit at length began to sink under the accumulated burden of anxiety and disease. On reaching Ahmednagar, he said he had now come to the end of all his journeys; and from his last letters we perceive, at once, the extent of his bodily sufferings, the failure of his hopes in this world, and his dread of that to come. The remembrance of Sháh Jehán seemed to haunt him more than ever; he nowhere expresses remorse for his share in that monarch's fate, but he shows by all his actions how much he fears that a like measure may be meted out to him.

His fears of encountering the fate of Sháh Jehán.

* Grant Duff, vol. i. p. 409.

CHAP. IV.

Prince Móazzim having proposed some arrangements which common prudence required at such a crisis, he interprets them into a design to seize on the government while he was yet alive. When a letter from Prince A'zim was read to him, entreating permission to come to Ahmednagar, on the ground that the air of Guzerát was ruining his health, he abruptly remarked, "That is exactly the pretext I used to Sháh Jehán in his illness;" and added, that "no air was so unwholesome as the fumes of ambition:" and although afterwards prevailed on by A'zim's importunity to allow him to pay him a visit on his way to his new government of Málwa, yet one of the last exertions of his authority was, to compel the prince to proceed on his journey, and to prevent his finding any excuse for remaining about the court. He had just before sent off Cámbakhsh to Bíjapúr; but this seems rather to have been done to gratify A'zim than from any apprehensions of his own.

His suspicions of his sons.

These measures had not been long completed before he became sensible that his end was approaching. In this awful moment, he wrote, or dictated, a letter to Prince A'zim, in which his worldly counsels and his adieus are mixed with broken sentences giving utterance to the feelings of remorse and terror with which his soul was agitated, and which he closes with a sort of desperate resignation, — "Come what come may, I have launched my vessel on the waves." . . . "Farewell! farewell! farewell!"

His alarms at the approach of death.

BOOK XI.

He also wrote to his youngest, and, latterly, his favourite, son, Cambakhsh. His letter, as to a much younger man, is more one of advice and admonition than that to A'zim. It shows that he retained his favourite habits to the last. "Your courtiers," he says, "*however deceitful*, must not be ill-treated: it is necessary to gain your views by gentleness and art," &c. Even in this letter, his sense of his own situation breaks out from time to time. "Wherever I look I see nothing but the Divinity." . . . "I have committed numerous crimes, and I know not with what punishments I may be seized." . . . "The agonies of death come upon me fast." . . . "I am going. Whatever good or evil I have done, it was for you."* It must have been about the same time that he drew up a sort of will, which was found under his pillow on his death. He there recommends that Móazzim should be recognised as emperor, and that he and A'zim should divide the empire, one taking the northern and eastern provinces, with Delhi for his capital; and the other, Agra, with all the country to the south and south-west of it, including all the Deckan, except the kingdoms of Golcónda and Bíjapúr. These last were assigned to Cámbakhsh.†

* I have taken the translation in Scott's "Deckan," vol. ii. page 8. of the Memoirs, though the original of it must have differed in some slight particulars from the Persian copy at the India House.

† He left another will, seemingly prepared when under less agitation. It contains some general maxims of government, and

He expired on the 21st of February, A.D. 1707, in the eighty-ninth year of his life, and fiftieth of his reign.*

His death, and character.

A native historian, impressed with the courage, wisdom, and ability of Aurangzíb, is at a loss to account for the ill success of his reign. The real defect was in his heart. Had he been capable of any generous or liberal sentiment, he would have been a great prince; his subjects would not have been alienated by his narrow views in religion, nor would the powers of his officers have been cramped, and their zeal chilled, by a constant spirit of suspicion and distrust.† In alluding, for the last time,

instructions about his funeral; the expense of which was to be defrayed by a sum of four rupees and a half (about ten shillings), saved from the price of caps which he had made and sold. Eight hundred and five rupees, which he had gained by copying Koráns, was to be given to the poor. (See *Asiatic Register* for 1801.)

* These are solar years. He was born the 15th Zi 'Cáad, 1027, about the end of October, 1618. (*Kháfi Khán. Gladwin's Jehángir*, p. 45.)

† "Of all the house of Teimur, indeed of all the kings of Delhi, none since the time of Secander Lódi ever appeared so distinguished, in point of devotion, austerity, and justice; and in courage, patience, and sound judgment, he was without a peer: but as, from reverence to the injunctions of the Divine law, he did not inflict punishment, and as without punishment no country can be kept in order — in consequence, also, of the dissensions arising from rivalry among his nobles — every plan and design which he formed came to little good, and every enterprise drew into delay, and never attained its object. Though he had lived ninety years, yet none of his five senses were at all impaired, except his hearing in a small degree, but not so that others could perceive it." (*Kháfi Khán.*)

BOOK XI.

to his narrow views in religion, which contributed so largely to the ruin of his empire, it is well worth while to observe by how little direct persecution that evil result was produced. The Hindús seem rather to have been irritated by systematic discouragement than inflamed by acts of cruelty or oppression. They were excluded from office; they were degraded by a special tax; their fairs and festivals were forbidden; their temples were sometimes insulted and destroyed; and it was sufficient to procure the abolition of any ceremony or practice of the court that it seemed to give a countenance to their superstition: but it does not appear that a single Hindú suffered death, imprisonment, or loss of property for his religion, or, indeed, that any individual was ever questioned for the open exercise of the worship of his fathers. Yet such is the effect of mutual jealousy and animosity in matters of religion, that the most violent outrages have seldom raised up so obstinate a spirit of resistance as was engendered by the partiality and prejudices of this emperor.

Some hundreds of Aurangzíb's letters have been preserved, from which we may glean some particulars of his character, in addition to the great lines marked by his actions. With all his bigotry he was not superstitious. He cordially detests the Hindús, and has very little more good will towards the Shías; but he lays out no money on mosques or endowments, shows no sign of being under the influence of the recognised clergy, and often ex-

presses his contempt for the assumed sanctity of fakírs and dervises.

His government is a system of continual mistrust: every man's character is secretly investigated, and colleagues are so selected, that each may be a check on his neighbour; yet there never was a prince so much cheated or so ill served.

The coldness of his heart is conspicuous in the manner in which he receives the accounts of the death of his oldest and most intimate friends. In so long a life such events often occur, and they always draw forth some pious or philosophical reflection, followed up by strict orders to seize on the property of the deceased, to see that none is embezzled, to hunt out all deposits, and to be careful in recovering all outstanding debts.

His letters almost invariably include some poetical quotation, or some verse from the Koran. They are sometimes familiar, and even jocose, especially those to his sons. One, written after he was eighty, ends with some burlesque verses, of two or three words long, each of which gives a ludicrous description of the present occupations of some one of the principal people about his court.* His letters.

* There are three collections of his letters:—First, the "Kalámát i Táibát," published by one of his chief secretaries, Enáyat Ullah; second, the "Rokáimi i Karáim," by the son of another secretary; and, third, the "Dastúr ul Aml Agáhí," collected from all quarters, thirty-eight years after his death. The two first collections profess to be merely the rough drafts or notes which he wrote with his own hand for his secretaries. Most of the third collection have the same appearance. They

BOOK XI.

Gemelli Carreri, who saw Aurangzíb in the seventy-eighth year of his age, describes him as of low stature, slender, and stooping with age, with a long nose and a round beard, the whiteness of which was more visible on his olive skin. He was dressed in plain white muslin, with one emerald of great size in his turban. He stood amidst his omrahs, leaning on a staff; received petitions; read them without spectacles, endorsed them with his own hand, "and, by his cheerful smiling countenance, seemed to be pleased with the employment."*

Of all the kings of India, Aurangzíb is the most admired among the Mussulmans. There are few who are quite blind to the lustre of Akber's character, but fewer still whose deliberate judgment would not give the preference to Aurangzíb.

Miscellaneous transactions.

There are some unconnected events which should not be entirely omitted in an account of this reign.

The insurrection of the Játs has been mentioned; they are a Hindú people of the Súdra class, who inhabit a tract near Agra, of which the capital is Bhartpúr. Though in an open country, and close to Agra and Mattra, they occasioned much embarrassment to the government even during this reign, and rose to so much greater consequence in

are without dates or order, and are often obscure, from their brevity and our ignorance of the subjects alluded to.

* Gemelli Carreri, in Churchill, vol. iv.

those that followed, that at one time they were in possession of Agra; and were the last people in the plains of India that have offered any serious obstacle to the British power.

In the thirty-eighth year of the king's reign, A.D. 1693, a ship bound from Surat to Mecca with pilgrims, which Kháfi Khán describes as carrying 80 guns *, and furnished with 400 muskets, was attacked by an English ship of small size. A gun burst on board the king's ship; the English boarded, and "although the Christians have no courage at the sword, yet by bad management the vessel was taken."

On this Aurangzíb ordered the English factors at his ports to be seized, and directed the Abyssynians to take Bombay.

The English retaliated by seizing the king's officers, and the Abyssinians, who (by Kháfi Khán's account) were on a friendly footing with them, showed no inclination to break it off. At length Kháfi Khán himself was sent on a mission from the viceroy of Guzerát to Bombay. He describes his reception as being conducted with great dignity and good order, and with a considerable display of military power. He negotiated with elderly gentlemen in rich clothes, and, although they sometimes laughed more heartily than became so grave

* The number is probably not exaggerated, though the guns must have been light. Some of the Company's ships of 600 tons carried seventy guns. (See *Macpherson's Commerce of India*, p. 133.)

an occasion, yet he seems to have been favourably impressed with their acuteness and intelligence. The English alleged, apparently with truth, that the king's ship had been taken by pirates, for whom they were not answerable; and explained their coining money in their own king's name (which was another complaint against them) by stating that they had to purchase investments at places where the Mogul's money did not pass.

Nothing is stated to have been settled on this occasion; but it appears from other sources that the English compounded for some pecuniary payments.*

It is curious that Kháfi Khán (though, in this case, he relates a transaction of small moment in which he was personally engaged) takes no notice of the war made on Aurangzíb by the English on both sides of India, which was of so much consequence in the history of the East India Company. He did not foresee the future importance of those unskilful antagonists.

* Grant Duff.

BOOK XII.

SUCCESSORS OF AURANGZÍB.

CHAP. I.

TO THE ACCESSION OF MOHAMMED SHÁH.

Bahádur Sháh.

CHAP. I.

As soon as Prince A'zim heard of his father's death, he returned to camp, and within a week was proclaimed sovereign of all India, in perfect disregard of the late emperor's will.

Contest between Prince A'zim and his elder brother, Prince Móazzim.

Prince Móazzim, with better reason, assumed the crown at Cábul, with the title of Bahádur Sháh; and both brothers prepared to assert their pretensions by force of arms. In spite of the exhausted state of the empire, they assembled very large armies, and met at length not far to the south of Agra. A bloody battle ensued, in which Prince A'zim and his two grown up sons were killed, and his youngest son, an infant, was taken prisoner. Prince A'zim had disgusted many of his principal officers by his arrogance: among others, Assad Khán, and his son, Zulfikár Khán, had quitted his camp, and remained spectators of the contest. When the event was known, they sent their submission to the victor. Bahádur Sháh received

Victory of Móazzim, henceforward Bahádur Sháh.

A. D. 1707, June.

A. H. 1119, Rabi al awal.

BOOK XII.

them graciously, and promoted them to the highest honours in the state. He showed like indulgence towards the other adherents of A'zim Sháh; but his confidence was chiefly reposed in Monim Khán, who had been his own principal officer at Cábul, and was now appointed vizír. Monim was an equally able and well-intentioned minister; and as the king's only fault was too great facility of temper, his accession was welcomed by the great body of his subjects, who looked to some relief from the religious austerity of Aurangzíb, and the sacrifices entailed on them by his obstinate wars.

Revolt of Prince Cámbakhsh in the Deckan.

Prince Cámbakhsh, though a vain and violent young man, had admitted the sovereignty of Prince A'zim, and had been confirmed in his appanage; but he refused to acknowledge Bahádur Sháh; and that king, after attempting in vain to win him over by concessions, marched against him to the Deckan, and defeated him in a battle near Heiderábád, where Cámbakhsh died of his wounds on the same day.

His defeat and death. A. D. 1708, February; A. H. 1119, Zí Cáad.

Bahádur's proceedings in the Deckan.

The emperor's presence in the Deckan made it necessary to consider what course should be adopted towards the Marattas. It was easier at this time to effect an accommodation with them than could have been expected from the state of affairs at Aurangzíb's death. At that period, Sáho, the rightful rája, was still a prisoner in the hands of the Moguls, and the government was carried on by Tára Bái, the widow of his uncle, Rája Rám, in the name of her infant son. But though the

State of the Marattas.

Factions of Rája Sáho and Tára Bái.

necessity of having an efficient chief had induced the Marattas to place Rája Rám on their throne after the taking of Ráighar, they had not forgotten the hereditary claim of his nephew, and were not pleased to see him again excluded without the same motive as before. With a view to profit by these contending claims, Prince A'zim, on his march against Bahádur Sháh, released Sáho, who was now grown up, and promised him peace on favourable terms if he should succeed in establishing his title. This plan was adopted at the suggestion of Zulfikár Khán, and completely answered its end. The Maratta chiefs took different sides; and instead of overwhelming their enemies, who seemed incapable of further resistance, they fell into civil war among themselves, and left the Moguls undisturbed at the moment of their greatest weakness. When Bahádur Sháh turned his attention to the Marattas, Sáho seemed likely to prevail in the contest; and Zulfikár, who was now in great favour, was anxious that peace should be concluded with him, at the price of the concessions formerly offered by Aurangzíb. But Moním Khán, the vizír, though willing to agree to the terms, wished them to be granted to Tára Bái, and the whole negotiation fell to the ground.

Dáúd Khán Panni left in charge of the Deckan for Zulfikár Khán.

On Bahádur's departure, he gave the viceroyalty of the Deckan to Zulfikár; and, as that chief could not be spared from court, he left the administration of the government to Dáud Khán Panni, a Patán

BOOK XII.

officer already distinguished in Aurangzíb's wars, who was to act as his lieutenant.

Makes a truce with the Marattas.

Dáúd followed up the views of his principal, and concluded a personal agreement with Sáho, consenting that the *chout*, or fourth, should be paid while he remained in office, but stipulating that it should be collected by agents of his own, without the interference of the Marattas.

Transactions with the Rájpúts.

This arrangement kept the Deckan quiet till the end of the present reign, and allowed Bahádur to turn his thoughts to other scenes where his exertions were scarcely less required. While he was on his march against Cámbakhsh, he had endeavoured to make a settlement of his disputes with the Rájpúts. He had entered into a treaty with the rána of Oudipúr, restoring all conquests, re-establishing religious affairs on the footing on which they stood in Akber's time, releasing the rána from the obligation to furnish a contingent in the Deckan, and, in fact, acknowledging his entire independence in every thing but the name.* He had concluded a treaty, apparently on similar terms, with Ajít Sing, the rája of Márwár, except that, in the latter case, the service of the contingent was still retained. On Jei Sing, the rája of Jeipúr, (who, though he had never asserted his independence, had joined with Prince A'zim in the late civil war,) he had imposed more rigorous terms. He had left a garrison in his capital; and, although he

* Colonel Tod's Rajasthan, vol. i. p. 395.

allowed him to command the Jeipúr contingent with the army, he seems to have deprived him of all authority in his own principality. By the time the army reached the Nerbadda on its advance, Ajít Sing also had received some cause of offence; and the two rájas went off together, with their troops, and entered into a league to resist the Mogul authority. As soon as the contest in the Deckan was put an end to by the death of Cámbakhsh, Bahádur Sháh turned his attention to breaking up the confederacy; but, before he reached the Rájpút country, he received intelligence of the capture of Sirhind by the Síks, and of such a state of affairs in the Panjáb, as left him no time for his intended operations.* CHAP. I.

In these circumstances, he became anxious to make peace with the Rájpúts; and, as the great obstacle to an accommodation arose from their fears of treachery, he sent his own son, Prince A'zim u Shán, to accompany them to a meeting which took place on the emperor's line of march, and at which the rájas appeared at the head of their own armies. All their demands were agreed to, and they were probably left on the same footing as the rána of Oudipúr. Peace with that power. A. D. 1709, A. H. 1121.

The Síks, against whom the emperor was obliged to march, had originally been a religious sect; were then rising into a nation; and have, in our times, Rise of the Síks.

* Scott's Memoirs of Erádat Khán, p. 58. Tod's Rajasthan, vol. ii. p. 77, &c.

BOOK XII.

attained to considerable political influence among the states of India.

Peaceful character of their sect.

Their founder, Nánik, flourished about the end of the fifteenth century. He was a disciple of Kabír, and consequently a sort of Hindú deist, but his peculiar tenet was universal toleration. He maintained that devotion was due to God, but that forms were immaterial, and that Hindú and Mahometan worship were the same in the sight of the Deity.* The spirit of this religion promised to keep its votaries at peace with all mankind; but such views of comprehensive charity were particularly odious to the bigoted part of the Mahometans; and accordingly, after the sect had silently increased for more than a century, it excited the jealousy of the Mussulman government, and its spiritual chief was put to death in A. D. 1606†, within a year after the decease of Akber. This act of tyranny changed the Síks from inoffensive quietists into fanatical warriors. They took up arms under Har Govind, the son of their martyred pontiff, who inspired them with his own spirit of revenge and of hatred to their oppressors. Being now open enemies of the government, the Síks were expelled from the neighbourhood of Láhór, which had hitherto been their seat, and constrained to take refuge in the northern

Persecuted by the Mahometans.

Their revolt.

* Professor Wilson, in the *Asiatic Researches*, vol. xvii. p. 233.

† Sir J. Malcolm, Ibid. vol. xi. p. 212.

mountains.* Notwithstanding dissensions which broke out among themselves, they continued their animosity to the Mussulmans, and confirmed their martial habits, until the accession (A. D. 1675) of Guru Govind, the grandson of Har Govind, and the tenth spiritual chief from Nánik. This leader first conceived the idea of forming the Síks into a religious and military commonwealth, and executed his design with the systematic spirit of a Grecian lawgiver.

Guru Govind.

He forms the Síks into a religious and military commonwealth.

To increase the numbers of his society, he abolished all distinctions of caste among its members, admitting all converts, whether Mahometan or Hindú, Bramin or Chandala, to a perfect equality; while, to preserve its unity, he instituted a peculiar dress and peculiar manners, by which his followers were to be distinguished from all the rest of mankind. Each was to be a vowed soldier from his birth or initiation, was always to carry steel in some form about his person, to wear blue clothes, allow his hair and beard to grow, and neither to clip nor remove the hairs on any other part of his body.

Their doctrines and manners.

Reverence for the Hindú gods, and respect for Bramins, were maintained, and the slaughter of kine was most positively forbidden; but all other prohibitions relating to food and liquors were abolished; the usual forms of worship were laid aside; new modes of salutation, and new ceremonies on the principal events of life, were intro-

* Sir J. Malcolm, p. 214.

BOOK XII.

duced *; and so effectual was the change operated on the people, that the Síks have now (after parting with several of their singularities) as distinct a national character as any of the original races in India. They are tall and thin, dark for so northern a people, active horsemen, and good matchlockmen: they are still all soldiers, but no longer fanatics; though unpolished, they are frank and sociable, and are devoted to pleasure of every description and degree.

They are overpowered at first.

Far different was their character under Guru Govind, when they were filled with zeal for their faith and rancour against their enemies, and were prepared to do or suffer any thing to promote the success of their cause. But their numbers were inadequate to accomplish their plans of resistance and revenge: after a long struggle, Guru Govind saw his strong holds taken, his mother and his children massacred, and his followers slain, mutilated, or dispersed. His misfortunes impaired his reason, or at least destroyed his energy; for so little formidable had he become, that he was allowed to enter the Mogul dominions unmolested, and was murdered by a private enemy, at Nándér, in the Deckan.† But although it is sometimes possible to crush a religion even after

* Sir J. Malcolm, *Asiatic Researches*, vol. xi. p. 219, 220. 284. 288.

† Sir J. Malcolm. Forster's Travels, p. 263. The latter author states that Guru Govind had a small command in the Mogul service; which is confirmed by Khâfi Khân.

it has taken root, it can only be done by long and steady persecution; and *that* the internal disturbances of the Moguls prevented their applying.

Their fanaticism.

Their severities only exalted the fanaticism of the Síks, and inspired a gloomy spirit of vengeance, which soon broke out into fury. Under a new chief named Bandu, who had been bred a religious ascetic, and who combined a most sanguinary disposition with bold and daring counsels, they broke from their retreat, and overran the east of the Panjáb, committing unheard-of cruelties wherever they directed their steps. The mosques, of course, were destroyed, and the mullahs butchered; but the rage of the Síks was not restrained by any considerations of religion, or by any mercy for age or sex: whole towns were massacred with wanton barbarity; and even the bodies of the dead were dug up and thrown out to the birds and beasts of prey.

Their successes, ravages, and cruelties under Bandu.

The principal scene of these atrocities was Sirhind, which the Síks occupied after defeating the governor in a pitched battle; but the same horrors marked their route through the country eastward of the Satlaj and Jamna, into which they penetrated as far as Seháranpúr. They at length received a check from the local authorities, and retired to the country on the upper course of the Satlaj, between Lodiána and the mountains. This seems, at that time, to have been their principal seat; and it was well suited to their condition, as they had a near

BOOK XII.

and easy retreat from it when forced to leave the open country.

Their retirement, on the present occasion, was of no long continuance; and on their next incursions they ravaged the country as far as the neighbourhood of Láhór on the one side, and of Delhi itself on the other.

Bahádur marches against them.

It was the extent of these depredations that made it necessary for Bahádur to come against them in person. He soon drove them within their own limits, and then obliged them to take refuge in the hills: to subdue them effectually, however, required a considerable exertion; and after Bandu had at length been reduced to take refuge in a fort, it was only by means of famine that the emperor could hope to take the place. A long and strict blockade was therefore set on foot; but, although the Síks endured the utmost extremities of hunger, and died in vast numbers, they still continued the defence. When further resistance became hopeless, a desperate sally was made by the besieged: many of the partakers in this bold enterprise were killed, and the Mussulmans took possession of the fort without further resistance. A person who seemed to be their chief, and had used every means of making himself conspicuous, was made prisoner, and carried off in triumph: when he arrived in camp, it was found that he was a Hindú convert who had sacrificed himself to save his leader, and that Bandu himself had escaped during the sally. The emperor, though sufficiently struck by

They are driven into the hills.

Escape of Bandu.

CHAP. I.

the prisoner's self-devotion to spare his life, was yet so ungenerous as to order him to be shut up in an iron cage and sent to Delhi.*

After this success, the emperor returned to Láhór, leaving a detachment to watch the Síks, and to check their depredations. This object was not fully attained, and the power of the Síks was again on the ascendant, when Bahádur Sháh died at Láhór, in the seventy-first lunar year of his age, and fifth of his reign.

Death of Bahádur Sháh. A. D. 1712, February; A. H. 1124, Moharram.

The death of Bahádur Sháh was followed by the usual struggle among his sons. The incapacity of the eldest (afterwards Jehándár Sháh) had given a great ascendancy to the second, whose name was A'zim u Shán; and as he was supported by most of the nobility and of the army, he appeared to have an irresistible superiority over his competitors.

Contest between his sons.

But his three brothers joined their interests, and were kept together by the persuasions and false promises of Zulfikár Khán, whose love of intrigue was still as strong as ever. Their concord was of short duration, but lasted until the defeat and death of A'zim u Shán. Two of the surviving brothers soon after came to an open conflict, and the third attacked the victor on the morning after the battle: he was, however, repulsed and slain; and Je-

Artifices of Zulfikár Khán.

He secures the victory to Jehándár Sháh.

* The proceedings of the Síks, till their capture of Seháranpúr, is from Sir J. Malcolm, Foster, and Khafi Khán: the subsequent narrative is from Khafi Khán alone.

BOOK XII.

hándár Sháh remained undisputed master of the throne.

A. D. 1712, May or June; A. H. 1124, Jamádi al awal.

Jehándár Sháh.

Accession of Jehándár Sháh. His incapacity.

Immediately on his accession, Jehándár appointed Zulfikár Khán to be vizír. This crafty and able chief had supported Jehándár through the whole of the preceding contest; judging, from the low and slothful habits of that prince, that he was best suited for a tool in the hands of an ambitious minister.

Arrogance of Zulfikár Khán.

Accordingly, he assumed the control of the government from the first, and treated the emperor with the utmost arrogance and disdain. He could not have ventured to adopt this course, if Jehándár, besides degrading his own dignity by his vices and follies, had not provoked the nobility by his partiality for the relations of his favourite mistress. This woman had been a public dancer, and her family were of the same discreditable class: yet they were exalted to high stations, to the exclusion of the nobles, whom they were also allowed on several occasions to insult with impunity. But though their disgust at such proceedings prevented the nobility from taking part with the emperor, it did not reconcile them to the pride and tyranny of Zulfikár, which soon came to be displayed towards all ranks; and it is not improbable that their discontents might have led to open opposition, if the attention of all had not been attracted by a danger from without.

General discontent.

CHAP. I.

One of Jehándár's first acts had been to put all the princes of the blood, within his reach, to death: among those whom he could not get into his power was Farokhsír, the son of A'zim u Shán, who was in Bengal at the time of Bahádur Sháh's death. After that event, and the ruin of A'zim u Shán, he threw himself on the compassion and fidelity of Seiad Hosén Ali, the governor of Behár, an old adherent of his father's, who warmly espoused his cause, and prevailed on his brother, Seiad Abdullah, governor of Albahábád, to adopt the same course.

Revolt of Prince Farokhsír in Bengal.

He is supported by Abdullah and Hosén Ali, governors of Behár and Allahábád.

By the aid of these noblemen, Farokhsír assembled an army at Allahábád, repelled a force sent to oppose him on his advance, and had marched to the neighbourhood of Agra, when he was met by Jehándár and Zulfikár with an army of 70,000 men. The battle was fiercely contested; and Hosén Ali, the soul of Farokhsír's enterprise, was left for dead upon the field. But success at length declared for the rebels: the emperor himself fled in disguise to Delhi; whither Zulfikár retreated at the head of his remaining troops. Jehándár, on reaching Delhi, repaired to the house of Assad Khán, the father of Zulfikár: this practised traitor immediately committed him to custody; and, on the arrival of Zulfikár, persuaded him, though at first unwilling to part with the instrument of his ambition, to endeavour to make his peace with the new emperor by the sacrifice of his rival.

Defeats the imperial army.

A. D. 1713, Jan. 1.; A. H. 1124, Zil Haj 15.

Accordingly, as Farokhsír approached the capi-

Zulfikár betrays

BOOK XII.

tal, both father and son went out to meet him, and delivered their late unfortunate master into his hands. Assad Khán's life was spared; but Zulfikár paid the penalty of his selfish and perfidious career, and was strangled before he left the imperial tent. Jehándár was put to death at the same time; and these severities were followed by many other executions.

Jehándár Sháh to the enemy; but is put to death along with the emperor.

A. D. 1713, Feb. 4.; A. H. 1125, Moharram 17.

Farokhsír.

The accession of Farokhsír was naturally accompanied by the elevation of his protectors. Abdullah Khán, the eldest brother, was made vizír; and Hosén received the rank of amír at ómra (or commander-in-chief), which was the second in the state. These brothers were sprung from a numerous and respected family of descendants of the Prophet, who were settled in the town of Bára; and in consequence of this origin, they are best known in India by the name of the Seiads.

Great power of Seiads Abdullah and Hosén Alí.

They had expected, from their services, as well as from the grovelling disposition of Farokhsír, and his submissive behaviour while courting their support, that they would be allowed to exercise all the real power of the state, leaving to the emperor only the pageantry, and such a command of wealth and honours as might enable him to gratify his favourites. But neither Farokhsír nor his favourites were so easily contented. His principal confidant was a person who had been cázi at Dacca, in Ben-

Jealousy of the emperor.

gal, and on whom he conferred the high title of Mír Jumla. This man, though devoid of capacity, had an obstinate perseverance in his narrow views, which was well suited to gain an ascendancy over a mind like Farokhsír's, incapable of comprehending a great design, and too irresolute to execute even a small one without support. CHAP. I.

It was no difficult task to make the emperor jealous of the authority which he was so incompetent to exercise, and the overbearing conduct of the Seiads gave him a reasonable motive for counteracting them.

The first scheme contrived in his secret cabinet was to weaken the brothers by a division of their force. For this purpose Hosén Ali was sent against Ajít Sing of Márwár, while secret messages were transmitted to the Rájpút prince, intimating that he could do nothing more acceptable to the emperor than by offering an obstinate resistance to his lieutenant. But Hosén Ali was too well aware of the danger occasioned by his absence to insist on terms that might protract the war; and Ajít, when his own interests were secured, had no inducement to make sacrifices for those of the emperor. Peace was accordingly concluded, on terms, to appearance, honourable to Farokhsír; the rája engaging to send his son to Delhi, and to give his daughter in marriage to the emperor.

His intrigues.

Hosén Ali sent against Ajít Sing, rája of Márwár.

Makes an honourable peace.

The mutual distrust of the parties at court was increased after Hosén Ali returned, and Farokhsír, as destitute of prudence and steadiness as faith and

Increased distrust.

BOOK XII.

honour, was exactly the sort of person with whom it was least possible to feel secure.

The Seiads, conceiving (probably with good reason) that their lives were aimed at, assembled their troops about their palaces, and refused to go to court. It was now the king's turn to be alarmed, and the preparations of the contending factions threw the capital into the utmost confusion and distress; and there remained no alternative but an immediate conflict, or the submission of the least determined of the parties. The king was therefore prevailed on to allow the gates of the citadel, in which was his palace, to be occupied by the guards of the Seiads, while they waited on him for the purpose of settling the terms of a reconciliation. It was there agreed that Mír Jumla should be made governor of Behár, and removed from court; that Abdullah Khán should continue to exercise the functions of vizír, but that Hosén should undertake the government of the Deckan, and proceed immediately with his army to that distant province.

Submission of the emperor.

Harmony being to appearance restored, the emperor's nuptials with the daughter of Ajít Sing were celebrated with unprecedented splendour, and the Ráhtór rája, from his independent territory, saw his importance acknowledged at the capital whence he had in his infancy been conveyed with so much difficulty to escape the tyranny of Aurangzíb.

After this ceremony, Hosén Ali set off for the

Hosén Ali marches to

CHAP. I.

Deckan. He was well aware that his continued absence would be the signal for the recall of Mír Jumla, and he told the emperor, at parting, that if he heard of any attempt to disturb his brother's authority, he should be at Delhi with his army within three weeks of the intelligence.

settle the Deckan. A. D. 1715, December; A. H. 1127, Zí Haj.

But Farokhsír did not trust to the ordinary chances of war for affording employment to his general. He had recourse for this purpose to Dáúd Khán Panni, who was renowned throughout India for his reckless courage, and whose memory still survives in the tales and proverbs of the Deckan. Dáúd Khán had been removed on the accession of Farokhsír to the province of Guzerát, to which that of Cándésh was now added; and, being an old fellow-soldier of Zúlfikár Khán, could be relied on for zeal against the instrument of his ruin. He was secretly instructed to repair immediately to Cándésh, to carry with him all the troops he could collect, to exercise his influence with the Marattas and other chiefs of the Deckan, and, under pretence of co-operating with Hosén Ali, to take the first opportunity of accomplishing his destruction. Dáúd's manner of executing these orders was conformable to his established character. He at once set Hosén Ali at defiance, proceeded to engage him as an open enemy, and soon brought the question to a trial of strength in the field. The impetuosity of his charge on this occasion entirely disconcerted Hosén Ali's army; they began to disperse in all directions, while Dáúd Khán, at the

Farokhsír instigates Dáúd Khán Panni to resist him.

BOOK XII.

head of 300 chosen men of his tribe, armed with battle-axes, pushed straight at the person of his opponent. At this decisive moment, Dáúd received a ball through his head, and his fall immediately turned the fortune of the day. His wife, a Hindú princess, who had accompanied him to Cándésh, stabbed herself on hearing of his death.

Defeat and death of Dáúd Khán.

A. D. 1716; A. H. 1129.

Hosén Ali, after his victory, proceeded to his operations against the Marattas, without imputing to the emperor any share in the opposition which he had met with.*

Renewed devastations of the Síks.

Meanwhile, the long-continued dissensions among the Mussulmans had afforded an opportunity to the Síks to recruit their strength. Bandu had issued from his retreat, defeated the imperial troops, and ravaged the level country with greater fury than before. At length an army was sent against him, under an able chief named Abdusemed Khán. By him the Síks were beaten in repeated actions, and Bandu was at last made prisoner with a number of his men, and some of his principal followers. Most of these persons were executed on the spot; but 740 were selected and sent with Bandu to Delhi. They were paraded through the streets on camels, dressed in black sheepskins, with the wool outside (in derision of the shaggy appearance they affected), and were exposed to the maledictions of the populace, which, it must be owned, they had well deserved. Their punishment ex-

They are defeated and nearly extirpated.

* The above account is from the "Seir Mutákherín" and Scott's "Deckan," who have both borrowed from Kháfi Khán.

ceeded the measure of offences even such as theirs. They were all beheaded on seven successive days, and died with the utmost firmness, disdaining every offer to save their lives at the expense of their religion. CHAP. I.

Bandu was reserved for greater cruelties. He was exhibited in an iron cage, clad in a robe of cloth of gold, and a scarlet turban; an executioner stood behind him with a drawn sword; around him were the heads of his followers on pikes, and even a dead cat was stuck on a similar weapon to indicate the extirpation of every thing belonging to him. He was then given a dagger, and ordered to stab his infant son; and on his refusing, the child was butchered before his eyes, and its heart thrown in his face. He was at last torn to pieces with hot pincers, and died with unshaken constancy, glorying in having been raised up by God to be a scourge to the iniquities and oppressions of the age. The Síks who were still at large were hunted down like wild beasts, and it was not till after a long interval that they again appeared in force, and once more renewed their depredations. Cruel execution of Bandu.

But the Síks, when at the strongest, were not numerous, and they were never formidable beyond a certain not very extensive tract.* It was with a different sort of enemy that the Moguls had to contend in the Deckan; to which country we must now return. The removal of Dáúd Khán Progress of the Marattas.

* The Síks have never been so flourishing as they are now (1839), and they are confined to the Panjáb and the neigh-

BOOK XII.

(A.D. 1713) had dissolved his engagements with the Marattas. His successor, Chín Kilich Khán (afterwards so well known under the titles of Nizám ul Mulk and Asof Jáh), was a man of much ability and more cunning; and as the feud among the Marattas now raged with more bitterness than ever, he contrived, by favouring the weaker party, not only to foment their internal dissensions, but to induce several of their chiefs to espouse the Mogul cause.

Chín Kilich Khán (afterwards Asof Jáh).

But these measures, though they prevented the increase of the Maratta power, had little effect in restoring the tranquillity of the country; and the removal of Chín Kilich Khán, to make way for Hosén Ali, put an end to the little good they had produced. Bands of Marattas ravaged the Mogul territory as before, and individuals of that nation seized on villages within its limits, and turned them into forts, from whence they plundered the adjoining districts.*

Ill success of Hosén Ali.

The most troublesome of these, at the time of Hosén Ali's arrival, was a chief whose family name was Dábári: he occupied a line of fortified villages in Cándésh, and, by his depredations on caravans and travellers, shut up the great road from Hindostan and the Deckan to Surat.

---

bouring countries: their numbers do not exceed 500,000 souls; and they are supposed to have 3,000,000 subjects by no means well affected to their government.

* Grant Duff, vol. i. p. 431. Briggs's Seir ul Mutákherín, vol. i. p. 141.

CHAP. I.

Soon after the defeat of Dáúd Khán, a very strong detachment was sent to remedy this pressing evil, and was opposed by the usual Maratta tactics. The villages were evacuated as the Moguls advanced, and re-occupied as soon as they had passed by; and Dábári, after affecting to fly till he reached a convenient scene of action, suffered himself to be overtaken, when his men dispersed in small parties among the hills and broken ground with which the place was surrounded. The Moguls, elated with their victory, broke up to pursue the fugitives. The Marattas allowed them to involve themselves in the ravines until they could no longer assemble, and then turned on them at once, cut the general and most of the detachment to pieces, and did not suffer one to escape till he was stripped of his horse, arms, and even clothes.* The further progress of the campaign corresponded to this inauspicious commencement; and the Marattas, in addition to the manifest inefficiency of their enemies, were encouraged by the intrigues of Farokhsír himself. At length Hosén Ali, finding that his presence could no longer be spared at Delhi, made a treaty with Rája Sáho, and agreed to acknowledge his claim to the whole of the territory formerly possessed by Sévají, with the addition of later conquests; to restore all the forts in his possession within that tract; to allow the levy of the *chout*, or fourth, over the whole of the Deckan;

He makes peace with Rája Sáho, and submits to pay the chout. A.D. 1717†.

* Seir ul Mutákhesín, vol. i. p. 142.

† Grant Duff, vol. i. p. 446.

BOOK XII.

and to make a further payment of one tenth on the remaining revenue, under the name of sirdésmuki. This tenth, with the cession of part of the territory, was all that had been demanded in the last negotiation with Aurangzíb. In return, Sáho was to pay a tribute of ten lacs of rupees; to furnish 15,000 horse, to preserve the tranquillity of the country, and to be answerable for any loss occasioned by depredations, from whatever quarter.

Though Sáho had at this time a superiority in the Maratta civil war, a great part of the country thus acknowledged to be his was not in his possession, and he was entirely unable to check the depredations of the hostile party, if he could those of his own adherents. But Hosén Alí's object was attained by being enabled to withdraw his troops from the Deckan, and by obtaining the assistance of a body of 10,000 Marattas on his march to Delhi.* Farokhsír refused to ratify this disgraceful treaty. His refusal only served to hasten the crisis of the dispute between him and the Seiads. The ultimate occurrence of such an event had long become inevitable.

Farokhsír refuses to ratify the treaty.

Abdullah Khán, the elder of the brothers, though a man of talents, was indolent and fond of pleasure. His business of vizír, therefore, was left to his deputy, a Hindú named Rattan Chand, whose strict measures and arbitrary temper made his administration very unpopular. Encouraged by this

State of the court of Delhi — Abdullah Khán.

Plots of Farokhsír.

* Grant Duff, vol. i. p. 144, &c.

circumstance, and by Abdullah's want of vigilance, Farokhsír began to form schemes for the recovery of his independence; and reports arose of an intention on his part to seize on the vizír's person. These rumours seemed confirmed by the proceedings of some large bodies of troops who had been suddenly dismissed from the king's service, and by the unexpected appearance of Mír Jumla, who made a rapid and secret journey from Behár to Delhi. He represented himself as obliged to fly from the dangers to which he was exposed by the disaffection of the troops in his province: he was very coldly received by the emperor; and he ostensibly threw himself on the vizír's protection, professing to have renounced all thoughts of public employment. But these appearances did not satisfy the vizír. He assembled his adherents, and prepared for the worst that might occur. If the emperor had entertained the design imputed to him, he had not the courage to carry it through. Overawed by the vizír's preparations, he hastened to appease his resentment; protested his anxious wish to maintain the administration on its present footing, and dismissed Mír Jumla to his native town of Mult n.

But this reconciliation was only superficial; the vizír retained a well-founded conviction of the emperor's insincerity; and the other almost immediately renewed his plots, which he took up with as much levity, and abandoned with as much

BOOK XII.

pusillanimity, as before. His plan now was, to form a combination of the principal persons who were discontented with the vizír. Among these was Jei Sing, rája of Ambér. This chieftain had been previously employed against the Játs, and had, by a long course of operations, reduced them to extremities, when the vizír opened a direct negotiation with an agent whom they had sent to Delhi, and granted them peace in a manner very derogatory to the honour of Jei Sing. Chín Kilich Khán, who had been removed from the viceroyalty of the Deckan to the petty government of Morádábád, was also ready to revenge the injury, and was summoned to Delhi: he was joined by Sirbuland Khán, governor of Behár: Rája Ajít Sing, the emperor's father-in-law, was also sent for, but showed no inclination to embark in an enterprise directed by such unsteady hands, and soon after openly attached himself to the prevailing party. The other conspirators, however, were zealous; and it was determined to assassinate the vizír on the occasion of a great annual solemnity, at which the number of troops well affected to the king would much surpass that of Abdullah's guards. But Farokhsú had now got a new favourite, a Cashmirian of low birth and profligate manners, on whom he conferred the title of Rokn u Doula. By this man's persuasion, which fell in with his natural timidity, he postponed the execution of the concerted plot, and he afterwards promised to his favourite the succession to the office of prime minister, and con-

Combination of great nobles to support him.

His levity and irresolution.

CHAP. I.

ferred on him, as a private jágír, the very district of which Chín Kilich Khán was governor.

Disgusts his confederates.

Disappointed and disgusted with this preference, and convinced that Farokhsír's irresolution must be fatal to any plan in which he was an actor, his confederates, with the exception of Jei Sing, lost no time in making their peace with the vizír.

Return of Hosén Ali, accompanied by 10,000 Marattas.

That minister, whose fears had been awakened by the previous appearances, had already called for the assistance of his brother from the Deckan; and Hosén Ali, who kept his army at his devotion, by carefully excluding all persons appointed by the court from command, was now in full march on the capital.

A. D. 1718, December; A. H. 1131 *, Moharram.

Jei Sing endeavoured to excite the emperor to take some decisive step during the short interval that was left, but was unable to animate that feeble prince even with the courage of despair; and Hosén Ali's first demand, on his arrival, was for the dismission of the rája to his own territory. Farokhsír, thus at the mercy of his enemies, had recourse to the most abject submission. Hosén Ali remained encamped without the city; but the vizír's guards were admitted into the palace, and it only remained to the brothers to decide on the fate of its tenant. In this state of affairs, some nobles who remained faithful to the

* This is the date of his march from Cándésh, taken from Kháfi Khán; Grant Duff also confirms the year. The "Seir Mutákherín" (Briggs's translation, vol. i. p. 164.) makes the year A. D. 1719, A. H. 1132; and many of its subsequent dates differ, in the same manner, from all other authorities.

BOOK XII.

emperor, set out with their retainers to his assistance; and a rising of the townspeople for the purpose of massacring the Marattas took place at the same time. In consequence of the confusion which followed, Hosén Ali marched into the city, of which he took possession after some opposition. It seemed no longer safe to spare Farokhsír; and that unfortunate shadow of a king was dragged from his hiding-place in the seraglio and privately put to death.

Farokhsír deposed and put to death. A. D. 1719, February; A. H. 1131, Rabi u Sáni.

Some of the fruits of Aurangzíb's religious policy appeared during this reign. Enáyat Ullah, who had been secretary to that monarch, being appointed to the head of the finance, endeavoured to enforce the capitation tax on Hindús with the rigour of his former master; but he was soon forced to desist by the public clamour, and the tax was formally abolished in the next reign.

There was a violent affray between the Shiás and Sunnis in the capital, and a still more serious one, in Ahmedábád, between the Hindús and Mussulmans, in which many lives were lost: on this occasion the Mussulman governor (Dáúd Khán Panni) took part with the Hindús.

Nominal emperors set up by the Seiads. Rafí u Dirját. A. D. 1719, February; A. H. 1131, Rabi u Sáni. Rafí u Doula. A. D. 1719, May; A. H. 1131, Rajab.

On the deposition of Farokhsír, the Seiads set up a young prince of the blood, to whom they gave the title of Rafí u *Dirját*. He died in little more than three months, of a consumption; when another youth of the same description was set up under the name of Rafí u *Doula*, and came to the same end in a still shorter period.

CHAP. I.

These princes had been brought up in the recesses of the seraglio, without any prospect of the succession, and had the ideas of women superinduced on those of children. Their deaths must have been inconvenient to the Seiads, and they pitched on a healthier young man as their successor. This was Roushen Akhter: he had no advantages in previous situation over the others; but his mother was a woman of ability, and had perhaps helped to form his character, as she subsequently influenced his conduct.

He was raised to the throne by the title of Mohammed Sháh. *

Mohammed Sháh. A. D. 1719, September; A. H. 1131, Zí Cáda.

* At Mohammed's accession it was determined that the names of his two predecessors should be left out of the list of kings, and that his reign should commence from the death of Farokhsír. (*Seir Mutákherín*, vol. i. p. 197. *Grant Duff*, vol. i. p. 450. Marsden, *Numismata Orientalia*.)

CHAP. II.

TO THE DEPARTURE OF NÁDIR SHÁH.

Mohammed Sháh.

BOOK XII.

A. D. 1719, September; A. H. 1131, Zí Cáda.

General indignation against the Seiads.

THE murder of Farokhsír (in spite of his personal character, and the familiarity of such a catastrophe in Asia) produced a general feeling of horror, and led to suspicions regarding the premature deaths of his successors. The frequent change of pageants also drew attention to the moving power which they were intended to veil.

Internal dissensions of their party.

The authority of the Seiads, thus shaken in the public opinion, was further impaired by their own disagreement, as well as by the discontent of some of their principal adherents, and soon began to show signs of weakness in the inefficiency of the internal government.

Insurrections.

The governor of Allahábád (a Hindú) rebelled; and, although Hosén Ali went against him in person, he only gave up his province on condition that he should receive that of Oud in exchange: the tributary state of Búndi required a strong force to settle some disturbances that broke out there; while the Afghán chief of Kosúr, in the south of the Panjáb, revolted, defeated the royal troops, and was not subdued without an effort. A furious contest between Hindús and Mussulmans also took

place in Cashmír, in which the efforts of the government to maintain tranquillity were unavailing, until some thousand persons had fallen on the two sides, and much loss of property had been sustained.

Proceedings of Asof Jáh.

The most alarming sign of the times was in the proceedings of Chín Kilich Khán. This chief (whom, anticipating the title, I shall henceforth call Asof Jáh, and whose descendants are known to Europeans as Nizáms of the Deckan) was of a respectable Túrk family, and was the son of Gházi u dín, a favourite officer of Aurangzíb, under which emperor *he* also distinguished himself. He showed spirit in maintaining his dignity during the depression of the nobility by the mistress of Jehándár Sháh and her relations*; and subsequently rose to importance (as has been related) by his services as viceroy of the Deckan. He had quitted the party of Farokhsír because he found he was not to be prime minister; and yet, on the success of his new allies, he was not even restored to his viceroyalty, but made governor of the single province of Málwa.

The disturbed state of that country gave him a pretence for raising troops; and he became so for-

* Being rudely stopped in a narrow street, to make way for a woman who had unbounded influence with the mistress, and through her with the emperor, he ordered his attendants to repel force with force, dispersed the favourite's retinue, and compelled her to quit her elephant, and escape on foot to the palace.

BOOK XII.

midable to the Seiads, that they made a feeble attempt to remove him, offering him the choice of four other governments. This only showed Asof Jáh that the time for dissembling was passed; and as he saw the difficulty of establishing a permanent control at the capital, he determined to lay the foundations of his power on a firmer basis, and turned his first attention to the conquest of the Deckan. He had there many old connections both with the Mussulmans and the Marattas.

A. D. 1720, April; A. H. 1132, Jamádi u Sáni.

He establishes his power in the Deckan.

Defeats the armies of the Seiads.

Immediately on his revolt he marched to the Nerbadda. By intrigue and money he obtained possession of the fort of Asírghar, and procured the junction of several officers of the province. He was pursued from Hindostan by a force under Diláwer Khán (a Seiad of Bára), and another under A'lam Ali Khán (the nephew of the usurping brothers) was awaiting him at Aurangábád. Taking advantage of the impetuous character of Diláwer, he drew him into an engagement before he could be supported by his colleague, and totally defeated him in a battle fought near Burhánpúr; Diláwer Khán himself was among the slain. He then turned against A'lam Ali, whose force, though weakened by the desertion of some chiefs gained by Asof Jáh, was still very powerful. A battle took place at Bállapúr in Berár, in which large bodies of Marattas were engaged on both sides, and which terminated in the defeat and death of A'lam Ali.

A. D. 1720, June.

A. D. 1720, July.

Alarm at Delhi.

These events threw the Seiads into consterna-

tion, and, though secretly agreeable to the emperor and many of the nobility, filled the minds of reflecting men with dismal forebodings of the ruin of the empire. This gloom was rendered deeper among a superstitious people by a violent earthquake which occurred about this time, and seemed to threaten the existence of the capital; and in these depressing circumstances the brothers betrayed those signs of irresolution which are often the forerunners of great calamities.

Prudent conduct of Mohammed Sháh.

Mohammed Sháh (tutored by his mother) had carefully avoided any opposition to the Seiads, and patiently waited for some change of circumstances favourable to the assertion of his own authority. He now began, with the utmost secrecy, to deliberate what could be done to accelerate his deliverance. His counsellor in this dangerous undertaking was Mohammed Amín Khán, one of the noblemen who had deserted Farokhsír when he proved a traitor to his own cause, and who had since adhered so the Seiads, though full of envy and disgust at their power and arrogance. He was in the habit of conversing in Túrki with Mohammed, and by means of that language, which was unknown to Indian Seiads, he was able to ascertain the sentiments of the emperor, although closely surrounded by the connections and creatures of the brothers. Hints interchanged in this manner paved the way to more private communications, and a party was gradually formed, the second place in which was occupied by Sádat Khán, originally a

His plans against the Seiads.

Mohammed Amín Khán.

Sádat Khán.

BOOK XII.

merchant of Khórasán, who had risen to a military command, and was the progenitor of the present kings of Oud. These combinations, however secret, did not fail to excite obscure apprehensions in the minds of the Seiads, and occasioned much perplexity about the manner of disposing of the emperor during the approaching contest with Asof Jáh. It was at length decided that Hosén Ali should march to the Deckan, and should carry the emperor and some of the suspected nobles along with him, while Abdullah should remain at Delhi, and watch over the interests of his family at home.

Hosén Ali marches against Asof Jáh, accompanied by the emperor.

After much hesitation the brothers quitted Agra, and each marched off towards his destined station. The separation was judged by the conspirators to afford an opportunity for executing their designs. It was determined to assassinate Hosén Ali, and Mír Heider, a savage Calmuc, who (though a man of some rank in his own country) was ready for the most desperate enterprise, was pitched on to strike the blow. He waited for his victim as he passed in his palankin, and attracted his attention by holding up a petition. Hosén Ali made a sign to his attendants to allow him to approach, and was about to read the petition, when Mír Heider plunged his dagger into his body. The blow was fatal: Hosén Ali rolled out a corpse from the opposite side of the palankin, and Mír Heider was cut to pieces in an instant by the fury of the attendants. The death of this powerful minister threw the whole camp into commotion. A fierce

Assassination of Hosén Ali. A. D. 1720, October; A. H. 1132, Zí Haj 6.

conflict took place between his adherents, many of whom were Seiads like himself, and the partisans of the conspirators, who were joined by numbers whose only object was to protect the emperor. Mohammed was with some difficulty prevailed on to show himself at the head of his own friends, and his appearance materially contributed to decide the fate of the day. The party of the Seiads was driven from the field, and many of its members, with all the neutral part of the army, made their submission to the emperor.

The emperor assumes the government.

The intelligence of this event reached Abdullah Khán before he entered Delhi. Painful as it was in itself, it was as alarming in its consequences. Abdullah had now to oppose his sovereign without either right or any popular pretext in his favour; and he was made aware of his situation by the immediate breaking out of disturbances in the country around him. But his energy rose with his danger. He proclaimed one of the princes confined at Delhi king, conferred offices and dignities in his name, and applied himself with vigour to strengthening his cause by securing the services of troops and officers.

Difficult situation of Abdullah Khán.

He sets up a new emperor.

Few men of rank adhered to him; but by means of high pay he drew together a large, though ill-disciplined, army. He marched in little more than a fortnight after his brother's death, and was joined as he advanced by Choráman, the rája of the Játs, and by many of his brother's soldiers who deserted after having submitted to the emperor.

Assembles an army.

BOOK XII.

On the other hand, Mohammed was reinforced by the arrival of 4000 horse, hastily sent forward by Rája Jei Sing, and of some chiefs of the Rohilla Afgháns. The armies met between Agra and Delhi. Abdullah was defeated and taken prisoner; his life was spared, probably from respect for his sacred lineage. Mohammed Sháh immediately proceeded to Delhi, which he entered in great pomp, and celebrated his emancipation by an extensive distribution of offices and rewards. Mohammed Amín was made vizír; but he had scarcely entered on his office, when he was taken ill, and died in a few hours.

A. D. 1720, November; A. H. 1133, Moharram. Is defeated and taken prisoner.

A. D. 1720, Nov. or Dec.; A. H. 1133, Safar. Sudden death of Mohammed Amín, the new vizír.

In most cases, the sudden death of a prime minister would have been attributed to poison; but in this instance there was a manner of accounting for it still more acceptable to the popular love of wonder. An impostor had made his appearance at Delhi some years before, who produced a new scripture, written in a language of his own invention, framed from those spoken in ancient Persia, and had founded a sect in which the teachers were called Békúks and the disciples Ferábúds. He had become so considerable at the accession of Mohammed, that the new vizír sent a party of soldiers to apprehend him. Before he was taken into custody, the vizír was seized with a violent illness, and his family, in alarm, endeavoured by presents and entreaties to avert the anger of the holy man. The Békúk boldly avowed the miracle, but said his shaft, once shot, could not be recalled.

A. D. 1721, January; A. H. 1133, Rabi al Awal.

He was nevertheless left undisturbed, and lived for some years after.

The office of vizír was only filled by a temporary substitute, being ultimately designed for Asof Jáh.

Rapid decline of the monarchy.

Meanwhile, every day brought some fresh proof of the decline of the monarchy. The government of Guzerát had been conferred on Rája Ajít Sing as a reward for his adherence to the Seiads; the addition of that of Ajmír had been secretly promised by Mohammed, as the price of his friendship or neutrality in the contest between himself and those brothers, and a grant for life of both governments had been delivered to him under the royal seal. In spite of these engagements, Ajít was now removed from Guzerát; and although his deputy, a Rájpút, endeavoured to keep possession by force, he was driven out by the Mussulmans of the province, and compelled to take refuge with his master at Jódpúr. Ajít Sing, on this, occupied Ajmír with a large army of Rájpúts, took and plundered Nárnól, and advanced his parties to Rewári, within fifty miles of Delhi. All attempts to check his progress had been rendered ineffectual by the dissensions of the generals ordered against him, and their reluctance to undertake the duty; and when, at last, the commander-in-chief moved out to protect the capital, he was glad to agree to the terms originally proposed by Ajít, that he should submit to the loss of Guzerát on condition of being confirmed in Ajmír.* A. D. 1721, A. H. 1133.

* Seir Mutákherín. Tod's Rajasthan.

BOOK XII.

Asof Jáh vizír.

A. D. 1722, January; A. H. 1134, Rabi u Sáni.

Soon after this, Asof Jáh arrived at Delhi, and took possession of the office of vizír. Though he had for some time been apprised of his appointment, he thought it of more importance to secure his independence in the Deckan than to seize on the authority held out to him at the capital. He had been engaged in many transactions with the Marattas, who were rapidly assuming the form of a regular government, and it was not till he had settled affairs in that quarter to his satisfaction that he repaired to Delhi. He found the court in a state of the utmost weakness and disorder. The emperor was given up to pleasure; his favourite advisers were young men of the same pursuits, and his mistress had such an ascendancy over him, that she was allowed to keep his private signet, and to use it at her discretion. This state of things gave great disgust to Asof Jáh, brought up at the austere court of Aurangzíb, and, in spite of his predilection for intrigue, both able and willing to conduct a vigorous administration: but he had neither the boldness nor the power to seize the government by force; and he made no progress in gaining the confidence of the emperor, who felt himself constrained by his grave manners, and importuned by his attempts to draw attention to public business, and who had no greater pleasure than to see his antiquated dress and formal courtesy burlesqued by his own dissolute companions.

Indolence of the emperor.

His favourites.

His dislike to Asof Jáh.

Asof Jáh sent against the refrac-

After some months of mutual dissatisfaction, the emperor and his favourites thought they had de-

vised a plan to free themselves from their troublesome counsellor. Heider Cúli, the governor of Guzerát, though one of the principal actors in the revolution which restored the royal authority, was offensive to the cabal for his proud and inflexible disposition; and they hoped, by embroiling him with Asof Jáh, that both might be rendered more dependent on the court. They accordingly directed Heider Cúli to give up his government to Asof Jáh; on which the former chief, as they expected, repaired to his station, and made ready to defend his possession of it by force of arms. But this deep-laid scheme ended in sudden disappointment; for their subtle adversary so well employed his talents for intrigue and corruption, that his rival's army deserted almost in a body, and he speedily returned to Delhi, strengthened by the addition of a rich province to his former exorbitant command.

tory governor of Guzerát.

Quells the insurrection, and retains the government of the province.

No event of importance succeeded to Asof Jáh's return, except the murder of the deputy governor of Agra by the Játs; on which Rája Jei Sing *, the old enemy of that people, was appointed governor of Agra for the purpose of revenging the outrage. Choráman, the aged rája of the Játs, happened to die during the expedition; and Jei Sing, by dexterously supporting his nephew against his son and successor, brought about a

Expedition against the Játs of Bhartpúr.

* Kháfi Khán. Scott's Deckan, vol. ii. p. 187. Briggs and Grant Duff make it Ajít Sing, as does the old translation of the "Seir Mutákherín;" but probably all on one authority.

BOOK XII.

division among the Játs, and at last placed the nephew in possession on condition of his paying tribute to Delhi.

Disgust of Asof Jáh.

The mutual aversion of the emperor and his vizír were not diminished after the return of the latter; and it was probably, at the moment, a relief to Mohammed, when his minister, after securing his safety, by removing, on some pretence, from the capital, sent in his resignation and marched off for the Deckan. But this measure amounted, in reality, to a declaration of independence, and was viewed in that light by the emperor himself, who, although he graciously accepted Asof Jáh's resignation, and conferred on him the highest titles that could be held by a subject, did not on that account remit his active hostility. He sent orders to Mobáriz Khán, the local governor of Heiderábád, to endeavour to dispossess the viceroy, and assume the government of the whole Deckan in his stead. Mobáriz entered zealously on the task imposed on him; and by the sanction of the emperor's name, joined to his own influence and the enmity of individuals to his rival, he succeeded in collecting a powerful army. Asof Jáh, always more inclined to art than force, protracted his negotiations for several months, during which he endeavoured to sow sedition among Mobáriz's adherents. As he made little progress in this mode of hostility, he at last came to open war, and soon gained a decided victory over Mobáriz, who lost his life in the battle. As the emperor had not avowed the

He resigns his office, and sets off for the Deckan.

A. D. 1723, October; A. H. 1136, Moharram.

The emperor instigates Mobáriz Khán, governor of Heiderábád, to supplant him.

Mobáriz defeated and slain.

CHAP. II.

attack which he had instigated, Asof Jáh, not to be outdone in dissimulation, sent the head of Mobáriz to court with his own congratulations on the extinction of the rebellion. He then fixed his residence at Heiderábád; and, though he continued to send honorary presents, on fixed occasions, to the emperor, he thenceforth conducted himself, in other respects, as an independent prince.

A. D. 1724, October; A. H. 1137, Moharram.

But, although he was now beyond the reach of attack from his former sovereign, he was by no means equally secure from his neighbours the Marattas. Their power, being now concentrated and in able hands, was too great for any resistance that he could oppose to it, and all the refinements of his artful policy were for a time employed to divert it from himself, and to turn it against his enemies at Delhi.

Asof Jáh's policy towards the Marattas.

The change in the state of the Maratta government had been gradually brought about during a considerable period, and requires to be taken up from the commencement. Though Sáho had been set up as rája by the Moguls, it suited the policy of Asof Jáh, during his first government of the Deckan (A. D. 1713 to A. D. 1716), to assist his rival, Samba, at that time the weaker of the competitors. Other circumstances tended, soon after, to depress the party of Sáho, who would never have recovered his superiority, but for the abilities of his minister, Bálaji Wiswanát.

Consolidation of the Maratta government.

This person (the founder of the Bramin dynasty of Péshwas) was the hereditary accountant of a

Bálaji Wiswanát, péshwa.

BOOK XII.

village in the Concan. He afterwards entered into the service of a chief of the Jádu family, whence he was transferred to that of the rája. He distinguished himself by many services; the most important of which was his bringing over A'ngria (a powerful chief as well as famous pirate), in the Concan, from the side of Samba to that of Sáho.

His merits were at length rewarded with the office of péshwa, at that time the second in the state; the pírti nidhí, or *delegate of the rája*, being the first.

It was through his means that the cession of territory and tribute was obtained from Hosén Ali Khán (A. D. 1717), and he was joint commander of the Maratta force that accompanied that minister to Delhi. At that time Sáho (without in other respects laying aside the titles or the independence assumed by his predecessors) was content, in his intercourse with the Mogul court, to acknowledge himself a vassal of the empire. It was professedly in this quality that his troops accompanied Hosén Ali; and the fall of that chief did not necessarily make any change in their relation to the government. Under this view Bálají remained at Delhi after the death of Farokhsír, and ultimately obtained a ratification of the treaty by Mohammed Sháh (A. D. 1720). This recognition of his authority, together with other advantages, had established the ascendancy of Sáho over his rival; and Bálaji, before his death,

Establishes the government of Sáho.

(which happened in October, 1720,) had the satisfaction of seeing him placed above the assaults of enemies, either foreign or domestic.

Dies.

His complicated revenue system.

The cessions by the treaty having given legality to what before was mere robbery, enabled Bálají to introduce some degree of order into the Maratta mode of collection. It appears extraordinary, at first sight, that he did not prefer a solid territorial possession to assignments on other proprietors, such as the *chout* and *sirdésmuki*; or that he did not, at least, consolidate those dues, by throwing those on the same territory into one head, and uniting it with the land revenue where that also belonged to the Marattas. But it was by no means his object to simplify the claims of his government. He knew, from the relative power of the parties, that the rája would be a gainer in all disputed points with the Moguls, and was more anxious to obtain a pretext for interference and encroachment over an extensive territory than clearly defined rights within a small one. In furtherance of this policy, he claimed, as *chout*, one fourth of the permanent revenue fixed by Tódar Mal and Malik Amber, of which but a small portion was now realised from the exhausted country; and, although he did not enforce this principle to its full extent, it still served to keep his claim undefined. It was not in dealing with the Moguls alone that he profited by keeping up this system of confusion: by granting the *chout* and *sirdésmuki* to different persons, and even

His motives.

BOOK XII.

inventing new subdivisions, so as to admit of further partition, he parcelled out the revenues of every district among several Marratta chiefs; so that while each had an interest in increasing the contributions to the general stock, none had a compact property such as might render him independent of the government. The intricacy produced in the affairs of the Maratta chiefs, by these innumerable fractions of revenue, led to another effect that Bálají had quite as much at heart: it threw them entirely into the hands of their Bramin agents, and strengthened the péshwa's power by increasing that of his cast. But, though this system of subdivision was general, it was not universal: some chiefs had already landed possessions in the old territory; and similar grants, more or less extensive, continued to be made from special favour. Every chief required a village or two for his head quarters, and all were anxious to possess the government claims on those of which they were natives or hereditary officers.

Báji Ráo péshwa.

His enterprising policy.

Bálaji Wiswanáth was succeeded by his son, Báji Ráo, the ablest of all the Bramin dynasty, and of all the Maratta nation, except Sévají. Báji Raó did not at once enjoy the whole authority that had been possessed by his father. He had a powerful rival in the pírti nidhí, and the interests of those politicians were not more opposed than their opinions. The pírti nidhí was sincerely apprehensive of the effects of a further diffusion of the Maratta power; and he strenuously contended

for the necessity of consolidating the rája's present possessions, suppressing civil discord, and acquiring a firm hold on the countries in the south of the peninsula, before attempting to make any conquests in Hindostan. Báji Ráo took a wiser as well as bolder view. He saw that the hordes of predatory horse, who were so useful in an enemy's country, would be utterly ungovernable at home; and that it was only by forming an army, and establishing a military command, that an efficient internal government could be brought into existence. He therefore counselled an immediate invasion of the northern provinces, and pointed out the inward weakness of the Mogul empire, which was nowhere so rotten as at the core: "Let us strike," said he, "the withered trunk, and the branches will fall of themselves." The eloquence and earnestness with which he pressed his advice overcame all the doubts of the rája; and when urged by Báji Ráo to allow him to carry his standard beyond the Nerbadda, he exclaimed, with enthusiasm, "You shall plant it on Hémaláya." *

The results of these debates gave Báji Ráo a preponderance in the councils of the rája, and his ascendancy daily increased from the necessity for his assistance. Though Sáho was not destitute of abilities, his education in a Mussulman seraglio was alike unfavourable to hardiness of body and activity of mind; while Báji Ráo, born in a camp

Character of Sáho.

Of Báji Ráo.

* Grant Duff, and Maratta MSS. quoted by that author, vol. i. p. 482—486.

BOOK XII.

and trained up a statesman and diplomatist, combined the habits of a Maratta horseman with an enlarged judgment and extensive knowledge. Unlike his cold-blooded brethren of the priestly class, his temper was ardent and his manner frank; he never flinched from fatigue or danger, and could make a meal of dry grain rubbed out of the husks between his hands as he rode along on a march.

His designs on the northern provinces were aided by the Moguls themselves. Shortly before the battle with Mobáriz, Azof Jáh was removed from his governments of Málwa and Guzerát. Rája Gírdhar was appointed to the former province, and found no difficulty in occupying it, while the troops were drawn off to the contest in the Deckan; but was unable to defend it from the incursions of Báji Ráo; and in Guzerát, Hamíd Khán, Asof's uncle, not only offered a strenuous resistance himself, but directly called in the aid of the Marattas. In return, he gave up to them the *chout* and *sirdésmuki* of the country under him; and Sirbuland Khán, the lawful governor, though successful in expelling Hamíd, was, after a long struggle, obliged to confirm the grant.

Báji Ráo ravages Málwa.

Obtains a cession by the governor of the chout of Guzerát.

A. D. 1725, A. H. 1138.

Notwithstanding the loss of these governments, Asof Jáh's power was now so well established in the Deckan, that he thought he might venture on an attempt to reduce that of his formidable neighbours. For this purpose, he again availed himself of their internal dissensions. He first applied himself to the pírti nidhí, and by his means had

Asof Jáh foments the dissensions of the Marattas.

nearly concluded a treaty, by which the chout and sirdésmuki on the country round his new capital were to be commuted for a territorial cession and a fixed pecuniary payment; but Báji Ráo, faithful to his system of indefinite claims, and no doubt offended by the interference of his old rival, gave his decided opposition to the execution of the agreement; and Asof gained nothing by the negotiation, except the advantage of exasperating the jealousies of the Maratta ministers.

His next attempt of the same nature was of more importance. Samba, the claimant to the Maratta throne, though eclipsed by the superior fortune of Sáho, had fixed the seat of his government at Cólapúr, and retained the southern part of the dominions of his family, while he continued to assert his claim to the whole. Asof Jáh, without formally espousing his cause, affected to be in doubt to whom he ought to pay the money due from his country to the Marattas, and called on the parties to exhibit the grounds of their respective claims. This demand was highly resented by Sáho, and his anger found a willing instrument in Báji Ráo. At the end of the rainy season, the péshwa invaded Asof's territories, and first threatened Burhánpúr; but when Asof Jáh (now openly joined by Samba) moved to the relief of that city, Báji Ráo changed the direction of his march, made a rapid incursion into Guzerát, where the chout had not at that time been con-

He is attacked, and compelled to make concessions. A. D. 1727, A. H. 1140.

BOOK XII.

firmed), and after ravaging the province with fire and sword, returned with equal celerity to the Deckan. He now laid waste the country round Asof's army, and so straitened his supplies, by the usual Maratta means, that he was obliged to renounce his connection with Samba, and to concede some other advantages to the Maratta government. After this adjustment, Báji Ráo crossed the Nerbadda to ravage Málwa, and to extort Sirbuland Khán's confirmation of his predecessor's grant of the chout of Guzerát.

A. D. 1729, A.H. 1141-2.

Accommodation between Sáho and his rival, Samba.

During his absence the pírti nidhí surprised and defeated Samba, and at last compelled him to sign a treaty acknowledging Sáho's right to the whole Maratta country except a tract round Cólapúr, bounded on the west by the sea. This portion he was himself to retain, with the title of rája, and the same dignity as that assumed by Sáho. Though this success raised the reputation of the pírti nidhí, it did not enable him to enter the lists with the péshwa, and Asof was obliged to look out for some other instrument to disturb the Maratta government.

A. D. 1730, A. H. 1142.

Renewed intrigues of Asof Jáh.

Dábári, a great Maratta chief in Guzerát.

He found one in the head of the family of Dábári, the hereditary sénapati or commander-in-chief. This leader had been the principal means of establishing the Maratta power in Guzerát, and saw with indignation the fruit of his labours carried off by another. His jealousy derived additional bitterness from the ascendancy acquired by the péshwa, who now conducted the government with

out the least control on the part of the rája. Incited by these feelings, and the promise of powerful co-operation from Asof Jáh, Dábári assembled an army of 35,000 men, and set out for the Deckan, with the professed object of delivering the rája from the thraldom of his minister.

Marches to depose the péshwa.

Báji Ráo had not an equal force at his disposal; but what he had was composed of old troops, and he saw the advantage of promptitude in acting against a combination. Without allowing time for Asof Jáh to declare himself, he crossed the Nerbadda, entered Guzerát, and encountered Dábári not far from Baródra. The superiority of his veterans over Dábári's less experienced troops decided the victory in his favour, and he used it with prudence and moderation. Dábári having fallen in the action, he conferred his office, in the rája's name, on his son, and left him in possession of the Maratta rights in Guzerát on condition of his paying half the produce, *through the péshwa*, to the government. As the son was an infant, his mother was appointed his guardian, and Guzerát was to be administered in his behalf by Pilaji Geikwár, an adherent of his father's, and ancestor of the Geikwár family that still rules in Guzerát.

Is anticipated by Báji Ráo, defeated and killed.

A. D. 1731; April; A. H. 1143, Sháwál.

Moderation of Báji Ráo, in settling Guzerát.

Most of the other great Maratta families had also their origin a little before this time. When Báji Ráo began his incursions into Málwa he gave commands to U'daji Puár, Malhár Ráo Hólcar, and Ránaji Sindia. The first of these was a chief before his connection with the péshwa: he soon

Origin of the families of Puár, Hólcar, and Sindia.

BOOK XII.

acquired a territory about Dhár, on the borders of Guzerát and Málwa; but never rose to such power as his colleagues or their descendants. Hólcar was a shepherd on the Níra, south of Púna; and Sindia, though of a respectable family near Sáttára, was in such abject poverty as to be a menial servant of Báji Ráo's. These chiefs, and others of this period, were no longer adventurers warring at the head of their own retainers, but officers of the péshwa, commanding divisions of *his* troops, and acting under *his* commission.

Compromise between Báji Ráo and Asof Jáh.

Báji Ráo had now the means of punishing the machinations of Asof Jáh; but both parties began to perceive the advantages of a mutual good understanding: Báji Ráo saw how much his supremacy at home would be endangered, during remote expeditions, by the enmity of so powerful and so insidious a neighbour; and Asof, besides other grounds of apprehension, felt by no means secure that the emperor might not revenge his defiance of the royal authority by transferring the viceroyalty to the péshwa, in whose hands such a title would not be inoperative. Accordingly, not long after Báji Ráo's return, the two usurpers entered into a secret compact, by which it was settled that Asof should support the government of Báji Ráo, while the other carried his arms into Málwa, and pushed his conquests over the emperor's remaining dominions.

Rája Abhi Sing of Márwár

Báji Ráo had, at this period, strong motives of his own for extending his views in the country

CHAP. II.

beyond the Nerbadda. Immediately after his departure from Guzerát, the court of Delhi refused to ratify the grant of chout, removed Sirbuland Khán from the government, and conferred it on Abhi Sing, rája of Jódpúr.

viceroy of Guzerát.

The appointment of an independent prince to such a charge would have been objectionable at any time; and the profligate character of Abhi Sing, who had acquired his power by the murder of his father, Ajít*, did not promise much fidelity on his part; but he possessed resources not enjoyed by the Mogul government, and seemed able by his own means, both to expel Sirbuland, and to defend the province against the Marattas.

The first of these objects was attained in one campaign; the second was not so easy of accomplishment. Pilají Geikwár, though driven out of Baródra, still continued so formidable that the unprincipled Abhi Sing saw no means of overcoming him except by procuring his assassination. This crime only roused the indignation of the Marattas, without weakening their power. The son and brother of Pilají appeared in greater force than ever, and not only ravaged Guzerát themselves, but raised all the surrounding hill tribes of Bhíls and Cúlis, and threw the whole province into revolt and confusion. While the Rájpút prince was completely occupied by these disturbances, the Geikwárs made a sudden irruption into his hereditary terri-

A. D. 1730.

A. D. 1732.

Procures the assassination of Pilají Geikwár.

Retaliation of the Marattas.

* Tod's Rajasthan, vol. ii. p. 91.

BOOK XII.

tory, and penetrated to the neighbourhood of Jódpúr itself. This attack, and the threatening aspect of the Maratta force in Málwa, compelled Abhi Sing to withdraw to his own principality, and the deputy whom he left in Guzerát could make but a feeble stand against the Marattas.

Abhi Sing retires to Márwár.

The affairs of that nation were not less prosperous in Málwa. Gírdhar Sing, the governor of that province, had fallen in a battle with Báji Ráo's officers (in 1729); and his nephew, Deia Rám, who succeeded him, and had opposed a gallant resistance till this time, was defeated by Chimnají, the péshwa's brother, and lost his life in the battle.

A. D. 1732.

When Báji Ráo entered Málwa in person (1732), the government was in the hands of Mohammed Khán Bangash, an Afghán chief, who was also governor of Allahábád. He was at that period employed against a rája in Bundélcand, which lay between his two provinces; and the rája, reduced to extremities, had recourse to the aid of the Marattas. Báji Ráo immediately obeyed the summons, came suddenly on Mohammed Khán, and before long compelled him to take refuge in a fort. The government of Delhi was too weak to afford him any relief, and he must have surrendered at discretion, but for the exertions of his own family. His wife sent her veil (the strongest appeal to Afghán honour) to her countrymen in Rohilcand. His son put himself at the head of the volunteers thus assembled, and by these means he was de-

Successes of Báji Ráo in Málwa.

livered from his difficulties and escorted to Allahábád. But this rescue of his person did nothing for his province. The rája of Bundélcand ceded the territory of Jánsi on the Jamna in return for the services of Báji Ráo; and afterwards, at his death, left him rights in Bundélcand, which in time led to the occupation of the whole of that country by the Marattas.

Obtains possessions in Bundélcand.

Mohammed Khán's ill success procured his removal from Málwa, and the province was conferred on Rája Jei Sing of Ambér.

This prince, whose love of science makes him one of the most remarkable persons of his nation, was by no means so distinguished for his firmness or decision. His hereditary connection with the Marattas, although not sufficient to induce him to betray his trust, facilitated an accommodation after he found resistance desperate; and the result was, that, in the succeeding year, he surrendered his province to the péshwa, with the tacit concurrence of the emperor, on whose behalf the territory was still to be held.

Rája Jei Sing II. viceroy of Málwa.

A. D. 1734. His tacit surrender of the province to the Marattas.

But if the Moguls thought to obtain permanent forbearance from Báji Ráo by concession, they knew little of him or his nation; for though he for a time turned his attention to the internal affairs of the Deckan, he continued to press the formal cession of the chout and sirdésmuki of Málwa and Guzerát, and directed the chiefs whom he had left behind him to carry their incursions up to Agra. The Moguls on their part made

BOOK XII.

great demonstrations, and sent out unwieldy and feebly conducted armies, whose operations served only to expose them to the contempt of the enemy.

Báji Ráo increases his demands. A. D. 1736.

After some lapse of time Báji Ráo again took up the negotiation in person; and in proportion as the progress of it disclosed the weakness of his adversaries, he continued to rise in his demands, until at length he insisted on the grant of a jágír, comprising the province of Málwa and all the country south of the Chambal, together with the holy cities of Mattra, Allahábád, and Benáres. The emperor, though all his attempts at open resistance proved futile, was not reduced quite so low as to submit to such terms. He endeavoured to pacify the Marattas by minor sacrifices, and those they accepted without receding from their great object.

Further cessions by the emperor.

Among the concessions were a right to levy tribute on the Rájpúts, and to increase that already due from the territories of Asof Jáh. These were, doubtless, given with a view to embroil the Marattas with the last-named powers, and they did not quite fail of their purpose; for Asof Jáh began to perceive that he was pushing his present policy too far, and that he had now as much to fear from the weakness of the emperor, as he formerly had from his enmity. At the same time he was assiduously courted by the cabinet of Delhi, who no longer looked on him as a rebellious subject, but as a natural ally, capable of rescuing them from the danger that hung over them.

Alarm of Asof Jáh.

He is reconciled to

The result of this state of circumstances was to

determine Asof Jáh to support the emperor; but while he was engaged in these deliberations, Báji Ráo was advancing towards the capital. By the time he had himself arrived within forty miles of Agra his light troops were ravaging the country beyond the Jamna, under the command of Malhár Ráo Holcar; and while so employed they were attacked and driven back on the main body by Sádat Khán, governor of Oud, who, with a spirit very unlike his contemporaries, issued from his own province to defend that adjoining. This check, which was magnified into a great victory, and accompanied by reports of the retreat to the Deckan of the whole Maratta army, only stimulated Báji Ráo to wipe off the disgrace, and (as he said himself) to show the emperor that he was still in Hindostan. An army had been sent out to oppose him under the vizír, Kamr u dín Khán. While it lay inactive near Mattra, Báji Ráo suddenly quitted the Jamna, passed off about fourteen miles to the right of the Mogul army, and, advancing by prodigious marches, all at once presented himself before the gates of Delhi.

the emperor.

Báji Ráo appears before Delhi. A. D. 1737, A. H. 1149.

The consternation produced by his appearance may easily be imagined; but as his object was to intimidate, and not provoke the emperor, he forebore from further aggression, and endeavoured to prevent the destruction of the suburbs. He was unable entirely to restrain the devastation of his followers, and he made that a pretext for drawing

BOOK XII.

off to some distance from the city. This retrograde movement induced the Moguls to attempt a sally, and they were driven back into the town with heavy loss. By this time, however, the vizír had been joined by Sádat Khán, and was on his march to relieve the capital; and Báji Rái deemed it prudent to commence his retreat, a step involving no dishonour, according to the Maratta rules of war. His intention, at the time, was to have crossed the Jamna lower down, and to have plundered the country between that river and the Ganges; but the approach of the rainy season, and the advance of Asof Jáh, determined him to return at once to the Deckan, where his presence was also required for other objects. After the péshwa's retreat, Asof Jáh pursued his march to Delhi, and was invested with full powers to call out all the resources of the state; while the governments of Málwa and Guzerát were conferred on his eldest son, Gházi u dín. But to so low a point was the power of the empire reduced, that, with all the means at his disposal, he could only complete the army under his personal command to the number of 34,000 men.

He retreats.

A. D. 1737, A. H. 1150. Arrival of Asof Jáh at Delhi.

He was, however, furnished with a fine train of artillery, and supported by a reserve under the command of Safdar Jang, the nephew of Sádat Khán of Oud. With this force he advanced to Serónj, while Báji Ráo crossed the Nerbadda at the head of an army, said by himself to be 80,000 strong, and probably superior in numbers to that

Marches against Báji Ráo.

of Asof Jáh.* This disparity ought not to have deterred the Mogul general from an engagement; for the Marattas had never been formidable in pitched battles; and with them, more even than with other enemies, it was of importance to assume a superiority at the commencement of a campaign. Asof Jáh, on the contrary, probably from reliance on his artillery, as well as the caution natural to his disposition and his advanced age, determined to await an attack in a favourable situation, close to the fort of Bópál. The strength of his position availed him nothing against such an enemy: the Marattas laid waste the country round him, intercepted his supplies, attacked every detachment that attempted to show itself beyond his lines, and completely broke off the communication between him and his reserve.

A. D. 173 January. Is attacked by Báji Ráo, near Bópál,

The effects of these operations so straitened Asof Jáh, that at the end of a month or six weeks he was obliged to attempt a retreat towards the north. He had probably lost many of his cattle, and, although he left his baggage at Bópál, he had still a heavy train to drag along with him: his movements, in such circumstances, were slow, and were further impeded by the Marattas. Though deterred by his artillery from attempting a general attack, they harassed him with rockets, and hung

* According to the present way of speaking among the Marattas, "lak fouj," which ought to mean 100,000 horse, will seldom be found to imply more than 10,000 or 15,000 fighting men.

BOOK XII.

on his rear with their cavalry, until, after some marches at the rate of three or four miles a-day, he was obliged to submit to his fate, and enter into terms with the péshwa. By this convention, he engaged to cede all the country from the Nerbadda to the Chambal (including all Málwa), and to use his best endeavours to procure from the emperor a confirmation of the cession, and a payment of fifty lacs of rupees. *

and constrained to make great cessions on the emperor's part.

A. D. 1738, February; A. H. 1150, Rámzán.

Asof Jáh was then permitted to pursue his retreat to Delhi, and Báji Ráo took possession of his conquests: but before he could receive the promised confirmation from the emperor, the progress of the transaction was arrested by one of those tremendous visitations which, for a time, render mem insensible to all other considerations.

Invasion of Nádir Sháh.

The empire was again reduced to the same state of decay which had on former occasions invited the invasions of Tamerlane and Báber; and a train of events in Persia led to a similar attack from that country.

Previous transactions in Persia.

The family of Safavi, after having reigned for 200 years (about the usual duration of an Asiatic dynasty), fell into a state of corruption and decay, and was at last dethroned by the Afgháns of Candahár.

Western Afgháns.

An account has already been given of the north-eastern portion of the Afghán nation †; but the western tribes, who were the actors in the revolu-

* 500,000*l.* † Page 286.

tion in Persia, differ from those described, in more points than one.

Their country is on the high table land * which is supported on the east by the mountains of Sólimán, and separated by them from the plain on the Indus. On the north, a similar bulwark is formed by the range anciently called Caucasus, which overlooks the low level of the Oxus and of the Caspian Sea.† The part of this table land westward of Herát belongs to the Persians; and that eastward of the same city, to the Afgháns.

There are fertile plains in this tract, and on the most extensive of them are the cities of Cábul, Ghazni, Candahár, and Herát‡; but the greater part consists of high downs, ill-suited to agriculture, and inhabited by pastoral tribes, who live in tents. They have the same government and the same character as the north-eastern Afgháns, except that they are much less turbulent and contentious. In the pastoral tracts, the Afgháns are almost unmixed; but a great part of the population of the plains, including the cities, consists of Tájiks, who speak Persian, and are the same peo-

* The city of Cábul is 6000 feet above the sea. (*Burnes's Travels*, vol. i. p. 151.)

† See an essay by Mr. J. Baillie Fraser, in *Transactions of the Royal Geographical Society.*

‡ Herát is just beyond the ridge which divides the waters that run to the south from those that flow northward to the Oxus; but it is on the same level with the rest of the table land, and may be regarded as forming a part of it.

BOOK XII.

ple that occupy similar situations in Persia and Transoxiana.

The plains alone formed the conquests of the Persian and Indian kings. The Afghán tribes remained independent; though those near the possessions of the two great monarchies must no doubt have been influenced by their power.* The greatest of the western tribes were the Ghiljeis, who inhabited the country round Candahár, and the Abdális †, whose original seat was in the mountains of Ghór, but who chiefly resided at the time now spoken of in the country round Herát. These tribes were always rivals, and often at war with each other.

Ghiljeis.

Abdális (or Duránis).

During the reign of Sháh Hosén (the last of the Safavis), the Ghiljeis had given such offence to Persia as to provoke a formidable expedition against them. Gurgín Khán, the prince of Georgia (a convert from Christianity to the Mahometan religion), was sent to Candahár with an army of upwards of 20,000 men ‡, a force his opponents were unable to withstand. But so galling was the yoke of the Persians, that the Ghíljeis, ere long, resolved to run all risks to throw it off. They were headed by Mír Weis, their hereditary chief, a man of talents and enterprise, and well aware of the feeble con-

Revolt of the Ghiljeis.

* The Abdális agreed about the beginning of the seventeenth century to pay tribute to Persia on condition of protection against the Uzbeks.

† Now called Duránis.

‡ Malcolm's Persia, vol. i. p. 601.

dition of the Persian empire. Conducting his operations with equal caution and boldness, Mír Weis surprised Candahár, expelled the Persians from the surrounding country, and formed his acquisitions, with the original possessions of his tribe, into an independent state. This achievement took place in 1708, and was followed by repeated attempts of the Persians to recover Candahár, in which they were at one time assisted by the Abdális. In A. D. 1716 that tribe joined the Ghiljeis against them, and took Herát, and overran the greater part of Persian Khorásán. The two tribes, however, continued their mutual hostilities: the Persians profited by their disunion, and persevered in operations against both until 1720; when the chief of the Ghiljeis formed the bold resolution of carrying the war into Persia, and striking at once at the existence of the government which had oppressed him and his people.

Conquest of Persia by the Ghiljeis.

Mír Weis had died in A.D. 1715, and was at first succeeded by his brother; but his son, whose name was Mahmúd, before long seized on the government; and it was by him that the invasion of Persia was planned. The Persians had before this been defeated in a great battle with the Abdális, who now threatened Meshhed, and whose progress was assisted by the incursions of the Uzbeks from the Oxus.

The north-western part of Persia, also, had been invaded by the Lezgis, from Mount Caucacus;

BOOK XII.

and the misconduct of the government itself made it weaker than those foreign attacks.

Mahmúd left Candahár with 25,000 men. He first marched to Kirmán, and thence to Yezd, from which place he moved directly on Isfahán. *

He was opposed at Gulnábád, in the neighbourhood of that capital, by an army of very superior numbers, admirably equipped, and furnished with twenty-four pieces of cannon. † But the spirit of the Persians was declined and their councils divided: the Afgháns obtained a complete victory, and soon after began operations against the town. Isfahán had at this time attained to its highest pitch of magnificence and population. ‡ The last advantage became a calamity on the present occasion; for the Afgháns, finding themselves unable

* He had before been, for a time, in possession of Kirmán, while in a temporary alliance with Persia against the Abdális. (*Jones's Histoire de Nádir Shah*, introduction, sect. 6.)

† "The Persian soldiers looked fresh and showy, and all their equipments, from their tents in which they reposed, and the dresses they wore, to the gold and enamelled furniture of the sleek horses on which they rode, were rich and splendid. The Afgháns had hardly a tent to cover them, their horses were lean from fatigue, the men were clothed in tatters, and tanned by the rays of the sun; and, throughout their whole camp, it was emphatically observed, nothing glittered 'but their swords and lances.'" (*Malcolm's Persia*, vol. i. p. 623.)

‡ Hanway, following Chardin, states the inhabitants at 600,000 souls (vol. ii. p. 164.); and although the comparisons drawn by travellers between this city and those of India render so great a population incredible, yet it cannot be unreasonable to admit one third of it, or 200,000 souls.

to make an impression on the walls, had recourse to intercepting the supplies. It seemed a wild project to blockade so extensive a city with 20,000 men, to which amount the Afgháns were now reduced; yet so well did Mahmúd supply the want of numbers by vigilance and activity, that the inhabitants before long began to suffer all the horrors of famine. The extent of this calamity, and the miseries endured by the besieged, are described by most writers as surpassing the greatest extremities ever known on such occasions.* This disproportioned contest continued for no less than six months; a proof of the prostration of the courage of the Persians as well as of their powers of endurance. At length, after all their sallies had been repulsed, and all the attempts of troops from the provinces to force in convoys had failed, the necessity of submission became apparent. The king went forth with all his principal courtiers in deep mourning, surrendered himself to Mahmúd, and with his own hand placed the diadem on the head of the conqueror (October, 1722).

Their tyrannical government.

Mahmúd's government was, at first, exercised with unexpected leniency; but his garrison in Cazvín having been surprised and massacred by the inhabitants of that city, he became alarmed for his own safety, put several of the Persian chiefs to

* The poet Mohammed Ali Hazín, however (who was in Isfahán during the siege), contradicts these statements, and doubts if any man actually died of hunger. (*Belfour's Memoirs of Hazín*, p. 122.)

BOOK XII.

death, and compelled all the armed part of the population to quit the city on pain of a similar fate. Though the cruelties of the Ghiljeis have been extravagantly exaggerated *, it is easy to imagine the insolence and barbarity of a tribe of shepherds suddenly raised to uncontrolled power over their former oppressors, and rendered deaf to compassion by a consciousness of numerical insignificance which could find no protection but from terror.

* An example may be found in the different accounts of the transaction just mentioned. Hanway, who is by no means given to exaggeration, but who sometimes drew his information from popular rumour or from worse authority, asserts that Mahmúd extirpated the whole of the nobility, and hunted down their children, turning them out, one by one, like beasts of chase; and that he afterwards ordered the slaughter of every man, civil or military, who had received pay (in however humble a capacity) from the former government, commencing the massacre by the execution of 3000 of the late king's guards. On the other hand, the author of the "Nádirnámeh," whose statement may almost be considered as official, and who certainly had no wish to extenuate the atrocities of Mahmúd, relates that "he formed a design to massacre the Persians; and, on the same day on which the Afgháns arrived from Cazvín, he caused *one hundred and fourteen persons* to be put to death, confounding the good with the bad, and the small with the great." (From Sir W. Jones's French translation, vol. v. of his Works, p. 12.) The same author relates that soon afterwards his evil genius led him to massacre all the princes of the blood, and that he put them to death, to the number of thirty-nine. These statements are not very consistent with the idea of a massacre by thousands; and it may be observed, that, during all this time, Shah Hosén was left alive, and so far from being cruelly treated, he complained of his condition because he was confined to a small palace, and only attended by five male and five female servants. (*Malcolm's History of Persia*, vol. i. p. 644.)

CHAP. II.

Mahmúd had not reigned two years when the agitation and anxiety he was exposed to, together with the effect of religious austerities and penances which he superstitiously imposed on himself, unsettled his reason. He became raving mad, and either died or was put to death; when he was succeeded by his nephew, Ashref (April, 1724.).

Their wars with the Turks and Russians.

The new king was a man of talents and vigour. Before he had completed the conquest of Persia, he was assailed at once by the Russians and Turks, who had entered into a confederacy for dismembering the kingdom. The western provinces were to belong to the Porte, and the northern, as far as the Araxes, to Russia. Ashref turned his attention in the first instance to the Turks: he defeated them in repeated actions, and compelled them to acknowledge his title; but he was not able to expel them from the conquests they had made. The Russians, though led by the czar Peter in person, were less dangerous, from the strong country through which they had to advance: they had, however, made their way to Resht, on the south of the Caspian Sea, when their career was interrupted, and afterwards abandoned, in consequence of the death of the czar.

Rise of Nádir Sháh.

But Ashref's most formidable enemy was now rising nearer home. Tahmasp, the son of Hosén, had fled from Isfahán, and had remained under the protection of the tribe of Kajar, on the shore of the Caspian, with nothing of the royal dignity but the name. The first sign of a change of fortune

BOOK XII.

was his being joined by Nádir Cúli, the greatest warrior Persia has ever produced.

This chief, who had first collected troops as a freebooter, now appeared as the deliverer of his country. He raised the courage of the Persians by his example and his success, called forth their religious zeal, and revived their national pride, until, by degrees, he elevated them from the abject condition into which they had sunk, to as high a pitch of military glory as they had ever before enjoyed.

He drives out the Ghiljeis, and recovers Khorásán from the Abdális.

His first exploits were the capture of Meshhed and the recovery of Khorásán from the Abdális and Mohammed Khán of Sístán, who had seized on part of that province: he afterwards engaged the Ghiljeis under Ashref, who advanced to the northern frontier to attack him, drove them, in a succession of battles, to the southern limit of the kingdom, and so effectually wore down their army that they at last dispersed, and gave up the possession of their conquest, which they had retained for seven years. Most of their number were killed in the war or perished in the desert on their return home. Ashref was murdered by a Belóch chief between Kirmán and Candahár (January, 1729).

Nádir next marched against the Turks, whose treaty with Ashref left them in possession of part of the Persian territories. He had already recovered Tabríz, when he received intelligence of a rising of the Abdális, and was obliged to return to Khorásán.

CHAP. II.

On his former successful expedition against that tribe, he had followed up his victory by measures of conciliation. By those means, and from their common enmity to the Ghiljeis, he gained a strong party among the Abdális, and to its leader he confided the charge of Herát. The other party had now gained the ascendancy, had overrun Khorásán, and laid siege to Meshhed, then held by Nádir's brother, Ibráhím, whom they had just before defeated in the field. They had even formed a connection with the Ghiljeis: but the new allies had no sooner met, than their old enmities broke out, and they separated more estranged than ever. This war was more tedious than the former one, the siege of Herát alone occupying ten months; but the Abdális were this time completely subdued. Nádir again took measures to attach them to him after his victory, and as he not long after embraced the Sunni religion, they became the most devoted of his followers.

Renewed invasion of the Abdális.

Nádir takes Herát,

and gains the attachment of the Abdális.

The length of time occupied in these operations produced a crisis in the affairs of Persia. While the sole function of the government was the employment of the army, the king naturally remained a mere pageant in the hands of the general; but when restored to the capital, and acknowledged throughout the kingdom, he became a person of more importance; and, during the absence of Nádir, he took upon him the exercise of all the royal prerogatives.

Nádir was not at all disposed to acquiesce in

He deposes Tahmasp Sháh.

BOOK XII.

such a transfer of authority, and, as soon as he had settled the affairs of Khorásán, he repaired to Isfahán, and, taking advantage of the odium created by an unfavourable treaty with the Turks, he deposed Tahmasp, and raised his infant son to the nominal sovereignty. This may almost be considered as the avowed commencement of his own reign; but it was not till he had gained many victories over the Turks, recovered the whole of the territory occupied by that nation and the Russians, and made peace with both powers, that he formally assumed the title of King of Persia. Before he was invested with that dignity, he repaired with his army to the plain of Móghán, to which place he summoned the civil and military officers, the governors of districts, the magistrates, and all the other men of distinction in the empire, to the number of 100,000 persons. By the unanimous voice of this assembly he was offered the crown, which, after some affected reluctance, he accepted, on condition that the Shía religion should be abolished, and that of the Sunnis established throughout Persia (1736).*

Is himself elected king.

He suppresses the Shía religion.

By this change of religion Nádir hoped to eradicate all attachment to the Safavis, whose claims were founded on their being the champions of the Shía sect; but as the Persians remained at heart as much devoted as ever to the national faith, the

* Nádirnámeh. Jones's Works, vol. v. p. 237. Hanway represents Nádir as only stipulating for a toleration of the Sunni religion, and *subsequently* abolishing that of the Shías.

real effect of the measure was to produce an alienation between the new king and his subjects, and led to consequences equally calamitous to both.

Though little aware of this result at the time, Nádir felt that a throne established by a succession of victories must be maintained by similar achievements: he therefore determined to gratify the pride of his countrymen by retaliating on their former conquerors, the Ghiljeis, and restoring Candahár to the Persian monarchy.

Invades the Ghiljeis.

He made great preparations for this expedition, and set out on it at the head of an army estimated, by some authorities, at 80,000 men.* He had, on this occasion, the hearty co-operation of the Abdális, while the Ghiljeis were dispirited and disunited. But they had not so far lost their martial character as to yield without a struggle; and it was not till after a close blockade of nearly a twelvemonth that Nádir ventured on an assault of Candahár: even then he was more than once repulsed before the city fell into his hands (March, 1738). While the siege was pending, he settled the greater part of the surrounding country; and, at the same time, his son, Reza Cúli Mirzá, who had marched from Meshhed against the Uzbeks, not only conquered the province of Balkh, but

Takes Candahár.

* Malcolm's History of Persia, vol. ii. p. 68. Hanway (vol. ii. p. 355.) says that this army of 80,000 men was closely followed by another of 30,000; but these great numbers do not seem probable to the west of the Indus, where the vast armies, common in India, are very seldom seen.

BOOK XII.

gained a victory on the Oxus, over the king of Bokhára, in person.

His conciliatory policy.

Nádir's conduct towards the Ghiljeis was moderate and politic: he took no vindictive measures in retaliation for the invasion of Persia; he treated the Ghiljeis like his other subjects, and enrolled many of them in his army; but he removed a portion of the tribe from their lands round Candahár, which he made over to the Abdális, and particularly to that part of them who had been settled about Níshapúr, in the west of Khorásán.*

His difference with the government of India.

The acquisition of the Ghiljei territory brought Nádir to the frontier of the Mogul empire. The extreme weakness of that monarchy could not escape his observation; and the prospect of repairing the exhausted resources of Persia from so rich

* Jones's Nádirnámeh, Works, vol. v. p. 275. The account of the Ghiljei conquest is almost entirely drawn from Hanway and the "Nádirnámeh:" that of Nádir Sháh's proceedings chiefly from the latter work. Hanway is himself a man of judgment and veracity, but his facts seem sometimes to rest on the authority of the "Derniere Revolution de la Perse," a sort of version (we are told) of the notes of Father Krusinski, a Polish Jesuit, which, though founded on good information, is too fanciful and highly coloured to be at all depended upon. It bears a considerable resemblance, in these respects, to Catrou, formerly mentioned (in the reign of Sháh Jehán). Krusinski's own work has since been published in Germany, but I have never seen it. The "Nádirnámeh" is a Persian history, by Mírza Mehdi (who is stated by Sir J. Malcolm to have been confidential secretary of Nádir Sháh). Though a minister and a panegyrist, he is a much more faithful historian than Abul Fazl, and his style (in Sir W. Jones's French translation at least) is much clearer and more compact.

CHAP. II.

a mine was scarcely a greater temptation than the means of employing the warlike tribes now subject to his authority, and combining their rival energies in an undertaking so acceptable to them all.

While engaged in the siege of Candahár, he had applied to the court of Delhi for the seizure or expulsion of some Afgháns who had fled into the country near Ghazni. The Indian government was probably unable to comply with this demand, and they seem also to have had some hesitation in acknowledging Nádir Sháh's title: for these reasons they allowed a long period to elapse without returning an answer. Nádir Sháh remonstrated in strong terms against this neglect of his application, and without further delay advanced on Ghazni and Cábul. Another messenger, whom he now dispatched to Delhi, having been cut off by the Afgháns in the mountains, Nádir thought himself fully justified in an invasion of India. Cábul had fallen into his hands with little difficulty; but he remained in that neighbourhood for some months for the purpose of settling the country, and did not commence his march to the eastward till near the approach of winter. The court of Delhi had been too much absorbed in the dread of the Marattas and its own internal factions to pay much attention to the proceedings of Nádir. As long as he was engaged in a contest within the old territory of Persia, they looked on with total indifference; and even when he had invaded their own

A. D. 1738, May; A. H. 1151, Safar.

A. D. 1738, October; A. H. 1151, Shábán.

Supineness of the court of Delhi.

BOOK XII.

territory and taken Cábul, they still expected that the mountain tribes between that city and Pésháwar would check his further advance. But the money which, in regular times, was paid for the purpose of keeping up an influence with those tribes, had for some years been withheld; and they had no inclination, if they had possessed the power, of interfering in favour of the Moguls. It was therefore with dismay proportioned to their former supineness that the Moguls learned that Nádir had passed the mountains, had defeated a small force under one of their governors, had thrown a bridge of boats over the Indus, and was advancing into the Panjáb.

Nádir invades India.

A. D. 1738, November; A. H. 1151, Rámzán.

Notwithstanding a faint show of opposition attempted by the governor of Láhór, Nádir met with no real obstruction till he approached the Jamna, within 100 miles of Delhi, when he found himself in the neighbourhood of the Indian army.

Mohammed Sháh had at length exerted himself to collect his force: he had been joined by Asof Jáh, and had moved to Carnál, where he occupied a fortified camp. Sádat Khán, the viceroy of Oud, arrived in the neighbourhood of this camp about the same time with Nádir Sháh; and an attempt to intercept him by the Persians brought on a partial action, which ended in a general engagement. The Indians would in no circumstances have been a match for the hardy and experienced soldiers opposed to them; and they were now brought up in confusion and without concert. Asof

Defeats Mohammed Sháh.

CHAP. II.

Jáh having, from some real or pretended misconception, taken no part in the action.*

The result was the rout of the Indian army: Kháni Dourán, the commander-in-chief, was killed, and Sádat Khán taken prisoner; and Mohammed had no resource but to send Asof Jáh to offer his submission, and repair, himself, with a few attendants, to the Persian camp. Nádir Sháh received him with great courtesy, and allowed him to return on the same day to his own encampment. He did not on that account desist from pressing his advantages; for he soon after obliged Mohammed to join his army, and in this manner the two kings marched on towards Delhi. Different accounts are given of the negotiations carried on during the interval, which were embarrassed by the rivalry of Asof Jáh and Sádat Khán; but such intrigues could have no result of consequence, for Nádir had the power completely in his own hands, and required no prompter to tell him how to exercise it.

A. D. 1739, Feb. 13.; A. H. 1151, Zí Cáda 15.

The army reached Delhi in the beginning of March, when both kings took up their residence in the royal palace. Nádir distributed a portion of his troops throughout the town; he ordered strict discipline to be observed, and placed safeguards in

Advances to Delhi.

A. D. 1739, March; A. H. 1151, Zí Haj.

* The journal translated by Fraser (*Life of Nádir*, p. 154.) makes Nádir's whole army, with the followers, who were all armed, amount to 160,000; but an enumeration, by a newswriter in his camp, states his whole force, *when at Pésháwer*, at 64,500 fighting men, and 4000 followers. (Ibid. pp. 140, 141.)

BOOK XII.

different places for the protection of the inhabitants.

Insurrection of the inhabitants.

These precautions did not succeed in conciliating the Indians, who looked on the ferocity of these strangers with terror, and on their intrusion with disgust.* On the second day after the occupation of the city a report was spread that Nádir Sháh was dead, on which the hatred of the Indians broke forth without restraint. They fell on all the Persians within their reach; and from the manner in which those troops were scattered throughout the city, a considerable number fell sacrifices to the popular fury. The Indian nobles made no effort to protect the Persians; some even gave those up to be murdered who had been furnished for the protection of their palaces.†

Nádir Sháh at first applied his whole attention to suppressing the tumult, and, though provoked to find that it continued during the whole night, and seemed rather to increase than diminish, he mounted his horse at daybreak, in the hope that his presence would restore quiet. The first objects that met his eyes in the streets were the dead bodies of his countrymen; and he was soon assailed with stones, arrows, and firearms, from the houses. At last one of his chiefs was killed at his side, by a shot

General massacre by the Persians.

* Fraser.

† Hazín states the number cut off at 700 (p. 281. of Mr. Belfour's edition of the original: in the translation, p. 299., it is 7000, but doubtless from an error of the press). Scott (vol. ii. p. 207.) makes it 1000.

aimed at himself; when he gave way to his passion, and ordered a general massacre of the Indians.* The slaughter raged from sunrise till the day was far advanced, and was attended with all the horrors that could be inspired by rapine, lust, and thirst of vengeance. The city was set on fire in several places, and was soon involved in one scene of destruction, blood, and terror.

At length Nadir, satiated with carnage, allowed himself to be prevailed on by the intercession of the emperor or his prime minister, and gave an order to stop the massacre; and, to the infinite credit of his discipline, it was immediately obeyed.†

* Fraser, p. 183.

† The authentic accounts differ about the suspension of the massacre. It is said that Nádir, during the whole period, sat in gloomy silence in the little mosque of Rokn u doula, in the Great Bázár; where Mohammed Sháh and his nobles at length took courage to present themselves. They stood before him with downcast eyes, until Nádir commanded them to speak; when Mohammed burst into tears, and entreated Nádir to spare his subjects. I wish there was better authority than Dow for this not improbable anecdote. The best accounts of the massacre are that of Hazín, who was an eye-witness, and whose narrative is copied, almost verbatim, by the author of the "Seir Mutákherín;" and the journal of a native Indian, who was secretary to Sirbuland, given by Fraser, in his "History of Nádir Sháh." The succeeding transactions (in some of which the writer must have been an actor) are minutely recorded in the same journal. Hazín informs us the massacre lasted for half the day, and that the numbers slain were beyond calculation. Fraser makes the amount from 120,000 to 150,000; but the author of the "Nádirnámeh" seems nearest the truth, and probably below it, in stating that the slaughter continued for almost the whole day, and that about 30,000 persons were put

BOOK XII.

Nádir's extortions.

But the sufferings of the people of Delhi did not cease with this tragedy. Nádir's sole object in invading India was to enrich himself by its plunder, and he began to discuss the contributions from the moment of his victory. His first adviser was Sádat Khán: that nobleman died soon after reaching Delhi, when the work of exaction was committed to Sirbuland Khán and a Persian named Tahmasp Khán; and their proceedings, which were sufficiently rigorous of themselves, were urged on by the violence and impatience of Nádir.

They first took possession of the imperial treasures and jewels, including the celebrated peacock throne. They afterwards seized on the whole effects of some great nobles, and compelled the rest to sacrifice the largest part of their property as a ransom for the remainder. They then fell on the inferior officers and on the common inhabitants: guards were stationed to prevent people leaving the city, and every man was constrained to disclose the amount of his fortune, and to pay accordingly. Every species of cruelty was employed to extort these contributions. Even men of consequence were beaten to draw forth confessions. Great numbers of the inhabitants died of the usage they received, and many destroyed themselves to avoid

His rapacity and violence.

to the sword during the course of it. Scott (vol. ii. p. 2[illegible]) restricts the number to 8000, but he does not give his authority: and it is incredible that so small a result should be produced by many hours of unresisted butchery by a detachment of 20,000 men, which was the body employed on it.

the disgrace and torture. "Sleep and rest forsook the city. In every chamber and house was heard the cry of affliction. It was, before, a general massacre; but, now, the murder of individuals."*

He prepares to return.

Contributions were also levied on the governors of provinces; until Nádir was at length convinced that he had exhausted all the sources from which wealth was to be obtained, and prepared himself to return to his own dominions. He made a treaty with Mohammed Sháh, by which all the country west of the Indus was ceded to him. He married his son to a princess of the house of Teimúr, and at last he seated Mohammed on the throne, invested him, with his own hand, with the ornaments of the diadem, and enjoined all the Indian nobles to obey him implicitly, on pain of his future indignation and vengeance.

The country west of the Indus ceded to him.

Mohammed Sháh restored.

Amount of the treasures carried off by Nádir Sháh.

At length he marched from Delhi, after a residence of fifty-eight days, carrying with him a treasure in money, amounting, by the lowest computation, to eight or nine millions sterling, besides several millions in gold and silver plate, valuable furniture, and rich stuffs of every description; and this does not include the jewels, which were inestimable. He also carried off many elephants, horses, and camels, and led away the most skilful

* The words between inverted commas are drawn from Scott (vol. ii. p. 210.); but the substance is the same in all the narratives.

BOOK XII.

workmen and artisans, to the number of some hundreds. *

* The various sums of *money* enumerated by Scott amount to between 8,000,000*l.* and 9,000,000*l.* The "Nádirnámeh" says fifteen crores of rupees; Fraser, thirty crores of rupees; and Hanway, thirty crores, which he estimates at 37,500,000*l.*: and all these sums are the *money* alone. The imperial treasures must have been greatly encroached on since the reign of Sháh Jehán: the peacock throne, which Tavernier estimated at 6,000,000*l.*, is only valued, in the "Nádirnámeh," at 2,000,000*l.*, and in Scott, only at 1,000,000*l.* Many stories which were current at the time, about the causes of this invasion, are preserved in Dow's "Hindostan." According to those narratives, Nádir was invited to India by Asof Jáh and Sádat Khán, and the loss of the battle of Carnál was concerted between those chiefs. Nádir Sháh rewarded their treachery by spitting on their beards, and ordering them to be driven from his court. The two nobles, thus disgraced, agreed to end their shame by a voluntary death; but, as they were rivals, and each suspected the sincerity of the other, they sent spies to discover whether the resolution was carried into effect. Asof Jáh, the more crafty of the two, took an innocent draught, and soon after pretended to fall down dead; on which Sádat, deceived by the artifice, swallowed real poison, and forthwith expired. These fictions, like many others which are believed in times of agitation, disappear when full light is thrown on the period.

CHAP. III.

TO THE DEATH OF MOHAMMED SHÁH.

CHAP. III.

For some time after Nádir Sháh's departure, the inhabitants of Delhi remained in a sort of stupor. They had not yet recovered the terror of the past, and the destruction of their fortunes: many of their houses were in ruins; much of the city was entirely deserted, and the whole infected by the stench of the bodies which still lay unburied in the streets. It was not till long after Nádir was gone, that the court awoke as if from a lethargy.* The view of the empire which presented itself was as full of ruin and desolation as the capital. The army was destroyed, the treasury emptied, the finances all but annihilated; the Marattas still threatened on the south, and the only provinces which had not been laid waste by their ravages had now been destroyed by Nádir's army.

Deplorable condition of the capital,

and of the empire.

To these unavoidable evils the court added internal dissension. The prevailing faction was formed of a few great families who, from their Túrk descent, were called the Túráni nobles: the heads were the vizír Kamr u dín Khán and Asof Jáh; and they were connected by intermarriages as well as by party. To them were opposed all those de-

Internal dissensions.

* Fraser.

BOOK XII.

sirous of supplanting them, or jealous of their ascendancy; among which number the emperor himself was thought to be included.

This divided government would have fallen an easy prey to the Marattas, had not circumstances procured it a respite from the encroachments of those invaders. If the power of Nádir Sháh had been underrated by the Moguls, it was probably quite unknown to Báji Ráo: and he seems to have been struck with amazement at the appearance of this terrible antagonist, in a field which he expected to have traversed unopposed. His first thought was to suspend all his plans of aggrandizement, and form a general league for the defence of India. "Our domestic quarrels (he writes) are now insignificant: there is but one enemy in Hindostan." ... "Hindús and Mussulmans, the whole power of the Deckan, must assemble."* When he was relieved from the fear of Nádir Sháh, he returned to his old designs. He had a ground of quarrel with the Moguls, as the agreement made by Asof Jáh had not been formally ratified by the emperor, and the obvious course for him was to have enforced his claim at Delhi: but he was led to choose the Deckan for the theatre of the war, that he might be at hand to watch the proceedings of the Bosla of Bérar and the Geikwár of Guzerát, who were plotting to overthrow his power under pretence of emancipating the rája. He disposed of the Bosla

Proceedings of the Marattas.

Báji Ráo resumes offensive operations.

Attacks Asof Jáh's possessions.

* Grant Duff, vol. i. p. 547.

CHAP. III.

by engaging him in a remote expedition into the Carnatic, and then attacked Násir Jang, the second son of Asof Jáh, who had been left in charge of his father's government, and was encamped with 10,000 men at Burhánpúr. Báji Ráo at first surrounded him, and probably expected the same success as he had lately met with against Asof Jáh himself; but the young viceroy showed a vigour unusual to the Moguls of that day; and, being joined by a reinforcement, he attacked the Marattas, broke through their army, and had advanced to Ahmednagar on his way to Púna, when Báji Ráo thought it prudent to come to an accommodation with him. The péshwa seems now to have been reduced to perplexity by the variety of embarrassments which he had brought on himself*, and was returning to Hindostan (for what purpose is not known), when his plans were arrested by his death, which took place on the Nerbadda.

A. D. 1740, A. H. 1153.

Is repulsed by Asof's son, Násir Jang.

Perplexed affairs of Báji Ráo.

His death. A. D. 1740, April 28.; A. H. 1153, Safar.

He left three sons: Bálají Ráo, who succeeded him as péshwa; Rágonát Ráo, or Ragoba, who was at one time much connected with the English, and was the father of the last péshwa; and Shamshír Bahádur, to whom (though an illegitimate son by a Mahometan woman, and brought up in his

His sons.

* He writes thus to his spiritual guide:—"I am involved in difficulties, in debt, and in disappointments; and like a man ready to swallow poison: near the rája are my enemies, and should I go at this time to Sattára, they will put their feet on my breast. I should be thankful if I could meet death." (*Grant Duff*, vol. i. p. 559.)

BOOK XII.

mother's religion) he left all his possessions and pretensions in Bundélcand.

Wars in the Concan before Báji Ráo's death.

During the last years of Báji Ráo's administration he had been engaged in wars in the Concan. They were chiefly conducted by his brother, Chimnají; and, from the position of his enemies in forts and islands, protected on one side by the sea, and on the other by hills and jungles, required extraordinary exertions, and were attended with imperfect success.

With A'ngria.

These enemies were A'ngria of Colába, the Abyssinians of Jinjera, and the Portuguese. A'ngria, after his acknowledgment of Sáho Rája, remained in nominal dependence on the Maratta state, but employed his own resources with little or no control. His piracies (which he called "levying *chout* on the sea") rendered him formidable to all his neighbours. The English made repeated attacks on him with considerable naval forces; and, on one occasion, with the co-operation of the Portuguese (A. D. 1719); yet failed in all their attempts. The Dutch also sent a strong force against him at a later period (A. D. 1724) with equal ill success. The péshwa interposed in a dispute between two brothers of the family, and received from one of the competitors two forts which they possessed in the Ghâts (about A. D. 1734). The contest, however, continued; and the péshwa, though latterly assisted by an English fleet, was unable to bring it to a conclusion till the time of Báji Ráo's death.*

* Grant Duff.

CHAP. III.

The war with the Abyssinians was still less successful. Those Mussulmans were as powerful at sea as A'ngria. They were, besides, in the practice of ravaging the Maratta territories on the main land, and had even seized on some of their forts. The utmost result of the péshwa's efforts was to procure forbearance from those aggressions (A. D. 1736).*

With the Abyssinians of Jinjera.

The war with the Portuguese originated in the contest between the A'ngrias (A. D. 1737). It ended in the loss of the Portuguese possessions in Salsette, Bassein, and the neighbouring parts of the Concan (A. D. 1739). The difficulties encountered by the Marattas in this conquest may be estimated from their loss at the siege of Bassein, which they themselves admit to have amounted to 5000 killed and wounded.†

With the Portuguese.

The storms which were gathering round Báji Ráo at his death might have been expected to overwhelm his successor; but Bálají, however inferior to his father in other respects, was at least his equal in address; and the skill with which he availed himself of some favourable circumstances effected his deliverance from the difficulties with which he was surrounded.

Bálají Ráo.

The dangers felt by Báji Ráo, besides his ill success against Násir Jang, were caused by his financial embarrassments and his domestic enemies. The chief of his enemies were, the pírti nidhí, Ragují

Domestic enemies of Báji Ráo.

* Grant Duff. † Ibid.

BOOK XII.

Bosla, and Dámají Geikwar. The first was the old rival of his family*; and, though much depressed, was still formidable. Parsojí, the founder of the Boslas, afterwards rájas of Berár, was a private horseman from the neighbourhood of Sattára: though he bore the same name with the house of Sévají, there is no proof that he was of the same descent. He, however, rose to distinction; and, being one of the first to join Rája Sáho when he returned from Delhi, was further advanced by that prince, and invested with a right to collect all the Maratta dues in Berár and the forest country farther to the east. Ragují, his cousin, who was a favourite of Sáho, and married to his sister-in-law, was raised to his station on his death, in preference to his son, who ought to have succeeded him. Ragují had given offence to the péshwa by levying contributions to the north of the Nerbadda, in the tract which had been appropriated to the latter chief: he was likewise an object of jealousy, from the apprehension that he might prevail on Sáho to keep up the name of Bosla by adopting him. The Geikwár had been the guardian, and was now the representative, of Dábári, the chief of Guzerát, another of the péshwa's rivals, whose own ignorance and debauchery incapacitated him for business.*

The pírti nidhi.

Ragují Bosla.

Damají Geikwár.

The last of Báji Ráo's difficulties arose from the enormous debts incurred in his military expeditions, which, from the exhausted state of the country,

* See p. 598.

CHAP. III.

and some changes in the mode of war, no longer paid their own expenses.

His principal creditor, Bárámatiker, was himself a man of some consequence, and of immense wealth: his unsatisfied demand had led to quarrels with Báji Ráo, and Ragují secured his co-operation by promising to support his claims, and even to procure for him an indemnity, in the succession to the high office lately held by his debtor.

Their intrigues to prevent Bálají succeeding to the office of péshwa.

Ragují, as has been mentioned, was on an expedition to the Carnatic, and was besieging Trichinopoly, when he heard of the péshwa's death; and, although he instantly hastened to Sattára to oppose Bálají's succession, he was obliged to leave the greater part of his army behind him: his views, also, were as inconsistent with those of the pírti nidhí as with the péshwa's; and he had, therefore, no concert with that minister. Dámají Geikwár was not ready to take the field; and Násir Jang, who soon after rebelled against his father, was too much occupied to profit by the Maratta dissensions. On the other hand, Bálají was already near the capital: he had been joined by a portion of his father's troops under his uncle, Chimnají, and the rest were disposable and at hand: the rája was surrounded by his creatures; and, above all, he was the head of the Bramin party; and as all the business, even of his enemies, was in the hands of that class, he had a prodigious advantage in every contest. He was accordingly appointed péshwa in spite of all opposition, and Ragují returned to his

A. D. 1740, August.

BOOK XII.

army at Trichinopoly, whither Bárámatiker, in this change of circumstances, was glad to accompany him. Bálají, however, did not fail to apply himself to the liquidation of his debts; a task for which he was much better fitted than his father.

Success of Bálají.

Bálají marches into Málwa.

After more than a year spent on internal arrangements, Bálají turned his attention to his claims on Hindostan which had been encroached on by Ragují Bosla. For this purpose he procured from the rája a distinct assignment of all the Maratta rights and all tribute that might be collected to the north of the Nerbadda, excepting in the province of Guzerát. To give reality to this grant, Bálají marched towards the point from which he could most easily check the interference of Ragují: he crossed the Nerbadda, took Garra and Mandala, and was about to move on Allahábád, when he was recalled by an invasion of Málwa by Damají Geikwár from Guzerát. Damají, who, perhaps, had no object but to make a diversion in favour of Ragují, retired on his approach; and Bálají took advantage of his position in Málwa to press the court of Delhi for a confirmation of the grant of that province extorted by Báji Ráo from Asof Jáh, which had remained in suspense during the Persian invasion. His views on this subject were facilitated by those very encroachments of Ragují which it had been so much his desire to check.

Revives his father's demands on the court of Delhi.

Invasion of Bengal by Ragují Bosla.

This chief had, on his return from the Carnatic, sent a force into Bengal, under his Bramin minister, Básker Pandit, which had ravaged the province,

threatening the viceroy himself when his troops were dispersed, and retiring into the southern and western hills, when he was in force. Ali Verdi Khán*, then viceroy, maintained a good resistance to Básker Pandit; but he was alarmed at the advance of Ragují in person, and besought the emperor to afford him immediate assistance, if he did not wish to lose the province. The emperor, conscious of his own weakness, ordered Safder Jang (who had succeeded his father, Sádat Khán, as viceroy of Oud) to undertake the task; at the same time he took the more effectual measure of calling in the aid of Bálají Ráo, and purchased it by a confirmation of the grant of Málwa.† Nothing could be more agreeable to Bálají Ráo than this invitation. He immediately marched by Allahábád and Behár, and reached Murshidábád, the capital of the province, in time to protect it from Ragují, who was approaching from the south-west. He here received from Ali Verdi the payment of an assignment granted to him by the court of Delhi on the arrears of the revenue of Bengal; and being now zealous in the cause which he was so well paid

The emperor purchases the aid of Bálají by the formal cession of Málwa.

* Called also Mohábat Jang.

† Captain Grant Duff states that the grant was not confirmed until after the expulsion of Ragují, in A. D. 1743; and it may not have been formally delivered over till then; but his own abstract of the grant (vol. ii. p. 15.) bears the date of Jamádi ul Awal, in the twenty-fourth year of Mohammed Sháh's reign, which would be about May, 1742. Bálají, on his part, was to furnish 4000 horse at his own cost, and 8000 more to be paid by the emperor.

BOOK XII.

for espousing, he marched against the invader. Ragují retired before him, but was overtaken, and suffered a rout, and the loss of his baggage, before he was completely driven out of the province. After this success Bálají returned to Málwa, whence, after some time, he set out for Sattára.

Bálají defeats and drives out Ragují. A. D. 1743, A. H. 1156.

His presence was at no time more required; for Ragují, on his return from Bengal, determined to profit by Bálají's absence, and was on full march for the capital. Damají Geikwár was also approaching from Guzerát, and the agent of the pírti nidhí (who was himself disabled by sickness) was in active preparation to assist him. Bálají must have formed a high estimate of the power of this combination, since he thought the dissolution of it worth the sacrifice of those exclusive rights beyond the Nerbadda for which he had so successfully contended. He conceded to Ragují the right of levying tribute in all Bengal and Behár, if not also in Allahábád and Oud. By this adjustment the other confederates were left without support; but it suited the péshwa's projects to temporise with them, and the storm which threatened so much disturbance was thus quietly dispelled. The concession to Ragují seems to have been dictated by sound policy: his views were henceforth turned towards the east, and his designs on the succession to the rája appear to have been laid aside. Bengal, indeed, soon afforded him sufficient employment.

Fresh combinations against the péshwa.

He buys over Ragují by liberal cessions. A. D. 1744, A. H. 1157.

Básker Pandit was again sent into that province: his operations in the field were successful; but he

Ragují again invades Bengal.

CHAP. III.

suffered himself to be inveigled into an interview with Ali Verdi, by whom he was treacherously murdered, and at the same moment his army was attacked and dispersed. Bengal was thus, for a time, delivered from the Marattas. But Ali Verdi's chief support in his wars had been a body of Afgháns, under a celebrated leader named Mustafa Khán; and with them he now quarrelled. A serious revolt ensued, of which Ragují took advantage; and, although the revolt was at last subdued, and many other vicissitudes befell the contending parties, yet Ragují was so far successful in the end, that, in A. D. 1751, not long before the death of Ali Verdi, he obtained a cession of Cattac (the southern division of Orissa), and an engagement for the payment of twelve lacs of rupees (120,000*l.*) as the chout or tribute of Bengal.

His general murdered by the vice-roy. A. D. 1745, A. H. 1158.

He ultimately obtains the chout of Bengal and a cession of Cattac.

During all this time the Marattas had been entirely free from disturbances on the side of the Moguls in the Deckan. Asof Jáh had been recalled from Delhi, in A. D. 1741, by a revolt of his second son, Násir Jang; and when it was suppressed, he was involved in disturbances in the subordinate government of Arcot, which occupied him till he died, at the age of 104 lunar years.

Affairs of Asof Jáh.

Revolt of Nájir Jang. Asof Jáh returns to the Deckan.

His death. A. D. 1748, June; A. H. 1161, Jamádi u Sáni.

His death led to contentions among his sons; which, being unconnected with events in the other parts of India, and chiefly influenced by the French and English, will be best understood when we come to relate the proceedings of those nations.

The death of Asof Jáh was followed, before the

Death of Sáho Rája.

BOOK XII.

A. D. 1749. (about Dec.).

end of the succeeding year, by that of Sáho Rája; and the latter event produced the crisis for which the péshwa had all along been preparing, and which was to decide the future fortunes of himself and his descendants.

Intrigues and contests for the succession.

As Sáho was without issue, it was necessary by the Hindú custom that he should *adopt* a successor; and the same custom restricted the choice to his kindred. The nearest kinsman, in this case, was the rája of Cólapúr; and his claim, in itself so difficult to set aside, was supported by a close alliance with Sawatri Bái, the wife of Sáho and the rival and enemy of the péshwa.

Though the government was entirely in the hands of Bálají, the personal conduct of the rája was almost as much under the control of his wife; the imbecility into which he had of late years fallen rendering him incompetent to judge for himself. There was, therefore, a continual danger of her prevailing on Sáho to adopt the rája of Cólapúr; and it was impossible for Bálají to anticipate her, as he was unprovided with a claimant, and could not yet venture to seize on the government in his own name. In this perplexity he had recourse to a stratagem well worthy of the subtlety of his class. Tára Bái, the widow of Rája Rám, who had so long maintained the claims of her son, Sévají II., in opposition to Sáho, was still alive at an advanced age; and although her enmity to the péshwa was not abated, she was tempted, by the prospect of recovering her influence, to enter into the designs

Boldness and address of Bálají.

of that minister. In furtherance of their project, a secret intimation was conveyed to Sáho, that a posthumous son of Sévaji II. had been concealed by Tára Bái, and was still alive. Sáho made known his supposed discovery to the péshwa, and it was determined to question Tára Bái. It may be imagined that she readily admitted the fact; but the whole story was treated with ridicule by the other party, and Sawatri Bái redoubled her vigilance to prevent the rája from acting on the delusion produced by it. She was safe from an adoption which could not take place without a certain degree of publicity; but she was circumvented by a stroke of audacity for which she could not have been prepared: it was no less than an assertion that the rája had signed an instrument, transferring all the powers of his government to the péshwa, on condition of his maintaining the royal title and dignity in the house of Sévají through the grandson of Tára Bái. It is said that this important deed was executed at a secret interview between Bálají and the rája: but whether the signature (if genuine) was obtained by persuasion or fraud, *when* the deed was produced, and how far its authenticity was admitted at the time, are left in an obscurity which is rendered more mysterious by the conduct of Bálají and Tára Bái in circumstances which will appear in the sequel.*

Alleged abdication of Sáho in favour of Bálají.

* I possess no facts relating to this revolution but what are given by Grant Duff; but I have been led to conclusions somewhat different from that author, both with regard to the reality

BOOK XII.

Bálají takes possession of the government.

A.D. 1750.

At the moment of the death of Sáho, the péshwa called in a fresh force to Sattára, and seized on the head of the opposite party. He then proclaimed the grandson of Tára Bái by the title of Rám Rája, and took measures to promote the influence of that princess, with the intention of turning it to his own use. After these preparations, he summoned the great chiefs to court, that the new arrangements might be confirmed by their recognition. Damají Geikwár did not attend, but Rágují Bosla appeared as an ally, and, after some affected inquiries, acknowledged the succession of Rám Rája. The former concessions to him were confirmed, and he received, in addition, a portion of the lands of the pírti nidhí, which were now confiscated. Various other chiefs received advantages calculated to bind them to the new government; and, among others, Sindia and Holcar received assignments of the whole revenue of Málwa, except a small portion granted to other chiefs.*

The establishment of the péshwa's authority was not effected without some attempts at insurrection, and was endangered by a temporary quarrel between him and his cousin, Sedásheo Bháo; but it was at length so fully completed as to leave Bálají at liberty to engage in the affairs of foreign states.

---

of Rám Rája's descent, and the *bonâ fide* consent of Sáho to the transfer of the sovereignty.

* Of 1,500,000*l.*, which formed the whole revenue, 750,000*l.* was allotted to Holcar, 650,000*l.* to Sindia, and 100,000*l.* to Púar and other chiefs. (*Grant Duff*, vol. ii. p. 40.)

CHAP. III.

He then undertook the cause of Gházi u dín Khán, the eldest son of Asof Jáh, against Salábat Jang, his third son, who was in possession of the family inheritance, after the death of two other competitors cut off during a civil war. He had before transferred his residence to Púna, and he now left Rám Rája at Sattára in perfect freedom, but under the control of Tára Bái. He then marched into the Nizam's territory, and was already in the neighbourhood of Salábat's army, when he received intelligence which obliged him to relinquish his undertaking, and to return by forced marches to his own country. He had no sooner set out on his campaign than Tára Bái, whose ambition and violence were not tamed by age, secretly invited Damají Geikwár to march with his army to Sattára: at the same time she proposed to Rám Rája to assert his sovereignty; and finding the rája averse to her design, she took advantage of the approach of Damají to seize his person and confine him to a a dungeon. She had it still in her power to have made use of her prisoner's name: instead of that, she proclaimed him an impostor, and carried on the government without any ostensible authority but her own.

Marches against Salábat Jang, the son of Asof Jáh.

He is recalled by the insurrection of Tárá Bái and Damají Geikwár.

Notwithstanding the rapidity of the péshwa's return, his officers had already more than once encountered the Geikwár; and the advantage, after some alternations of success, was on their side, when Bálají arrived. But that wily Bramin trusted to other arms than the sword: he procured a

BOOK XII.

meeting with Damají, at which he treacherously made him prisoner; attacked his army, thus deprived of their leader; and, in the end, completely broke up and dispersed his force. Tára Bái, though stripped of military force, and founding no title on the rája's pretensions, had still some inexplicable influence which prevented the péshwa from crushing her. She derived aid at the present moment from the advance of Salábat Jang, who invaded the Maratta dominions in his turn, and was more formidable than any of his predecessors since Aurangzíb, being accompanied by a French subsidiary force of 500 Europeans and 5000 Sepoys under M. Bussy, the most distinguished of the officers of his nation that ever appeared in India. Though Bálají opposed the invasion with all the resources of Maratta war, he soon learned their inefficiency against his new adversary, who repulsed his assaults, beat up his camps, and, before long, established a general impression of his own superiority. By these means the army advanced to within twenty miles of Púna. Bálají probably felt little uneasiness about his infant capital, but was alarmed by the discovery that the invaders were in communication with Tára Bái and the rája of Cólapúr, and made overtures for peace; which were in the course of negotiation, when he was unexpectedly relieved from the presence of his enemies. However superior to all parties in the field, Bussy was dependent on the civil arrangements of the prince with whom he served; and the mismanagement of

Bálají seizes Damají by treachery.

Salábat Jang advances on Púna.

Superiority of the invaders — M. Bussy.

A.D. 1751, Nov.

Bálají is saved by a mutiny of Salábat's army.

CHAP. III.

Salábat and his ministers had embarrassed his finances, thrown his troops into arrears, and brought on such discontents that the army became nearly ungovernable: at the same time Ragují Bosla (who had just obtained the cession of Cattak and the tribute of Bengal formerly mentioned) broke into the Nizám's part of Berar, took the forts of Gáweilghar and Nárnála, and threatened further hostilities. Salábat was therefore well satisfied to make up an armistice, and move back to his own dominions; where new troubles, in which the Marattas were again actors, awaited him at no distant day.

A. D. 1752.

An armistice concluded.

Transactions at Delhí resumed.

The division of India into several states, and the necessity of pursuing their separate histories, make it difficult, at this stage, to preserve the order of time, and have carried us on in the Maratta transactions for several years beyond the date to which those of Delhi have been brought down. These last, however, were for a long time of little importance. On the departure of Asof Jáh for the Deckan (A. D. 1741), his place at court was taken by his son, Gházi u dín, whose political connection with the vizír, Kamr u dín Khán, was strengthened by his being married to the daughter of that minister. Their union enabled them to resist many intrigues and combinations, which were stained with treachery and assassinations, on both sides, beyond the worst epoch of former history.

Rise of the Rohillas.

The only event of importance within that period

BOOK XII.

was the rise of the Rohillas, an Afghán colony which acquired possession of the country east of the Ganges from Oud to the mountains, and made a considerable figure in later times. Their chief was Ali Mohammed, a Hindú convert, adopted by an Afghán officer; and they were themselves mostly composed of Eusofzeis and other tribes of the north-east. Though no long period had elapsed since their appearance as a state, they had already attained to considerable importance; and it required an expedition headed by the emperor to bring them into temporary submission.

The emperor marches against them.

A. D. 1745, A. H. 1158.

But a far more formidable combination of the same people was forming within their native limits; and fresh invasions were prepared for India, by the death of her most dreaded enemy.

Fresh invasions from the side of Persia.

Though Nádir Sháh had not attained to sovereignty without incurring all the varieties of guilt by which that prize must be purchased in the East, and although he had more than once given instances of barbarous severity in his treatment of some offending towns, yet, on the whole, up to the taking of Delhi, he was, perhaps, less sanguinary than the generality of Asiatic monarchs, especially those of Persia. But the scenes of spoil and slaughter to which he was there habituated, together with the intoxication of uninterrupted success, appear to have commenced an alteration in his character which gradually changed him from a rigorous, but not unjust, master, into a cruel and capricious tyrant. These qualities did not at once

Revolutions in that country.

Tyranny of Nádir Sháh.

disclose themselves to their full extent. The first years after his return from India were occupied in the conquest of the kingdoms of Bokhára and Khárizm, which he subdued and evacuated as he had done India; in an attempt to reduce the hill tribe of Lézgi; and in three campaigns against the Turks: but when this war was terminated by a treaty, and the mind of Nádir remained without a vent for its natural energy, it turned its powers against itself, and became the abode of dark suspicions and ungoverned passions. His chief uneasiness arose from the religious prejudices of his countrymen. Though he had endeavoured to render the Sunni religion more acceptable, and to give it something of a national character, by placing its establishment under the special protection of the Imám Jáfir, who was a descendant of Ali, and a favourite saint in Persia, yet he was aware that the people were still zealous Shías, and that the feelings of the sect were turned against him by the priests, whose lands and stipends he had confiscated immediately after his accession. He therefore looked on every Persian as his enemy; but was especially jealous of his eldest son, Rezza Cúli, who, he thought, was the fittest instrument for the purposes of the disaffected. He had been wounded in a forest, on one of his campaigns, by a shot from a secret hand; and although there was no reason to think that the assassin was not one of the enemy, yet he could not divest himself of the belief that he was an emissary of the prince. The working of

His fears of the Shías.

BOOK XII.

He puts out the eyes of his son.

His intolerable cruelties.

His favour to the Afgháns.

these feelings at last led him to put out the eyes of Rezza Cúli; and his remorse, instead of softening his heart, exasperated his fury. He now taunted all who entreated him for mercy with their failure to intercede when his own son was in danger. His conduct became that of an open enemy of his species. His cruelties were equalled by his extortions; and both were accompanied by threats and expressions of hatred against his subjects. These oppressions led to revolts, which drew on fresh enormities: whole cities were depopulated, and towers of heads raised to commemorate their ruin: eyes were torn out; tortures inflicted; and no man could count for a moment on his exemption from death in torments. During the two last years of his life his rage was increased by bodily sickness, until it partook of frenzy, and until his subjects were compelled to lay plots for ridding themselves of a tyrant whose existence was incompatible with their own. In his distrust of his countrymen, he had entertained a body of Uzbek mercenaries; and he had thrown himself, without reserve, on the Afgháns, taking a pleasure in mortifying his old soldiers by a marked preference of their former enemies and his own. He now began to harbour a design for employing these new allies in hostility to his own nation, of whom he lived in constant dread. On the day before his death, while labouring under some presentiment of evil, he leaped on his horse in the midst of his camp, and was on the point of flying from his own army to take refuge in a fortress.

CHAP. III.

When his mind was somewhat calmed, after this act of madness, he sent for the Afghán chiefs, appealed to their fidelity for the preservation of his life, and concluded by instructing them to disperse his Persian guards, and to seize on his principal nobles. These orders were not given so secretly but they came to the ears of those so nearly concerned; and as the night was to pass before their destruction was accomplished, they had time to anticipate it by the assassination of their enemy.

He is assassinated by the Persians.

A number of the conspirators, among whom were the captain of his guard and the chief of his own tribe of Afshár, entered his tent after midnight; and, although they involuntarily drew back when challenged by that deep voice at which they had so often trembled, yet they soon recovered their courage: one of them made a blow at the king with a sabre, and brought him to the ground; he endeavoured to raise himself, and attempted to beg his life; but the conspirators only redoubled their blows until he expired; — "the boast, the terror, and the execration of his country." *

A. D. 1747, June; A. H. 1160 Jamádi u Sani.

* Pere Bazin (*Lettres Edifiantes*, vol. iv.). This Jesuit, who accompanied Nádir Sháh as his physician in the last years of his life, gives the best account of that period. The other authorities for his history are, Sir John Malcolm's "Persia," the "Nádirnámeh" (translated by Sir W. Jones), and Hanway. Hanway gives a different view of the transactions relating to Rezza Cúli, but Bazin's is confirmed by the "Nádirnámeh," which, likewise, gives a lively picture of the tyranny and atrocities of Nádir Sháh. (Livre vi. chap. xix. p. 398. Jones's Works, vol. v.)

BOOK XII.

Retreat of the Afgháns.

On the next morning an attack was made on the Persians by the Afgháns, under the command of Ahmed Khán Abdáli, who was joined by the Uzbeks. It was made in the hope of being still in time to rescue the sháh; but, considering the inferiority of the numbers of the Afgháns, they may be reckoned fortunate in making good their retreat to their own country, near the frontier of which the death of Nádir took place.*

Ahmed Khán Abdáli.

Ahmed Khán was the son of Zemán Khán, the hereditary chief of the Abdális, who headed them on their first conquest of Khorásán. He was descended of the family of Sadduzei, which was looked on with a sort of religious veneration by their tribe; and although only twenty-three years of age, he had been distinguished by the particular notice of Nádir Sháh.†

* An animated description of this unequal contest, and of the valour and good order with which the 4000 Afgháns conducted their retreat, is given by Bazin, who was a spectator of the action, "au milieu des balles et des sabres."

† The person of a Sadduzei was inviolable, and no officer, of whatever rank, could put an Abdáli to death without the authority of a Sadduzei. I have been led to think that the common story of Ahmed's having been a macebearer of Nádir Sháh's originated in the circumstance that the word (chóbdár), which on the west of the Indus belongs to a few of the greatest officers of state (who carry wands or gold sticks), is in India applied to a common macebearer; yet it is not probable that one of those high offices would be conferred on the chief of a foreign tribe. Ahmed's early history is well known. He was a prisoner with the Ghiljeis when Candahár was taken by Nádir Sháh. That conqueror received him with favour, assigned him an honourable maintenance, and sent him to reside in Mázun-

CHAP. III.

He had, therefore, already, the command of his own tribe, which he hastened to confirm; and, extending his influence over the neighbouring tribes and countries, before the end of the year he was formally declared king at Candahár. From some superstitious motive he changed the name of his tribe from Abdáli to Duráni, by which it has been since known.* He modelled his court on that of Nádir Sháh, and assumed all the pretensions of that monarch, but exercised them with the moderation that was required by his circumstances. He was absolute in the plains and cities, as well as in Balkh, Sind, Cashmír, and other conquered provinces; he left the Afghán tribes to their internal government, retaining only power enough to secure their contingents of troops or money, and to preserve tranquillity. Belóchistán, Sístán, and some other places remained under their native chiefs, and owed allegiance and military service. The dissensions of Persia prevented his being disturbed on that side, and enabled him to take possession of most of

Ahmed crowned king at Candahár. Oct. 1747.

Changes the name of Abdális to Duránis.

His skilful management of his unruly subjects.

dérán (*Nádirnámeh*, vol. v. of Jones, p. 274.). His object probably was to keep him at a distance from his tribe as long as the country was unsettled; for it appears, from a contemporary writer, who accompanied the Persian camp, that "Nádir Sháh always kept a watchful eye over him; but the officers of all ranks treated him, in private, with great respect." (*Memoirs of Abdoolkereem*, p. 176.)

* By an unaccountable confusion the least informed Indians often call the Duránis, Ghiljeis; in the north they are also called Khorásánis; but Duráni is the usual as well as the correct appellation.

BOOK XII.

Khorásán; but he saw the difficulties of further progress in that direction, and contented himself with protecting Sháh Rókh, the son of Nádir Sháh, in Meshhed, while his own immediate dependencies were confined to the east of that city. It was to India that he looked for conquest, as well as for pecuniary resources and employment for his army; and his first operations in that kingdom took precedence, in point of time, of the settlement of several of the other countries just mentioned.

His view on India.

His coronation, indeed, was scarcely over, when he began his march for the east, and soon brought all the country up to the Indus under his authority. The circumstances of the Panjáb invited his further advance. The viceroy was in revolt, and had no aid from Delhi, so that he offered but a feeble opposition; and Ahmed, after taking possession of Láhór and other towns on the road, pursued his march to the Satlaj. When he reached that river, he found the fords occupied by the Mogul army, which had been sent from Delhi to oppose him, under Prince Ahmed, the heir apparent, and the vizír, Kamr u dín Khán. Though his force did not exceed 12,000 men *, he saw that his best

He occupies the Panjáb.

He is repulsed by an Indian

* He marched with this number from Candahár; and although it was probably increased before he crossed the Indus, it would necessarily be again reduced by the garrisons in the Panjáb. The "Seir Mutakherín" says he had "*not more than* 67,000 horse;" which would be a greater army than that of Nádir Sháh: but the life of Háfiz Rehmet, translated by Mr. Elliott, gives the more reasonable number of 15,000 men (page 25.).

chance lay in a vigorous use of it; he crossed the river where there was no ford, left the Indians in his rear, and took Sirhind, where their baggage and stores had been deposited. Among other advantages of this success, he got possession of some guns, with which he was before entirely unprovided. His boldness intimidated the enemy, who halted when they approached him, and intrenched their camp. A small body of horse could do little in such circumstances; and although the Mogul vizír was killed by a cannon ball, while at prayers in his tent, yet his army continued to repel the Duranís till the tenth day, when, after a general and desperate attack on the intrenchments, during which a party of them made its way into the midst of the camp, the assailants were totally repulsed and defeated, and compelled to march off homewards during the ensuing night.

army under Prince Ahmed, the heir apparent.

A. D. 1748, March; A. H. 1161, Rabi ul Awal 26.

The Mogul prince forthwith sent a viceroy to the Panjáb; but as he was immediately afterwards recalled to Delhi by the illness of his father, Ahmed Sháh turned back before he had reached the Indus, and did not quit the Panjáb until the new viceroy had engaged to pay a permanent tribute.

Mohammed Sháh expired within a month after the battle of Sirhind, and was succeeded by his son, who bore the same name as his Duráni neighbour. 1748

Death of Mohammed Sháh.

A. D. 1748, April; A. H. 1161, Rabi u Sáni 26.

CHAP. IV.

TO THE EXTINCTION OF THE MOGUL EMPIRE.

Ahmed Sháh.

BOOK XII.

A. D. 1748, A. H. 1161.

Internal arrangements of the new king.

THE return of the Afghán monarch to the Panjáb, combined with his well-known power and activity, kept the new sovereign in a state of continued anxiety, and obliged him to sacrifice a portion of his independence for the sake of such allies as might secure him from foreign conquest. He therefore offered the appointment of vizír to Asof Jáh; and on his declining it (which was soon followed by his death), he invited Násir Jang (who succeeded Asof in the Deckan) to move to his assistance with all the troops he could assemble. But it was not long before he learned that the Duráni king was occupied in the western part of his dominions; in consequence of which intelligence he was enabled to dispense with the aid he had solicited, and was left to make his internal arrangements in the way best suited to his own views. He appointed Safder Jang, the son of Sádat Khán, to be vizír; and as that nobleman retained his vice-royalty of Oud, the first efforts of the imperial government were directed to the suppression of the Rohillas, who had again become formidable in the northern part of that province.

CHAP. IV.

Safder Jang's prospect was favourable, for Ali Mohammed was dead; and he engaged Cáiam Khán Bangash, the Afghán jágírdár of Farokhábád, to conduct the war against his countrymen: but Cáiam Khán, though at first successful, lost his life in battle; and Safder Jang, disappointed in his main object, turned his misfortune to account, by dispossessing the widow of his ally of the greater part of her territory. His ungenerous conduct brought him no advantage: the people of Cáiam Khán's country rose upon his agent, and called in the Rohillas; against whom the vizír was obliged to march in person. He was accompanied by a very numerous army; but so ill disciplined, that they sacked their own town of Bára (so famous as being peopled by descendants of the Prophet), and massacred many of the inhabitants who resisted the outrage. It is not surprising that such an army was routed by a very inferior force. The vizír himself was wounded; the Rohillas proceeded to carry their arms into his country; and, though beaten off from Lucknow and Bélgrám, they penetrated to Allahábád, and set the power of the vizír and the emperor alike at defiance.

Attempts to subdue the Rohillas by Safder Jang, the vizír. A. D. 1748, December; A. H. 1161, Zi Haj.

The vizír marches against them in person, and is defeated. A. D. 1750, A. H. 1163.

Safder Jang saw his embarrassments increasing, while his own power of resisting them was exhausted, and had recourse to the humiliating expedient of calling in the Marattas. He applied to Malhár Ráo Holcar, and Jeiapa Sindia (whom the péshwa had recently sent back into Málwa), and induced them, by the promise of a large sub-

He calls in the Marattas.

BOOK XII.

sidy, to join him with the greater part of their forces. By the same means he obtained a renewal of the services of Súraj Mal, rája of the Játs, who had been his confederate on the former expedition. With these auxiliaries, he defeated the Rohillas in a pitched battle, overran their country, and drove them into the lower branches of Hémaláya, which form their boundary on the north-east. To satisfy the claims of the Marattas, he authorised them to levy their subsidy from the conquered territory, and their ravages reduced it to a state from which it did not recover for years.

A. D. 1751, A. H. 1164.

Who compel the Rohillas to submit.

By the activity of these plunderers the Rohillas were reduced to such difficulties for subsistence, that they submitted to Safder Jang, and were content with the assignment of a few villages for the maintenance of their chiefs.*

Defeat of the Imperial troops in Márwár.

The little advantage which the Mogul government gained by this success was more than compensated by the defeat of the governor of Ajmír, who had interfered in a civil war between two claimants to the principality of Jódpúr.

Second invasion of Ahmed Sháh Duráni.

While the weakness of the Mogul government was thus daily more displayed, intelligence arrived that Ahmed Sháh Duráni had again invaded the Panjáb; and it was soon followed up by accounts of his having obtained complete possession, and by an ambassador demanding a formal cession of the province. The visit of Nádir Sháh was still suf-

* The "Life of Hafiz Rehmet" gives an account more favourable to the success of the Rohillas.

ciently remembered to produce a ready compliance with the demand; and when the vizír arrived at Delhi with his Maratta allies, he found the arrangement concluded. There is no reason to doubt that he would himself have agreed to it if he had been on the spot, or that he would have disregarded it after it was made, if he had thought that he could gain by infringing it; but he had other grounds of dissatisfaction with the court, and he made this cession, which he represented as degrading, the pretext of his complaints. During his absence in Róhilcand, his influence at court had been supplanted by a eunuch named Jawíd, who was favoured both by the emperor and his mother. Safder Jang, finding that his presence did not restore his authority, took a course which had become familiar at Delhi: he invited Jawíd to an entertainment, and had him murdered during the banquet. The emperor was naturally exasperated at this outrage, and he soon got a suitable instrument to avenge him on the vizír. Gházi u dín, the eldest son of Asof Jáh, had remained at Delhi during the first part of the contest between his younger brothers; but, seeing an opening afterwards, he entered into a connection with the péshwa, and set off for the Deckan, accompanied by Holcar and Sindia. He died soon after his arrival at Aurangábád; and his son, a mere youth, whom he had left at Delhi, was promoted, by the vizír's favour, to the title of Gházi u dín, and the high office of commander-in-chief. It was this young man that now guided

Cession of the Panjáb.

Discontent of Safder Jang, the vizír.

He assassinates the emperor's favourite.

Gházi u dín the younger.

BOOK XII.

the operations designed against his benefactor. He was a specimen of such of the Mogul courtiers as were not quite sunk in sloth. Restless and ambitious, as skilful in dissembling his passions as incapable of controlling them, he looked on perfidy and murder as the natural means of attaining his ends, and was as reckless of consequences as regardless of principle.

Resists the vizír.

The result of his measures was a civil war; not determined, as usual, by a battle in the field, but carried on for six months in daily combats in the streets of Delhi. The factious hostility of the parties was embittered by religious fury: the vizír was a Shía, and the test-word of his sect, and that of the Sunnis, became the war-cries of the combatants on each side. At length, the vizír, finding his position becoming weaker, and alarmed at the approach of the Marattas under Malhár Ráo, whom Gházi u dín had called in as an auxiliary, consented to make peace, retaining possession of the provinces of Oud and Allahábád. Gházi u dín, thus relieved, and anxious to employ his Maratta friends, while he revenged himself on a partisan of the vizír, marched out against Suraj Mal, the rája of the Játs, in the siege of whose strong forts, especially Díg and Bhartpúr, he found ample occupation for his army. But the emperor was by this time more disgusted with his arrogant and overbearing temper than he had ever been with Safder Jang; and moved out with what troops he could assemble, on pretence of hunting, but really to profit by the difficulties in

Calls in the Marattas, and expels the vizír.

The emperor plots against Gházi u dín.

CHAP. IV.

which Gházi u dín was entangled. So little judgment was shown in his ill-concerted operations that no step had been taken to secure the co-operation of Safder Jang; and it did not require the acuteness and activity of Gházi u dín to turn the whole scheme against his enemy. Without discontinuing the siege on which he was employed, he sent his Maratta confederate against Ahmed; but when he heard that the emperor was taken prisoner in the battle which followed, he repaired in person to the camp, deposed the captive king, and put out his eyes, as well as those of the queen, his mother. He then fixed on one of the princes of the blood for successor to the throne, and proclaimed him by the title of A'lamgír II.*

Is defeated and deposed.

A. D. 1754, July; A. H. 1167, Shábán.

A'lamgír II.

Safder Jang died soon after this revolution, and Gházi u dín took the office of vizír to himself, leaving Shujá u doula, the son of Safder Jang, in possession of his father's provinces, of which he was unable to dispossess him. A longer period of tranquillity now elapsed than might have been expected from the restless ambition of the new vizír; but his internal government was still as arbitrary as ever. At length he provoked a numerous body of troops to mutiny, and made himself personally so odious, that he was seized by

A. D. 1754, September; A. H. 1167, Zí Haj. Gházi u dín, vizír.

His violent government.

His life in danger in a mutiny.

* The above account is from the "Seir Mutákherín," and Grant Duff's "History of the Marattas."

BOOK XII.

the insurgents and dragged through the streets without his slippers or his turban. Though threatened with instant death, he continued to revile his captors, and to say that they should pay for their insolence with their heads. At length he was rescued by the interposition of the officers; when he instantly ordered a massacre of the whole body, giving up their tents, horses, and property to plunder, so as not to leave a vestige remaining of the corps.

His suspicions of the emperor.

A'lamgír, on pretence of saving the life of Gházi u dín, had offered, while the disturbance was at its height, to pay to the mutineers a considerable sum of arrears, if they would deliver their prisoner into his hands; but the proposal served only to awaken the suspicions of the vizír, who took additional measures to guard against the possible intrigues of his nominal sovereign.

A. D. 1756, A. H. 1170-71. His treacherous seizure of Ahmed Sháh Durání's governor of the Panjáb.

When interrupted by this adventure, Gházi u dín was on his march towards Láhór, and he now continued his progress. Mír Manu, the Mogul governor of the Panjáb, whom Ahmed Sháh had continued in his office after the cession, had died. His son had been appointed his successor by the Durání monarch, but was an infant under the tutelage of his mother. This state of things presented an irresistible temptation to the young vizír: he immediately entered into a most amicable correspondence with the widow, claiming the hand of her daughter, to whom he had really been affianced, and advancing towards Láhór as if to

CHAP. IV.

celebrate the marriage: when he had completely lulled all suspicion, he surprised the town and made the governess prisoner in her bed. While they were conveying her to the camp she broke into invectives against the treachery of her son-in-law, and prophesied the ruin of India, and the slaughter of its inhabitants, as the certain consequence of the vengeance of Ahmed Sháh. Her prediction was but too early accomplished; for Ahmed no sooner heard of the outrage offered to him than he flew to revenge it; and, speedily effecting his march from Candahár, passed through the Panjáb without opposition, and soon presented himself within twenty miles of Delhi. Gházi u dín, having contrived to pacify the widow of Mír Manu and to procure her intercession, repaired at once to the Duráni camp, and received pardon as far as his own person. Ahmed Sháh, however, insisted on pecuniary compensation, and marched on to Delhi to enforce his demand. Nearly all the horrors of Nádir Sháh's invasion were repeated on his arrival; for though not himself cruel like that monarch, he had much less command over his troops; and the city again became a scene of rapine, violence, and murder.

Third invasion of Ahmed Sháh.

He takes Delhi.

Nor were these sufferings confined to the capital; Ahmed Sháh sent a detachment of his army, with Gházi u dín, to levy a contribution from Shujá u doula, and marched, himself, with a similar intention against the Játs. He took a fort called Balamghar after an obstinate resistance, and put the garrison

Massacres and exactions.

BOOK XII.

to the sword; but the action which leaves the deepest stain on his character, or rather on that of his nation, was the massacre at Mattra. This city (one of the most holy among the Hindús) was surprised by a light detachment during the height of a religious festival, and the unoffending votaries were slaughtered with all the indifference that might be expected from a barbarous people, accustomed to serve under Nádir, and equally filled with contempt for Indians and hatred for idolatry. Meanwhile Ahmed himself was advancing towards Agra, to which city, as well as to one of the Ját forts, he laid siege. But by this time the summer was far advanced, and a mortality broke out among the Duránis, who are incapable of bearing heat: he was therefore obliged to be content with the money he had levied, and to direct his course towards his own dominions. Before he went he married a princess of the house of Delhi, and contracted another to his son, afterwards Teimúr Sháh; and having been entreated by the emperor not to leave him at the mercy of the vizír, he appointed Najíb u doula, a Rohilla chief of abilities and of excellent character, to be commander-in-chief at Delhi; in the hope that his own influence, even when at a distance, would render that nobleman a counterpoise to Ghází u dín.*

His return to his own dominions.

A. D. 1757, about June; A. H. 1171, Sháwál.

His arrangements for the protection of A'lamgír II. against Ghází u dín.

Najíb u doula, minister.

* The above account is chiefly from the "Seir Mutákherín:" it agrees, in most respects, with the Afghán accounts; but the latter state that Ahmed Sháh did not leave Delhi, and that the whole expedition to Agra, as well as that to Mattra, was commanded by Sirdár Jehán Khán.

CHAP. IV.

But no sooner had he quitted India, than Gházi u dín once more set him at defiance. He was at Farokhábád when the Afghán king departed, and he immediately gave the appointment of commander-in-chief to Ahmed Khán Bangash, the chief of that place, in supersession of Najíb u doula. But as he was not sufficiently strong to effect another revolution by himself, he called in the aid of the Marattas, who were now in greater power than ever.

Gházi u dín applies for the assistance of the Marattas.

Although Bálají made peace with Salábat Jang (as has been stated) in the beginning of A. D. 1752, it was no obstacle to his entering into fresh intrigues with Gházi u dín *the elder*, the brother and competitor of Salábat. On the arrival of that prince from Delhi, Bálají joined him at Aurangábád with all his forces; and so numerous was the combined army, that even the aid of Bussy might have been insufficient to have saved Salábat Jang, if the danger had not been averted by the sudden death of Gházi u dín. After this Bálají became involved in affairs to the southward, and transactions with the French and English, which will be best related with the history of those nations. But as his government got settled at home, he ventured to release Damají Geikwár, and to avail himself of his assistance in settling the province of Guzerát. He made severe terms, involving payments and reservations which led to many disputes in the end: but at first all went prosperously. Damají set out in company with the péshwa's brother,

Previous transactions of that nation.

BOOK XII.

Ragoba (A. D. 1755), and they soon reduced the whole province to complete subjection and obedience. Ragoba next levied contributions on the Rájpút states, and returned through Málwa to the Deckan. In the end of A. D. 1756 he was again sent into Málwa; and it was to him that the present application was made by young Gházi u dín. Supported by this ally, the vizír advanced on Delhi, occupied the city, and laid siege to the fortified palace, which held out more than a month.

Ragoba, the péshwa's brother, marches to support Gházi u dín the younger.

It was, nevertheless, evident that Najíb u doula could no longer withstand his enemies; and the emperor had already taken the precaution of sending his son, afterwards Sháh A'lam, to a place of safety; the escape of Najíb himself was the principal difficulty remaining, and it was accomplished by means of a bribe to Malhár Ráo Holcar. The emperor then opened his gates and received Gházi u dín as his vizír. Najíb u doula retired to his own country, which was about Seháranpúr to the north of Delhi, and divided from Róhilcand by the Ganges.

Takes Delhi.

Escape of the heir apparent,

and of Najíb u doula.

A. D. 1758, A. H. 1171.

After the taking of Delhi, Ragoba remained encamped near that city, until he was called away to an important and easy conquest. When Ahmed Sháh withdrew from India in the preceding year (A. D. 1757), he left his son Teimúr in charge of the Panjáb, under the guidance of Sirdár Jehán Khán. Their most dangerous opponent was Adína Bég, a man of a turbulent and artful character, who had been deputy to Mír Manu, and whose

Ragoba takes possession of the Panjáb.

CHAP. IV.

intrigues had mainly contributed to the various disturbances and revolutions in the Panjáb. He had fled from the province when it was occupied by Ahmed Sháh, and now returned for the purpose of continuing his factious designs. He first employed his influence with the Síks, who had recovered their strength during the past disorders; but not finding their power sufficient for his purpose, he applied to Ragoba, and pointed out the ease with which he might gain a rich prize for his countrymen. Ragoba marched accordingly, took possession of Láhór in May, 1758, and occupied the whole of the Panjáb, the Duránis retiring across the Indus without attempting a battle. The government was conferred on Adína Bég; and on his death, which happened soon after, a native Maratta was appointed his successor. Before this change, Ragoba had set off for the Deckan, leaving the Panjáb in temporary security, and the Maratta affairs prosperous in other parts of Hindostan. A force had marched from Delhi under Datají Sindia, for the purpose of pursuing Najíb u doula into his retreat; and Najíb, unable to resist, left his country to be plundered, and took post at Sakertál, a defensible ford of the Ganges. He maintained himself with difficulty in this position through the whole of the rainy season: and during this period there was time to mature a combination, to which all the neighbouring princes were called by a common and urgent danger.

A. D. 1758, May; A. H. 1171, Shábán.

A. D. 1759, June to September; A. H. 1172.

The Marattas were already masters of the Pan- Plans of the Marattas

BOOK XII.

for the conquest of Hindostan.

jáb: they had concerted with Gházi u dín a plan for taking possession of Oud; and they talked without the least reserve of their intended conquest of the whole of Hindostan. The apprehensions excited by this state of things induced Shujá u doula to forget his old enmities, and to enter into a league with Najíb u doula and his former opponents the Rohillas, the most considerable of whom was Háfiz Rehmet Khán. As soon as Datta Sindia was apprised of this confederacy he detached Góvind Ráo Bondéla* to invade Rohilcand. So effectually was the order performed that 1300 villages were destroyed in little more than a month, while the Rohillas were obliged to retreat for safety into the mountains. They were relieved from this distress by Shujá u doula. He marched from Lucknow immediately on the invasion, surprised the Marattas, and drove them with heavy loss across the Ganges. Datta Sindia's force was weakened by the losses of his detachment; but he had a stronger motive for desiring peace, in the reported approach of Ahmed Sháh from Cábul: terms were therefore proposed to Shujá u doula and the confederates, and a peace was concluded, which was of no long continuance.†

General combination of the Mahometan princes.

The Marattas invade Rohilcand.

A. D. 1759, November; A. H. 1173, Jamádi ul Awal.

The Afghán king was occupied in the north-western part of his dominions, when his son was

Fourth invasion of Ahmed Sháh.

* A Maratta Bramin, so called from his employment in "Bundélcand," and ancestor of the late chief of Ságar and Calpí.

† Seir Mutákherín, and Grant Duff.

CHAP. IV.

expelled from the Panjáb (A. D. 1758); and, when about to march to recover that country, he was arrested by the revolt of Nasír Khán, the ruler of the Belóches, who made an attempt to establish his entire independence. The operations necessary to place the affairs of that country on a satisfactory footing delayed Ahmed Sháh for a considerable time; after which he moved by the southern road of Shikárpúr to the Indus; and, marching up that river to Pésháwer, he crossed it in the month of September, and advanced into the Panjáb. The Marattas offered no opposition, and he avoided the swollen rivers and exhausted country by keeping near the northern hills, until he crossed the Jamna opposite Seháranpúr. During the sháh's advance, Gházi u dín, mindful of A'lamgír's connection with that monarch and with Najíb u doula, took alarm at the thoughts of his intrigues and his vengeance. He therefore at once gave orders for his assassination, and raised another member of the royal family to the throne. This prince's title was never acknowledged: Sháh A'lam, the heir apparent, was absent on a scheme for getting a footing in Bengal; and the confederate princes carried on their operations without any ostensible head.*

A. D. 1759, September; A. H. 1173, Moharram.

Murder of A'lamgír II. by Gházi u dín.

A. D. 1759, November; A. H. 1173, Rabi u Sáni 8.

At this time the Marattas, though not supported by their allies the Játs, had 30,000 horse of their own in the field; but they were in two bodies at some distance from each other; and the hatred of

The Maratta troops in Hindostan dispersed by Ahmed Sháh.

* Seir Mutákherín. Ahmed Sháh's proceedings are from Afghán accounts.

BOOK XII.

the country people, who were exasperated by their depredations, kept them in ignorance of the movements of the enemy. Ahmed Sháh came suddenly on the body under Dattají Sindia, and so effectually surprised it that the chief and two thirds of the force were cut to pieces before they could escape. The other division under Malhár Ráo Holcar was still at a distance, and commenced its flight towards the country south of the Chambal: it was drawn from the direct line by the temptation of plundering a convoy, and was overtaken and almost destroyed by a Duráni detachment which had made a prodigious march for the purpose.* Long before these reverses, Ragoba had arrived in the Deckan. The glory of his conquests did not reconcile the Maratta court to the financial results which they produced: instead of an ample harvest of plunder, as used to be customary, he had brought home near a million sterling of debt. This unproductive campaign appeared to more disadvantage when contrasted with that in which the péshwa's cousin, Sedásheo Ráo Bháo (best known in India as "the Bháo"), was engaged: he had remained as home minister and commander-in-chief in the Deckan, had just obtained possession of Ahmednagar, and was on the eve of a settlement, afterwards concluded at U'dgír, by which territorial and pecuniary cessions of great extent were obtained from Salábat Jang, and such a burden im-

* Seir Mutákherín. Grant Duff.

posed on the Mogul government in the Deckan as it never was able to recover. This contrast led to jealousy on the part of Ragoba, who, to Sedásheo's remonstrances on the profusion of his expenditure, replied that the Bháo had better undertake the next expedition himself, when he would find the difference between that and serving in the Deckan. Sedásheo took him at his word, and an exchange of duties was forthwith agreed on.

Power of the Marattas at its zenith.

The Maratta power was at this time at its zenith. Their frontier extended on the north to the Indus and Hémaláya, and on the south nearly to the extremity of the peninsula: all the territory within those limits that was not their own paid tribute. The whole of this great power was wielded by one hand: a settlement had been made with Tára Bái, by which the person of the rája was consigned to his nominal minister, and all pretensions of every description were concentrated in the péshwa,*

Their army.

The establishments of the Maratta government had increased with its power. Its force was no longer composed of predatory bands alone; it included an army of well-paid and well-mounted cavalry in the direct service of the state, and 10,000 disciplined infantry, who, though a very imperfect copy of that commanded by Europeans, were far superior to any infantry previously known in India.

The Marattas had now also a train of artillery

* Chiefly Grant Duff.

BOOK XII.

surpassing that of the Moguls, which they had so long regarded with awe and envy. They even endeavoured to assume the pomp which was characteristic of their rivals. Rich dresses, spacious tents, and splendid caparisons became common among them, and their courts and retinues were formed on the Mogul model.

This show of greatness did not seem misplaced in the péshwa and his ministers, who were Concan Bramins, a comely race, prepared by the mildness and gravity of their manners to take up dignity without any appearance of incongruity; but it sat very ill on the little active Marattas, whose sturdy figures and vulgar manners gave a ludicrous effect to their attempts at a stately demeanour.

Great preparations for the conquest in Hindostan.

Whatever the nation possessed either of power or magnificence was brought forth to give weight to Sedásheo Bháo. The news of the misfortunes of Sindia and Holcar were only a fresh stimulus to exertion; and it seemed to be resolved, by one great and decisive effort, to put the finishing stroke to the conquest of Hindostan.*

Arrogance of the commander, Sedásheo Bháo.

The prince thus elevated was naturally haughty and overbearing, proud of the new greatness of his family, and puffed up by recent success into an overweening confidence in his own abilities both as a statesman and a soldier. He was accompanied by Wiswás Ráo, the péshwa's youthful son and heir apparent, and by all the great Bramin and

* Seir Mutákherín. Grant Duff.

Maratta chiefs without exception. Many Rájpút detachments were sent to join him as he advanced, and Súraj Mal is said to have reinforced him with a body of 30,000 Játs.

This experienced old chief, who had long been accustomed to act with the Marattas, took occasion to advise the Bháo to leave his infantry and guns, and all his heavy baggage, in the Ját territory, where it would be protected by strong forts, to advance with his horse alone, to harass his enemies in the Maratta manner, and protract the war until the Duránis, who had already been many months in India, should be constrained by the climate to withdraw to their native mountains. This prudent counsel, though seconded by the Maratta chiefs, was at once rejected by their commander, who looked down on a victory obtained by such means, and who also attached an undue importance to his regular infantry and guns. This was not the only occasion on which he slighted Súraj Mal, whom he treated as a petty zemíndár, incapable of judging of politics on a large scale. He also offended his Maratta chiefs by his Bramin pride, as well as his imperious manner of exercising his command, and the absence of the freedom and familiarity to which they were accustomed in their leaders. In this manner he advanced to Delhi, which was held by a small garrison of Duránis and their partisans, Gházi u dín having taken refuge in the Ját country. The great extent of the city walls enabled a party of Marattas to climb up a neglected bastion,

He takes Delhi.

BOOK XII.

and the citadel yielded to the artillery after attempting a short defence. The Bháo made an injudicious as well as ungenerous use of this conquest. He defaced the palaces, tombs, and shrines, for the sake of the rich ornaments which had been spared by the Persians and Afgháns. He tore down the silver ceiling of the hall of audience, which was coined into seventeen lacs of rupees *, and seized on the throne (no longer so precious as of old), and on all other royal ornaments. He even proposed to proclaim Wiswás Ráo emperor of India, and was only prevailed on to postpone the measure until he should have driven the Duránis across the Indus. All these proceedings alarmed and disgusted Súraj Mal, who was unwilling to go to extremities with his own near neighbours. He soon after entered on a secret consultation with Shujá u doula, and withdrew to his own territory without openly renouncing his alliance with the Marattas. The Bháo affected to treat this defection as a matter beneath his notice.

Ahmed Sháh's negotiation with Shujá u doula.

During this time the sháh was cantoned for the rains at Anúpshehr, on the frontier of Oud, whither he had been drawn by an important negotiation. He was sure of cordial assistance from Najíb and the Rohillas, but the co-operation of Shujá u doula was by no means equally certain. Though that ruler could not declare against the Mahometans,

* 170,000*l.* Cási Raí's Narrative (*Asiatic Researches*, vol. iii. p. 97.). Grant Duff makes the 170,000*l.* include all the plate in the palace.

his interests counselled neutrality, and he had a hereditary disinclination to joining Ahmed Sháh, to whom his father, Safder Jang, had been openly opposed. It was to influence him that the sháh advanced to Anúpshehr; and this movement, with the persuasion of Najíb u doula, who paid him a visit for the purpose, succeeded in procuring his accession to the Mussulman cause.

Who joins the Mahometan confederacy. A. D. 1760, July; A. H. 1173, Zíl Haj.

He nevertheless kept up a constant communication with the Marattas, which might serve to secure an accommodation, if expedient, and was in the mean time a useful channel for overtures between that people and the sháh.*

After this arrangement was concluded, Ahmed was still prevented moving by the violence of the periodical rains; but before that season was well over, he broke up his cantonment, and marched towards Delhi. His movement was accelerated by hearing that the Bháo had set out with a picked force to attack Cúnjpúra, on the Jamna, sixty miles above Delhi, where there was a Duráni garrison, under an officer of distinction. On reaching that river, near the capital, he found it still swollen and rapid: he proceeded up the banks in search of a ford, until he got near Cúnjpúra, where he had the mortification to hear that the place had been taken, and the whole garrison put to the sword. Enraged at this disgrace inflicted almost before his eyes, the sháh passed the river, between fording

Ahmed Sháh marches against Sedásheo Bháo.

His bold passage of the Jamna.

* Cási Rái, the author of the Narrative, was one of the agents in this intercourse.

BOOK XII.

A.D. 1760, Oct. 25. Marattas retire to Pánipat, and intrench their camp. Their numbers.

and swimming; and though he lost many men in this bold undertaking, it made so great an impression on the enemy, that they hastened to remove out of his reach, and soon retired to Pánipat, where they threw up works round their camp, encompassed by a broad and deep ditch, and protected by their numerous artillery. The Bháo's force consisted of 55,000 cavalry in regular pay, with at least 15,000 predatory Maratta horse, and 15,000 infantry, of whom 9000 were disciplined Sepoys, under Ibráhím Khán Gárdi, a Mussulman deserter from the French service. He had 200 guns, with numerous wall pieces, and a great supply of rockets, which is a favourite weapon with the Marattas. These troops, with their numerous followers, made the numbers within his lines amount to 300,000 men.*

Force under Ahmed Sháh.

Ahmed Sháh had about 40,000 Afgháns and Persians, 13,000 Indian horse, and a force of Indian infantry estimated at 38,000, of which the part consisting of Rohilla Afgháns would be very efficient, but the great majority the usual rabble of Indian foot soldiers.† He had, also, about thirty

* Grant Duff agrees with Cási Rái in making the paid horse and infantry 70,000, as above, and estimates the predatory horse and followers at 200,000. Cási Rái states the whole number at 500,000. (*Asiatic Researches*, vol. iii. p. 123.)

† The accounts of the Duránis themselves make the number of the army that crossed the Indus 63,000; but, from a comparison with Nádir Sháh's force, and that of Sháh Zemán, in later times, as well as from the incorrectness of Asiatic muster-rolls, I conceive the amount to be much exaggerated. There

pieces of cannon of different calibres, chiefly belonging to the Indian allies, and a number of wall pieces.

Protracted operations.

The inferiority of the sháh's force making an attack on the enemy's camp impossible, he was obliged to encamp also, and to throw up lines round his army. The occurrence of a general action being thus suspended, the Bháo's prospects were by no means unfavourable. He had ordered Góvind Ráo Bondéla to collect what troops he could on the lower course of the Jamna, and that chief now appeared with 10,000 or 12,000 horse in the rear of the Duráni camp. He kept at a safe distance from the army, but spread over the country in the Maratta manner, so as to intercept all supplies. It is probable that the Bháo employed his own light cavalry in the same manner; for before much time had elapsed, the Mussulman camp began to suffer severely from the scarcity of provisions.

Failure of the Maratta supplies.

But although the Duránis were not accustomed to the desultory warfare used by the Marattas, they made up for their deficiency by the bold and

must also have been a great reduction from garrisons in the Panjáb and other places, casualties in action, and deaths from the climate during the hot season and rains; so that I think 40,000 a sufficient allowance for the Afgháns. The Indian numbers are from Cási Rái: Shuja u Doula had only 2000 horse and the same number of foot. Cási Rái's statement, that the Duránis had forty guns of their own, is quite contrary to their own account and to all probability.

BOOK XII.

rapid movements of their detachments; and on this occasion, a body of their horse under Attái Khán, the grand vizír's nephew, made a march of upwards of sixty miles, surprised Góvind Ráo's camp about daybreak, and completely destroyed his party, Góvind Ráo himself falling in the action. When the Duránis had got the command of the open country, the Bháo soon felt the difficulty of his situation, inclosed in a fortified camp with such a multitude as he commanded.

The Marattas are excellent foragers. Every morning at day-break, long lines of men on small horses and ponies are seen issuing from their camps in all directions, who return before night loaded with fodder for the cattle, with firewood torn down from houses, and grain dug up from the pits, where it had been concealed by the villagers; detachments go to a distance for some days, and collect proportionately larger supplies of the same kind; and cowoys, each of many thousands of oxen, are also brought in from remote countries by banjárras, a sort of camp grain dealers, who partake of the character of the soldiery more than of the mercantile body. All these resources were now cut off; and after the Marattas had entirely eaten up and consumed the town of Pánipat, which was within their lines, they began to feel the severest pressure of want.

While things were tending to this conclusion, neither party was inactive in its efforts to hasten the crisis. Continual skirmishes went on between

the armies: the Marattas made three vigorous attacks on the Duráni lines; convoys were always attempting to make their way into the camp; and though one charged with treasure from Delhi fell into the hands of the Afgháns, others were secretly forwarded by Súraj Mal and the Rájpút chiefs; and as the Bháo bore his difficulties with dignity and resolution, their extent and daily increase were unknown to his enemies. In these circumstances, the Indian allies lost all patience, and wearied Ahmed Sháh with their importunities that he would put an end to their fatigues by a decisive action: but his constant answer was, "This is a matter of war with which you are not acquainted. In other affairs do as you please; but leave this to me." He had a small red tent pitched in front of his intrenchment, to which he repaired every morning in time for prayers at day-break, and where he generally returned to dine in the evening. He was on horseback for the whole day, visiting his posts, and reconnoitring the enemy; and never rode less than fifty or sixty miles a day. At night he placed a picket of 5,000 horse as near as he could to the enemy, while other parties went the rounds of the whole encampment. "He used to say to the Hindostani chiefs, 'Do you sleep; I will take care that no harm befalls you;' and to say the truth, his orders were obeyed like destiny, no man daring to hesitate or delay one moment in executing them."*

* Cási Rái.

BOOK XII.

During this time, the Bháo's embarrassments became daily more urgent; and he made frequent applications to Shujá u doula through Cási Rái (the author of our Narrative) to mediate a peace between him and the Mussulmans. When his proposals were made known to the sháh, he replied that he was only an auxiliary, and had no views of his own; that he claimed the entire control of the war, but left the Hindostáni chiefs to carry on their negotiations as they pleased. The majority of those chiefs were well disposed to an accommodation, which would have been particularly acceptable to Shujá u doula; but Najíb always steadily opposed the overtures, and succeeded in impressing on the rest the ruin to which they would be exposed if the sháh left India while the Maratta power was still entire.

It is not difficult to conceive what must now have been the state of the Maratta host, cooped up amidst the stench of a blockaded camp, among dead and dying animals, surrounded by famished followers, and threatened with the terrible consummation of the evils which they already suffered. Among their last efforts, they sent out a foraging party, with innumerable camp followers, to endeavour to bring in some relief; but the helpless crowd was discovered by the enemy, and slaughtered in prodigious numbers. On this the chiefs and soldiers surrounded the Bháo's tent in a body; they said that they had entirely exhausted the last remains of their provisions, and that it was better to run any risk in the

field than to perish in misery. The Bháo agreed to their wish: they all partook of bitel leaf, and swore to fight to the last; and orders were given to make the attack on the next morning before daybreak.

In this extremity the Bháo wrote to Cási Rái a short note with his own hand: "The cup is now full to the brim, and cannot hold another drop. If any thing can be done, do it, or else answer me plainly at once; hereafter there will be no time for writing or speaking."

Battle of Pánipat.

Cási Rai was communicating this note to Shujá u Doula About three in the morning, when his spies came to report that the Marattas were getting under arms. Shujá immediately repaired to the shah's tent, and desired he might be awakened without delay. The shah soon made his appearance, ready dressed; and, mounting a horse which always stood saddled by his door, he rode towards the enemy, ordering his own troops out as he advanced.

A. D. 1761, January 6; A. H. 1174, Jumádi u Sání.

One of his first steps was to send for Cási Rái, and interrogate him about the source of the intelligence he had communicated. This he did as he was moving forward, until, about a mile from the camp, he met some Durráni horsemen loaded with plunder, who reported that the Marattas had deserted their camp and fled. On hearing this, Ahmed turned to Cási Rái and asked him what he said to that? but while he was yet speaking, the Marattas announced their presence by a gene-

BOOK XII.

ral discharge of their artillery along the whole of their line. "On this the shah, who was sitting upon his horse smoking a Persian kalliân, gave it to his servant, and with great calmness said to the nabob (Shujá), 'Your servant's news is very true I see.'" He then sent orders to hasten the advance of his own army. When objects became discernible, the colours of the Marattas were seen advancing slowly and regularly, with their artillery in front. The shah drew up his army opposite, and, himself, took post at his little red tent, which was now in the rear of the line.

The Mussulmans did not make much use of their [illegible] as those of the Marattas approached, the shot went over the heads of their adversaries. The regular engagement was begun by Ibrahim Khan Gardi, who rode up to the Bhao, respectfully saluted him, and said, "You have often been displeased with me for insisting on regular pay for my men: you shall now see that we have not carried it in vain." He then seized a colour with his own hand, and ordered his battalions to cease firing and charge bayonets. Their attack fell on the Rohillas, whose undisciplined valour only increased their loss, and who were broken after a prodigious slaughter. Their defeat laid open the right of the grand vizir, who commanded the centre of the Durâni line, and who was now charged by the Bhâo and Wiswás Ráo with the flower of the Maratta army. In this charge, Attái Khán, the vizir's nephew, was killed by his side, and his


0029806A

Digitized with financial assistance from

NSDL
Technology, Trust & Reach

on 07 January, 2017